Tag Archives: Rufus Saxton

April 21, 1865: “… making fair contracts in writing with the people to cultivate the land…” in South Carolina

On April 21, 1865, there were several matters competing for Major-General Quincy Gillmore’s attention. The day before Gillmore received word of Major-General William T. Sherman’s truce with General Joseph E. Johnston, which thus governed operations in the Department of the South.  Also arriving was news of Abraham Lincoln’s assassination.  The former prompted adjustments to Gillmore’s active field operations.  The latter prompted General Orders No. 48 informing the command of Lincoln’s death.

Gillmore had many active field operations, the most important of which was Brigadier-General Edward Potter’s expedition.  Potter’s instructions were to march to Georgetown or Charleston, as best accommodated the situation.  Sherman’s latest correspondence put on hold a planned follow-on expedition to Augusta, Georgia.  Instead, Gillmore was content to detail Colonel Henry Chipman’s 102nd USCT to guard the railroad bridge over the Santee River, and serve as an advanced force protecting the area north of Charleston.

Gillmore updated instructions for interacting with the civilian population, given the arrival of news.  Colonel Stewart Woodford, Gillmore’s Chief of Staff, provided those in writing to General John Hatch on April 21 (and thus the third person “he” in the instructions):

[Gillmore] directs that our forces in this department cease all further destruction of public and private property. While you are to execute this order literally, still the major-general commanding directs that you suppress every manifestation of rebellious or disloyal feeling within your command. He has learned, unofficially, that there are some expressions of gratification in Charleston at the cruel murder of our late President, and that you summarily arrested the offending parties. He commends this action and desires you to compel a decent and quiet behavior on the part of all residing within your lines.

But that area north of Charleston – specifically that of Charleston County between the Cooper and Wando Rivers in St. Thomas’ Parish – was of keen interest to Gillmore and Hatch.  St. Thomas’, and in general the area north of Charleston, contained several large plantations and thus now had a large recently emancipated population.  Hatch wrote to Gillmore about this two days earlier asking for instructions to deal with the issues arising:

The immense number of negroes flocking into the city threaten us with a pestilence and them with starvation. No adequate steps are taken by General [Rufus] Saxton for their removal and establishment. He complains of want of transportation. Something should be done without delay. I propose to issue a letter to the planters on Cooper and Wando Rivers–in it to state that slavery being extinguished, all who desire to be loyal citizens and to reside on their plantations will be allowed to do so, making fair contracts in writing with the people to cultivate the lands in shares for this season. Those who do so will be encouraged and protected as far as military necessity will allow. I do not care about taking this step without the approval of the general, but I think if something is not done, and that immediately, we will have starvation among the freedmen.

Saxton was at that time charged with managing resettlement of emancipated slaves onto confiscated lands in accordance with Sherman’s Field Order No. 15, as issued in January of that year. But Saxton faced some serious logistical problems, given the limited amount of shipping and other transportation, moving the former slaves to the designated areas.  Furthermore, Saxton was running out of “40 acres” to provide for all those now free, given the spectacular success of Federal operations.

On April 21, Woodford forwarded Gillmore’s response to the crisis Hatch identified:

I am directed by the major-general commanding to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 19, 1865. He desires me to inform you that the steamer Canonicus, after having returned from Darien, Ga., will be at the disposal of Brevet Major-General Saxton, and sent to him with the least possible delay. I am furthermore directed to inform you that you are authorized to issue a letter to the planters on Cooper and Wando Rivers, north of Charleston City, for the purpose and according to the tenor mentioned in your communication of the 19th instant. You will be careful not to act upon the question of the settlement of the freedmen within the territorial limits prescribed in General Sherman’s Special Field Orders, No. 15, dated headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, in the Field, at Savannah, Ga., January 16, 1865, that matter within these limits having been by this order specially placed under General Saxton’s charge.

