On June 19, 1863, Captain William W. Folwell and Company I, 50th New York Engineers were among a detachment of engineer troops at the Mouth of the Monocacy. Their original orders had them moving to Nolan’s Ferry with the intention of placing a bridge over the Potomac at that point. They had even conducted a leaders’ reconnaissance of the site to determine the best way of handling equipment out of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal to the river.
But, we know, from the distance of 150 plus years, the Army of the Potomac wasted a lot of paper and telegraph transmissions changing and countermanding orders. The situation was in flux. And as such, a soldier – particularly an engineer with the task of laying a bridge – went through the cycle of hurry up; wait; start; stop; repeat. That, more so than pitched battles, was the experience of the soldier.
The next entry in Folwell’s diary/letters is actually transcribed (in the typewritten version on line) as June 26. I believe that in error, with the correct date being June 20. But thought I would mention that here in case my assertion is incorrect. Regardless, we find Folwell at our favorite spot – Edwards Ferry:
Saturday, June [20], 1863.
Here we are at Edwards Ferry, 12 miles below Monocacy where we lay all day yesterday. It was just dark when the order came for us to get down to this place. No sooner had we started than the rain began pouring in torrents and continued for some hours. About midnight it ceased. We were going all night. Fortunately, there are only three or four locks on the way, which allowed our men to get some rest. Towards morning, I spread my blankets and lay down for a nap and took a very good one.
We still wait orders. Majors [Ira] Spaulding and [Wesley] Brainerd go to Washington this A.M. This leaves [Captain Michael H.] McGrath in command. This grinds me, for I laid Pontoon Bridges before ever McGrath tho’t of getting in to the Regt. I have told the Major what I think, and hope that an arrangement will be made by which I can be relieved. We make the river 1475 feet wide, i.e., 75 bays of Bridge required, 74 boats. We have only 64 along. The Major is writing a dispatch to Gen. Benham stating the case. What a change of base since last Saturday night when we took up the Bridge over the Rappahannock. Of the situation, I know nothing. Have heard no news in several days. I am getting on better than you would think without my baggage and [my] chest. It may be days before I see them. My horse is safe; that is one comfort.
There’s a lot to consider in just two short paragraphs. Let’s break this down in sequence.
Why were the engineers ordered to Edwards Ferry? Or more accurately what drove that change? Well, we can go back to correspondence between Army of the Potomac Chief of Staff Major-General Daniel Butterfield and Twelfth Corps commander Major-General Henry Slocum. That corps arrived in Leesburg on June 18, becoming the anchor for the army’s right flank as it pivoted to face west. On the 19th, Butterfield pressed Slocum for, among other things, an assessment of Potomac crossing points.
Late in the evening, Butterfield asked, “What advantages are to be gained by putting a bridge at Edwards Ferry? Are there any reasons why we cannot cross at Noland’s and Hauling Fords?” To which Slocum replied, as if to deflect the subject:
I think the bridge should be built at Edwards Ferry to supply us. I have not force enough to keep the route to Vienna, or to hold many fords on the river in the country filled with guerrillas. Edwards Ferry is most accessible, and is covered by a strong redoubt on this side. Our supplies should be sent from Georgetown, by canal, to Edwards Ferry.
The dialog is important to the storyline. Not only does this answer the why and what, but gives a glimpse into the situation as understood by the participants at the command level. As I’ve tread over the commander’s intent at this stage of the campaign in earlier posts, let us focus for now on the intent for the bridges. Up until at least midnight on the 19th, Butterfield (and by extension Major-General Joseph Hooker in command of the army) was focused on a bridge to move troops. But Slocum wanted a bridge to shorten, protect his supply line. Slocum’s reasoning won out by dawn of June 20. And that, I would submit, tells us a bit about what Hooker had decided was the main course of action he should pursue at that point in time. In other words – on June 20, the intent was to stay in front of Washington and anticipate battle in Loudoun. Of course, that would change in a few days.
Moving beyond commander’s intent, we see again the heavens opened and the rain came down in buckets. I contend that when the Army of the Potomac marched, the weather was always either too hot, or too wet, or a lot of both. In this particular case, the rains would also have the effect of swelling the Potomac which the engineers would shortly need to bridge.
