Dahlgren’s evaluated courses of action

In my military time, the service schools taught the Military Decision Making Process as a standard for developing mission orders.  While overblown and cumbersome for the lower levels of command, at higher echelons, where full staffs were required to formulate plans, the process did come in handy.  A good operations officer would lead the staffContinue reading “Dahlgren’s evaluated courses of action”

Dahlgren’s unease: “Work performed is neither known nor appreciated”

Yesterday’s post concluded that Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, while citing the torpedoes in Charleston harbor, considered the greatest risk to be the loss of a monitor.  That potential risk weighed heavily on both the military and political scales.  However, the admiral faced a dilemma.  His predecessor fell into disfavor due to a failed assault on the sameContinue reading “Dahlgren’s unease: “Work performed is neither known nor appreciated””

“Impediments in the harbor”: Dahlgren takes stock of Confederate defenses

In the middle of October 1863, Major-General Quincy Gillmore and Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren weighed the next moves for their joint forces with respect to their assigned goal of Charleston, South Carolina. The assessments, proposed plans, and evaluations offer insights on points technical, tactical, strategic, and political.  There was also much subtle finger pointing between theContinue reading ““Impediments in the harbor”: Dahlgren takes stock of Confederate defenses”