Thus, the military policy for the moment, given the lack of direction from Washington on the issue, allowed for two systems.  Saxton’s, operating under Sherman’s “40 acres and a mule” policy, continued for the selected confiscated lands, mostly on barrier islands.  And with Gillmore’s consent, Hatch would allow any planter, who took the oath of allegiance, to offer “fair contracts” to freedmen for their labor.  Woodford elaborated on that second system in a message to Saxton, just to make sure nobody’s toes were stepped on:

The major-general commanding directs me to inform you that he has received a letter from Brigadier-General Hatch, commanding the Northern District of the department, in which he states that he proposes to issue a letter to the planters on the Cooper and Wando Rivers, and to state therein that slavery being extinguished, all who desire to be loyal citizens and to reside on their plantations will be allowed to do so, making fair contracts in writing with the people to cultivate the land on shares this season, and that those who do so will be encouraged and protected so far as military necessity will allow.

Woodford added, for clear delineation, that the lands designated by Gillmore for Hatch’s purview were beyond those designated by Field Orders No. 15.

Certainly these two concurrent policies were not the “end state” that would apply to the question of freedmen and lands.  That would take us into a discussion of the post-war period and bring in the Freedmen’s Bureau.  My point in mentioning these orders issued on April 21, 1865 is to call out what would become a major issue during the Reconstruction period, as it was being evolved as part of a military operation.

Step back a bit further for a moment.  One of the considerations when assessing Reconstruction from the historian’s perspective is the nature of how the policies set forth by leaders – be they Lincoln, Johnson, or Grant – were implemented at the ground level.  We can all point to current events where that same factor holds play.  In the case of Reconstruction, much of that policy, at least for the initial phases, was implemented as part of a military operation.  A fascinating military operation, in context with American military operations since World War II, I would add.  Yet, I sense that in our rush to provide a simple description for the period, while rushing off to things like the Gilded Age, Robber Barons, and the run-up to World War I, that appreciation for the military aspects of Reconstruction is lost.

And with Reconstruction having a military component in play, there must be analysis of what could and could not be accomplished… operationally, in military terms.   You know, some of those “reach and grasp” discussions which often boil down to practical application of arithmetic and logistics.  Yes, there is a military history component… a very important military history component… to reconstruction.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 47, Part III, Serial 100, pages 256, 273, 274.)

March 21, 1865: “Slavery is dead”, “Who owns him?”, “No one” – A “Grand Jubilee for Freedom” in Charleston

On March 20, 1865, and order went out to Lieutenant-Colonel Augustus G. Bennett, commanding the 21st USCT then garrisoning Charleston, South Carolina:

By direction of the colonel commanding the city, you will have your regiment formed in line at 2 p.m. to-morrow to join in the procession of freedom.  Your regiment will have the right, and application is made for 200 colored sailors to have the left of the line.  They will report to you at the green at about 1.30. You will reduce the guards in your district just as much as possible to-morrow, in order that you may turn out as many men as possibly can be spared.

To Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren went the request for “about 200 colored seamen in uniform, with their officers” to report to the Citadel, “for the purpose of joining the procession of freedmen of this city.”

This “procession” labeled a “Jubilee of Freedom” was announced the previous Sunday at the Zion Church, by Colonel Stewart Woodford, commanding the city of Charleston.  Woodford called for those participating to organize at the Citadel’s green, where there was plenty of space. From there the procession would parade downtown.  The procession got underway, despite heavy rains, at around 2 p.m. the afternoon of March 21st. (Ever the sesquicentennialist, I’m timing my post as close to 150 years to the moment at possible.) Leading the procession were several local leaders and military officials, including Major-General Rufus Saxton.