And to that point, the estimate was 1475 feet, with the particular equipment needed detailed by Folwell. So let’s back up to June 16 and a report from Brigadier-General G. K. Warren. While listing the various potential crossing points of the Potomac, assessed for ease of access, capacity, and river width, Warren wrote:
Conrad’s Ferry, near Leesburg, is a good place for a pontoon bridge, requiring 600 feet. Above Edwards Ferry we can make a pontoon bridge, requiring about 700 feet. There is here at least an outlet lock from the canal into the river; also a bridge over the canal.
Conrad’s Ferry is today’s White’s Ferry, and crosses upstream of Harrison’s Island and Balls Bluff. And readers should be familiar with Edwards Ferry’s location in relation to Leesburg. If not, here’s the map again:
But 600 and 700 feet, respectively? No. Not even in the middle of a hot, dry summer (which 1863 was not). Today, the river at Conrad’s/White’s Ferry is 975 feet wide, based on my field notes. Standing upstream from Goose Creek, the width at Edwards Ferry is 1,260 feet… again today, 150 plus years after the war. Clearly Warren did not visit these sites in person… or if he did, his manner of estimating distance was faulty. And this error by Warren would cost the engineers, and by extension the Army of the Potomac, valuable hours. (Warren, I would offer, was much better at calling for reinforcements to beleaguered sectors of the battlefield than making proper engineering assessments… after all, what does a Chief Engineer get paid for?)
Let us give some allowances here for the river being up due to the rains that Folwell mentioned. But more importantly, Folwell and team had to add some length to the bridging as they accounted for abutments and other needs – raw crossing distance vs. actual feet of bridging needed. Still, Warren’s assessment was horribly wrong. The impact? The engineers at Edwards Ferry did not have sufficient equipment to do their job. This became a problem for Spaulding, Brainerd, and… at the top of this all… Benham.
So the estimates were wrong. Just order up some more pontoons, right? Well in the first place, Benham was busy refitting, repairing pontoons which had just been used opposite Fredericksburg and at other points in the march north. Furthermore, we have to consider those pontoons as a strategic resource, to be husbanded by Hooker and even further up by Halleck and Lincoln in Washington.
Thus we see a curious exchange of messages between the engineers and headquarters. At 5:20 p.m. Butterfield ordered the engineers to lay a bridge at Edwards Ferry, along with a bridge over Goose Creek. Responding at 7:20, Captain Charles Turnbull indicated he didn’t have enough pontoons, but would start the work anticipating more equipment from Washington. But at 9:20, Butterfield inquired about the river widths at other points, adding, “If 1,400 feet, general [Hooker] does not want bridge laid at Edwards Ferry.”
My take on all this – Hooker had a card to play with these pontoons. He was informed by his top engineer that 1400 feet would give him TWO crossing points. But when it came time to play the card, he is informed the pontoons would not cover even ONE crossing point! Granted, the army could get more pontoons. But that translated into a little “rob Peter to pay Paul” when Hooker’s staff started projecting towards future operations. Hooker would “pay” for that bridge, but it strained resource more than anticipated.
All of which impacted Folwell’s work. In addition to the bridging, we see he was concerned about command arrangements. I don’t have much on McGrath. He mustered as a first lieutenant in Company F in July 1862. Then was advanced to captain in October of the same year (though his rank was only advanced on December 26, 1862, back-dated to October). He replaced Spaulding in command of Company F. So there would be some natural inclination from Spaulding toward his former command, perhaps. But date of rank was more likely the justification. Folwell’s data of rank, to captain, was December 11, 1862. In the military, with respect to command assignments, date of rank carries more weight than experience.
However, I find much of Folwell’s concern a minor issue, no matter how much it did “grind” him. The man in charge of the bridging was Turnbull. He “commanded” the engineers at Edwards Ferry on the evening of June 20. And it was Turnbull who would give instructions to Folwell. So as the afternoon turned to dusk and then to night, Folwell’s orders involved placing a bridge at Edwards Ferry. That’s where we will turn next in this series.
(Citations from William Watts Fowell, Civil War Diary, unpublished, transcription retrieved from University of Minnesota Library, pages 412-13 (pages 418-9 of scanned copy); OR, Series I, Volume 27, Part III, Serial 45, pages 149, 208-9, and 229.)
