“I have up to the present time received over 3,000 of our men”: Prisoner exchanges in November 1864 upriver from Fort Pulaski

One of the long standing myths associated with the Civil War is that Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant stopped exchanges mid-way through the war.  This normally offered as a blanket statement.  And the lack of exchanges is then cited as causing the swelling prison population.  As I’ve discussed at length during the sesquicentennial, the Federals curtailed exchanges mostly due to the Confederates not affording POW status to captured US Colored Troops.  Such was a policy Grant inherited as commander, and one he stuck to.  But to say there were no exchanges is not a true statement.  The exchange of fifty senior officers at Charleston is one example.  Generals Sherman and Hood exchanged prisoners at the close of the Atlanta Campaign.  There were also non-combatant and smaller exchanges that took place during the summer and fall of 1864.

Well into the fall, efforts by both sides were thawing the cold stance made by both sides in regard to prisoners. Lieutenant-Colonel John E. Mulford (Federal) and Judge Robert Ould (Confederate) opened a dialog that led to an exchange of supplies to reduce the suffering of prisoners.  The particulars are too lengthy to replete here, but included the trade of cotton in order to secure blankets for Confederate prisoners.  Shortly after that agreement, an idea floated by several authorities finally took hold – an exchange of invalid prisoners.

LTC (later COL and BG) John E. Mulford

On October 31, Mulford received a very lengthy order from Major-General Benjamin Butler, assigning the task of overseeing just such an exchange:

Having, in obedience to orders by telegraph, received on board the fleet of vessels which Colonel Webster, chief quartermaster, has been ordered to place at your disposal all invalid Confederate prisoners of war, as certified to me by Colonel Hoffman, in the Eastern camps held by us, you will proceed to Fort Pulaski with your prisoners and there tender them for exchange according to the agreement made between the commissioner of exchange on the part of the United States and the agent of exchange for the Confederate authorities, and there receive on board all the prisoners belonging to the United States which shall be given you by the Confederate authorities. You will also inform the Confederate authorities that there are from 2,500 to 3,000 invalid prisoners within the agreement ready for delivery on the Mississippi River as soon as the point shall be designated. These are in the Western camps. As this matter of the exchange of prisoners is managed in behalf of the military authorities of the Confederates through the agent of exchange and the commissioner of exchange on the part of this Government, you will take no directions upon the subject except from the commissioner of exchange or the Secretary of War. This direction is given you because, as your business at Fort Pulaski will bring you within the department of General Foster, it is desirable to save all possible conflict of authority.

The orders went on for several pages to detail logistical and administrative matters that needed attention. But the gist of this was simple – Mulford would proceed to Hilton Head, where he would coordinate an exchange of prisoners at a point up river from Fort Pulaski.  Mulford departed on November 6.  And on November 11, Major-General John Foster gave notice to Lieutenant-General William Hardee:

I have the honor to inform you that several large steamers, bearing between 3,000 and 4,000 sick and wounded Confederate soldiers, have arrived in this harbor. Others are to follow, bringing, in all, 10,000 men.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mulfold, agent for exchange, is here and is prepared to enter upon an exchange of these prisoners for our own sick and wounded in your hands at once. He will ascend the Savannah River to-day, and meeting your flag-of-truce boat will make proper arrangements with Colonel Ould, or such agent of exchange as may be designated, to facilitate the exchange.

On the Confederate side, prisoners shifted from Andersonville to Camp Lawton, outside Millen, Georgia to facilitate this exchange.  There was even some rumor among the Immortal 600 that they would also be exchanged during the process.

The exchanges began on or about November 15 and continued through out the remainder of the month.  The place of exchange was a point on the Savannah River just above Fort Pulaski named Venus Point (location of a battery used to isolate Fort Pulaski in 1862). But there was some delay due to the method by which the two sides conducted truces in the Department of the South, as Mulford related in a report to Butler on November 21:

I have the honor to inform you that I have up to the present time received over 3,000 of our men. Their physical condition is rather better than I expected, but their personal is worse than anything I have ever seen–filth and rags. It is a great labor to cleanse and clothe them, but I am fairly at work and will progress as rapidly as possible. I have much to say, but have little time for writing now. I have got off two vessels to-day and will try and get off two to-morrow, and so on. Matters have been rather queerly managed here in the mode of conducting truce business. I have nothing whatever to do with the old matters, or the business of this department.

By the second of December, Federal troops had overrun Millen (finding the prisoners evacuated). And the siege of Savannah eventually put an end to the exchanges there.  On December 7, Mulford reported he had coordinated to move the exchanges to Charleston.  Though Mulford did not provide a total number of men exchanged at Venus Point, the last figure offered on November 29 was 4,000.

One of those 4,000 was a Private W.D. Baker of the 48th Alabama.