A brief description appeared in the Charleston Courier a few days later:


The New York Times correspondent in Charleston described the parade:

At 2 o’clock, the number of people thus assembled reached four thousand, and shortly after that hour, the colored Marshals, who had previously performed the duty assigned them of arranging the school children into companies, and the trade and other organizations into divisions, took their position in the tine, and everything was ready for the start. First in the procession came two colored Marshals on horseback, each wearing badges, and rosettes of red, white and blue. They were followed by an organization of about fifty butchers, who carried their knives at their sides, and in front of them displayed a good-sized porker. Next in order came the Twenty-first Regiment United States Colored troops, Lieut.-Col. Bennett, commanding, preceded by a band. The regiment turned out in nearly full force, and presented a very fine appearance. The music discoursed by the band was very creditable, and added much to the general effect of the whole proceedings.

Following the USCT were groups of school children carrying banners reading “We know no masters but ourselves” and “We know no cast of color.”  Tradesmen followed, dressed in their work clothes and displaying the tools of their respective trades.  Firemen from ten companies – freedmen who’d manned fire companies through the long war years at Charleston – came “dressed in red shirts, with belts around their waists.”  Then the one part of the parade I find most remarkable:

These were followed by a cart drawn by a mule, and containing an auctioneer, who was standing over two women seated on a block, with their children standing about them. A boy was also in the cart, whose office was to ring a bell with all the energy he possessed. The cart bore the announcement: “A number of negroes for sale;” and as it moved along the auctioneer would appeal to the crowd for a bid, making use of the phrases which are usually heard in a negro auction-room. For instance, the bystanders were repeatedly informed that such a one was an excellent cook, or an expert seamstress, or a valuable field-hand, and that some one of the number had run the price up to an extravagant amount — in Confederate money, of course. Attached to the cart was a long rope, tied to which was a number of men and women. Next was a hearse, bearing a coffin, and having the inscriptions: “Slavery is dead;” “Who owns him?” “No one;” “Sumter dug his grave on the 13th of April, 1861.” The hearse was followed by mourners dressed in deep black.

Clearly the irony of place an circumstance were not lost on the freedmen of Charleston.  The correspondent observed, “Whenever the American flag was passed it was honored with shouts, and the waving of handkerchiefs and caps.”

Can you imagine the emotions pouring out that day?  A southern spring like none preceding.   Emancipation had come to Charleston.  The promise of full civil rights seemed to be hovering on the next breeze.

(Citations, other than those linked above, from OR, Series 47, Part II, Serial 99, page 929.)

Emancipation: The lasting legacy of Sherman’s March

Often when historians offer a “wrap-up” of Sherman’s March to the Sea, there is focus, for good reasons, on this letter to President Abraham Lincoln:


It is the numbers – 150 guns and 25,000 bales of cotton – which often get some play as representative of the damage to the Confederate war effort.  Facts are, however, both numbers are incorrect.   The number of guns captured at Savannah alone was upwards of 160 (a total of over 200 captured in the campaign).  The am0unt of cotton captured reached 38,000 bales.  Not mentioned in the message, but often brought up in relation to the campaign, are the over 200 miles of railroad destroyed and an estimated $100 million in damage (in 1864 dollars).

These numbers are stark figures easily illustrating how Sherman’s campaign did much to topple the Confederacy (not the whole way, of course, as that would come in 1865, but the “teetering” was made acute).   And while I do not downplay the damage done, truth is that most of it was recoverable.  Within weeks, the railroad were running, somewhat.  Telegraph lines between Mobile and Richmond were working.  The cotton lost was value on the docks, and not cash in hand.  So another year’s crop could resolve the shortfall.  Perhaps the only items not “recuperated” were the cannons, as the Confederacy’s ability to manufacture such was limited.  Indeed, Georgia rebuilt… and faster than we often give credit.

However, there is something that changed forever in the wake of Sherman’s March.  If you study the Civil War, you should be acquainted with this map showing the distribution of slaves in the South (and if not, shame on you!).

Looking specifically at Georgia, consider the general route of the march in relation to the density of slave populations:


Notice how the line of march (and I’ve included Liberty and McIntosh Counties here as those were affected for weeks after the fall of Savannah) crosses some of the counties with the densest slave populations.  In 1860, Georgia had over 460,000 slaves, constituting 44% of the state’s population.  Sherman estimated some 20,000 escaped slaves joined his column by the time it reached Savannah. That figure does not count those who, heeding Sherman’s advice, stayed at home.

There were, as mentioned, some problems with the followers.  And certainly such brought to the fore attitudes of some officers, as we consider events at Ebenezer Creek and other crossing points.  But on whole, the burden created by those following the columns was accepted by those in command – often utilized to the favor of military operations.  The pioneer corps formed from the freed blacks should be credited as an important force enabling the Federals to cross the low-country swamps with relative ease.   And the escaped slaves turned expert guides where the maps were lacking.

And let us also not steer away from Sherman’s personal opinion about the free slaves and in general their race.  But no matter how pointed that was, Sherman was an instrument of policy and complied with orders.  The excess animals from the march were turned over to Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton for use in the contraband camps setup on the barrier islands.  The “mule” in the “Forty acres and a mule” often came from those herds.  We can debate the failures of that program at another time.  But for the moment consider that any limited success of the project was also a function of Sherman’s march.

Sherman’s march, regardless of what its leader may or may not have desired, brought emancipation to a large swath of Georgia.  That, unlike the material damage brought by the Federals, could not be rolled back.  It is, I contend, the real lasting legacy of the march.

“Obliged to reduce the fire so as to almost entirely stop it”: End of focused bombardments of Fort Sumter

Warren Ripley, historian and newspaper writer who chronicled the history of the Charleston siege concurrent with the Centennial of the Civil War, considered September 18, 1864 as the last day of the last “minor” bombardment of Fort Sumter.  After that time, as Confederate engineer Captain John Johnson described, “No firing upon the fort but such as may be termed desultory occurred.…”

There are several reasons Federal forces ceased their focused bombardments of Fort Sumter.  Some historians have, with notable bias, the Federals simply “gave up” what was a futile effort to reduce the fort.  That was a factor, but not the major factor.  The Federals had demonstrated through three major bombardments the ability to suppress Fort Sumter’s defenders (for offensive or defensive fires).  But at the same time, through three major bombardments the Federals had also demonstrated a great reluctance to press the matter further – that is to actually occupy Fort Sumter.  Major-General John Foster, just as his predecessor Major-General Quincy Gilmore had assessed, believed the fort could be taken.  Recall the original plan, in July 1863, was to silence Fort Sumter so Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren might rush into the harbor with ironclads. That plan stalled as the Navy considered risks associated with torpedoes and obstructions.  So one might argue the major factor at play with Fort Sumter’s defense was the reluctance of the Federals expend the resources that would “damn torpedoes.”

With Fort Sumter, and Charleston for that matter, being lower on the overall list of Federal objectives, Foster received less resources through the summer of 1864.  In particular, with an active siege underway at Petersburg, Virginia, less ammunition could be spared for Charleston.  On September 19, Foster wrote to Brigadier-General George Ramsay, Chief of Ordnance, to complain:

I have the honor to inclose you extracts from a letter received this day from General Saxton, commanding Northern District, which I forward to you for your information. The representations made by General Saxton are confirmed by my personal observation, and I feel satisfied that the ammunition expended in this department is all turned to the best possible account. My object in calling your attention to this matter is to explain my reasons for making what may appear large requisitions for ordnance stores. We are about out of ammunition for the guns in the front batteries of Morris and Folly Islands, and have been obliged to reduce the fire so as to almost entirely stop it, thereby giving the enemy opportunities of repairing Sumter, which they have taken advantage of with great energy.

Enclosed with the letter, Foster added a statement from Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton, commanding the effort against Charleston, in which he demonstrated what the ammunition shortage meant to the front lines:

The shelling from the enemy’s mortars was severe this morning [September 16?] in our front works, and having but little mortar powder, we were unable to reply effectually. The mortars were very much needed to-day. I regret that our ordnance supplies are so scanty that I cannot make a decent defense of this important post. No powder for the mortars; no suitable fuses for the fire on Charleston; no shells for the 30-pounder Parrotts, a most useful gun for silencing the enemy’s fire; no material for making cartridge bags, or grease for lubricating the projectiles. I shall do all in my power with what I have, but these deficiencies in material, which are of such vital importance to successful operations, I deem it my duty to call your attention to the subject in the hope that they may be soon supplied. More ammunition for the 300-pounder, the most useful guns in these works, is also very much needed.

For perhaps the first time since the Federals landed on Morris Island, they could not dominate the surrounding area with the their heavy artillery.  Not because the Confederates had better weapons, but because they had to husband their fires.

Foster also mentioned the growing importance of long range musket fire in the “skirmishing” against Fort Sumter:

I also inclose you extracts from General Saxton’s letter concerning telescopic rifles. I think there is no place where from ten to fifty of these rifles could be used to better advantage than in the front works of Morris Island. I would respectfully suggest that from ten to fifty of these rifles be sent here.

Foster added a statement from Saxton, mentioning how Confederate sharpshooters delayed employment of the naval battery on Morris Island.

Desultory fires were, from then until February 1865, the extent of Federal efforts.  The war was still out there at the mouth of Charleston Harbor 150 years ago.  Just a lot less noisy than previous months.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, pages 295-6.)


“The Yankees have done no work to-day… because of our sharpshooters”: A real skirmish at Fort Sumter

Most of the time, when I discuss the fighting around Charleston harbor during the Civil War, the actions involved very large caliber artillery – indeed the largest weapons of the war.  I have referred to it as skirmishing with Parrotts, columbiads, and mortars.  But on September 17, 1864, the “skirmishing” involved weapons most often seen on other battlefields – rifled muskets.

Two reports from Captain Thomas Huguenin point to the musketry exchanged between the opposing forces at the mouth of Charleston harbor that day.  The first came that morning:

Enemy keeps up a brisk fire with small-arms in answer to ours.

Then later at 6:40 p.m.:

The Yankees have done no work to-day at Gregg because of our sharpshooters.  Forty-four shots fired to-day at fort (18 missed), mostly from small rifle guns. No casualties.

On the Federal side, Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton reported:

Within the last two days the work on this battery (naval battery) has been greatly interfered with by a corps of sharpshooters which the enemy has stationed on Fort Sumter. The bullets came in very thick when I was at the front this morning.  I hope if there are any telescopic rifles in the department or any can be procured they may be sent to me at once. I think I can use them to great advantage.

Keep in mind the situation here. The heavy guns of Fort Sumter no longer faced Morris Island.  Two three gun batteries were built and partially armed.  But those were setup to fire on the channel and not Morris Island.  The only other artillery in the fort were mountain howitzers for defense against landing parties and the saluting gun.  So the Confederates had nothing at Sumter to contest the construction of new batteries.  And the long range fires from James and Sullivan’s Islands were not sufficiently accurate to seriously interfere with such work.  So the most important weapons in Fort Sumter at that time were small arms.  Recall the range from Fort Sumter to Morris Island was around 1400 to 1500 yards.  Long range indeed for small arms, but within the ballistic limits for such weapons – certainly for those equipped with telescopic sights.

On the Federal side, the biggest problem was a shortage of powder and shells.  One of the reasons for the naval battery was to employ guns for which the department could obtain more projectiles (from the Navy’s stocks).  But to get those XI-inch Dahlgrens in place, the work crews needed a break from those sharpshooters.

Consider the nature of the Federal fires, as reported by Huguenin.  The shells fired that day were mostly light Parrotts – 20-pdr or 30-pdr.  Those weapons were favored to counter Confederate fires.  Imagine them as large caliber “snipers” used by the Federal artillerists.  From many long months of firing on Fort Sumter, the Federal gunners had refined calculations so as to put their rounds on specific parts of the rubble pile – for instance where they’d seen evidence of a Confederate sharpshooter.

But those sharpshooters would often select positions on the flanks of the rubble pile so as to get a good angle against the Federal positions.  For the Parrott gunners firing at them, this posed a “point” target.  Such shots were at the mercy of winds or variations in powder.  That might explain why over a third of the shots missed.

For all the heavy guns at Charleston firing on a daily basis, the siege could and did fall down to a simple exchange of small arms fires.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part I, Serial 65, page 242; Part II, Serial 66, page 296.)

“In case of an alarm…”: Instructions for a Morris Island QRF in the event of Confederate attack

With the draw-down of forces on Morris Island in August 1864, the Federals assigned there assumed somewhat a “garrison” stance, but one in direct contact with Confederate forces.  In spite of living in well established camps, with accompanying liberties, the troops shared picket duties, supported the artillery, and guarded the 600 Confederate prisoners.  With that last assignment, the risk of a Confederate raid, aiming to free those men, was ever present.  So the garrison of Morris Island had to establish plans to react in that event.  On September 15, 1864, Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton issued General Orders No. 56 which outlined the contingency plan:

General instructions for the guidance of this command in case of an alarm:

In case of an alarm at this post, a rocket will be sent up from Fort Shaw and one gun fired from the same place. At this signal the long-roll will be sounded, and the entire command will be formed under arms at once.

Two rockets and two guns from Fort Shaw will be the signal for the command to assemble at the place of rendezvous, which is on the beach, in rear of Fort Shaw, fronting the water.

The regiments will move to the place of rendezvous at double-quick step, and will form in line of battle in the following order:  First, on the right, the Fifty-sixth New York Volunteers; second, the One hundred and twenty-seventh New York Volunteers; third, the Fifty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers; fourth, the Twenty-first U.S. Colored Troops.

The One hundred and twenty-seventh New York Volunteers will act as a reserve and hold Fort Shaw.

The Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Volunteers will join that portion of the regiment guarding the rebel prisoners.

The light battery will form in rear of the line of battle.

Each regimental commander will send an officer to report his command in line to the post commander, who will at once proceed to the place of rendezvous with his staff, to superintend the formation of the line.

At the first signal every officer and enlisted man in this command’, except the sick excused by the surgeon, will turn out under arms, and, if mounted, with his horse.

District staff officers will repair at once to the district headquarters and report to the brigadier-general commanding.

Post staff officers will, in like manner, report to the post commander. All mounted orderlies will report mounted. The quartermaster will see that all his means of transportation by land and water are ready to move at a moment’s notice, and the medical department will have its ambulances and other appliances for the sick in readiness.

The most prompt and thorough compliance with these instructions will be required, and no negligence or failure to respond to the above-mentioned signal call will be overlooked.

Modern day military professionals might compare these instructions to quick-reaction forces (QRF) established at forward bases.  Except that in the modern context, the QRF is a squad or platoon sized element in most occasions.  In 1864, the QRF was portions of four regiments with an artillery battery in support.

The important consideration with these instructions is not that Saxton outlined a strict response to Confederate attack.  Rather he provided a set of steps all men in the command would take if that attack came.  Detailed instructions, such as the line of attack, would follow as any situation warranted.  But at a minimum, the troops would be assembled for movement.  Momentum, you see, is a critical element in the reaction.

But while Saxton’s orders might be cited as a great example of QRF contingency planning, he did violate another consideration for base operations – operational security! Major-General John Foster addressed this on September 19:

I like your General Orders, No. 55, very much in itself, but very much fear that some one of the printed copies will find its way into the enemy’s camp. It should have been strictly confidential, and in such cases it [is] never safe to print. I have known for some time that we have spies among us, who have not as yet been detected, hence the necessity for extreme caution.

Whoops!  So the rebels might well have known the signals and intended actions, and thus adjusted any of their plans accordingly.

Foster went on to ask for similar detailed instructions for the other posts on Morris Island.  But he emphasized the general response over particulars:

The main and vital point in all the latter instructions will be to do the best under all circumstances, but under no circumstances to forget that their imperative duty is to hold their own work beyond peradventure.

Every officer and man in any work of ours who may be surprised or taken will be held in the lowest possible estimation thereafter, and will be condemned for extreme inefficiency or cowardice. These latter orders had better perhaps be given in manuscript.

So tell the men to man their posts with determination – and print that out.  But save the detailed instructions about signals, assemblies, and actions as closely guarded information.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, pages 289-90 and 296-7.)

A shot into Charleston every 15 minutes: Foster’s orders to Morris Island, September 12, 1864

On September 12, 1864, Major-General John Foster issued a lengthy order to Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton, commanding the Northern District (Morris and Folly Islands) of the Department of the South.  These orders began with a set of instructions about ongoing bombardments of Confederate positions, to include the city of Charleston:

I send you a recapitulation of the verbal orders you received when I was at Morris Island, with a few additions. You will cause a shot to be fired into the city of Charleston every fifteen minutes, each one carefully pointed so as not to endanger our prisoners, say at the middle steeple, and elevated and charged so as to range to the upper part of the city. An occasional shot will be fired at Sumter from our batteries on Cumming’s Point. The Swamp Angel will be fired at night in order to prevent the discharge of supply vessels or steamers at Sumter. The other batteries will regulate their fire by the enemy, generally answering all their shots, gun for gun…. The columbiads should be removed from Cole’s Island to Fort Delafield, and the 30-pounder Parrotts from Long Island to Morris or Folly Island. Light guns should be substituted for the columbiads on Cole’s Island and for those taken from Long Island.

Foster continued with detailed instructions to improve the works on Morris Island by repairing the palisading and stockades.  He also changed the steamers assigned to support the Northern District, replacing deep draft ships with those able to “go either outside or inside” the inland passages and shoals.

The second half of these orders focused on how to manage the 600 Confederate prisoners of war on Morris Island:

Your particular attention will be given to the care of the prisoners of war on Morris Island, and the utmost vigilance exercised on the part of the guards.

I desire that detailed orders may be given to every regiment and detachment in your command as to their rallying points and their duties, in case of an attack by a party of the enemy in boats with the design of liberating the rebel prisoners. These detailed orders should be concise and clear, and be thoroughly understood by every officer and man. Very little dependence must be placed upon the firing from Fort Strong on parties of men while on the island; all such must be attended to by infantry and light artillery. The rations of our officers, prisoners of war in Charleston, have been ascertained to be as follows: Fresh meat, three-quarters of a pound, or one,half pound of salt meat; rice, one-fifth pint; one-half pound hard-bread or one-half pint of meal: beans, one-fifth pint. I desire that in rationing the prisoners of war now in your hands you be governed accordingly, making sure that they receive no more than the above except what salt or vinegar may be necessary for them. You may, whenever it is deemed advisable, issue molasses to them in lieu of any of the articles mentioned. Our officers confined in Charleston are obliged to cook their own food, and I desire that the prisoners in our hands be made to do the same, unless you consider it more convenient or safe to do their cooking by soldiers detailed for the purpose. If you conclude to have the prisoners do their own cooking, details must be made from each detachment for the purpose, and the cooking must be done within the limits of the prison camp, and care must be taken to see that the cooking places are thoroughly cleansed after each meal. The printed orders issued by Colonel Gurney for the government of the camp must be modified accordingly.

Foster was determined to match, as closely as possible, the conditions of the Federals in Charleston, right down to the food preparation.  But at the same time, he was concerned for the sanitary conditions in the prison camp.

These orders set the tone and the focus for Foster’s command through the next weeks.  Bombardment of Charleston would continue, even if the bombardment of Fort Sumter and other points slackened.  The “prisoner issue” which started earlier in the summer, now reached a standoff. The “Immortal 600” were in their prison at the front lines.  For the first time, both sides held “hostages” under the guns.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, pages 284-5.)