Page 11

Here’s a close up of the paragraph at the bottom:

WDBakerPage 11

Baker was among 3,023 Confederate soldiers exchanged for at least 4,000 Federals there.  You might recall my interest in Baker is from a home town connection.  Prior to looking into Baker’s military records, I had but a passing notation about the prisoner exchanges at Venus Point, relating to some of the lesser known activity associated with Fort Pulaski.  I’d probably not even rated it worth a blog post.  And likely none of you would be reading of the 150th anniversary of those exchanges.  Funny, the trails research can take us.

(Citations from OR, Series II, Volume 7, Serial 120, pages 1070, 1120, and 1149.)


“In anticipation of the crossing of the James…”: Engineers begin preparing for Grant’s move 150 years ago

In the evening of June 11, Lieutenant-General U.S. Grant sent a dispatch to Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the Army of the James on the south side of the James River.  In part, that message read:

The movement to transfer [the Army of the Potomac] to the south side of the Jame River will commence after dark to-morrow night.  Colonel Comstock, of my staff, was sent specifically to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval … and also to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing…. Colonel Comstock has not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish….

Grant went on to detail the proposed movements, starting with the Eighteenth Corps to move its infantry by boat.   That corps trains and the balance of the army to march across the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and thence across the James.  Grant had already issued orders to Major-General George Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac.  And Meade already had orders ready for the corps to move.  Keep in mind the intricacy and sensitivity of this move – the Army of the Potomac was to disengage on an active front, march dozens of miles across unsecured ground, cross a major river, and then reform south of the James preparing to give battle.  And all that with the trains trailing along.  A long haul:


But, as Grant indicated, on June 11 there was no point fixed where the bulk of the Army of the Potomac would cross the James.  Details to be worked out, as he instructed Butler:

I wish you to direct the proper staff officers, your chief engineer and chief quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival.  If there is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid.

Brigadier-General Godfrey Weitzel was the Chief Engineer of the Army of the James.  Weitzel had just completed a survey of the defenses along the James in the Bermuda Hundred sector, but now shifted his attention to facilitate the planned movement:

June 12, in anticipation of the crossing of the James River by the Army of the Potomac, I sent Lieutenant Michie, U.S. Engineers, to examine the river in the vicinity of Fort Powhatan to get all information on the subject. He reported the width of the river at the three points (A, B, C) to be, respectively, 1,250 feet, 1,570 feet, 1,992 feet; that the two approaches on the east bank at A would be from an old field across a marsh 1,000 yards wide; at B over a marsh about 800 yards wide; from these a spit of sand and gravel bordering the river from the bridgehead, averaging about forty feet wide and easily made into a good roadway sufficient for the passage of two columns of troops.

Lieutenant Peter Michie is no stranger to readers.  The previous summer he supervised construction of the Left Batteries on Morris Island.  Major-General Quincy Gillmore brought Michie north with the Tenth Corps.  (A good selection if I may add.)  The map below demonstrates the four possible crossing points surveyed by Michie and mentioned by Weitzel:


Weitzel went on to describe other preparations to support the crossing:

On the west bank the approaches to the two first were already prepared, leading by gradual ascent to the bluff on which Fort Powhatan is situated. It would require, to make approaches to the third, the clearing away of trees, making a ramp of one-third leading to the field above, the filling up of ruts and gullies and making a roadway to the Petersburg and City Point road. In consequence of these facts, I telegraphed to Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock, senior aide to General Grant, that if the passage was to be made here I would only require, at the farthest, previous notice of thirty-six hours to have the approaches for the bridge ready.

Grant had a crossing point.

Now came the difficult work – getting the army to the crossing point, laying pontoons at the crossing point, building and improving wharves, and improving the road networks.  150 years ago this day, the Federal engineers were coming to the fore… again.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 36, Part III, pages 754-5; Volume 40, Part I, page 676.)


“Boyle would have been hung”: The scapegoat for Butler’s failed raid

Yes, the Battle of Morton’s Ford was a diversion … poorly conceived diversion at that.  A diversion from what?

In late January and early February 1864, Major-General Benjamin Butler, commanding the Army of the James on the Virginia Peninsula, gained information that the Confederate garrison of Richmond was weakened to support operations in North Carolina.  And at the same time, Butler learned of Confederate plans to move prisoners of war from Richmond to Andersonville.  So sensing an opportunity, and identifying a waning opportunity, Butler proposed a raid on Richmond.  Butler convinced officials in Washington this was practical, and secured support.  And that support included a demonstration by the Army of the Potomac, which as we’ve seen resulted in fighting at Morton’s Ford.

But, for all practical purposes, this raid never stepped off.  A deserter from the Federal ranks had tipped off the Confederates as to Butler’s intention.  When Brigadier-General Isaac Wistar arrived at Bottom’s Bridge on the early morning of February 7, he found a large force of Confederates commanded by Brigadier-General Eppa Hunton.  So for all practical purposes, the entire operation failed right there.   For everything done at Morton’s Ford, good or bad, there was no net gain.  All was for naught.

On the morning February 8, Butler reported the failure to Washington.  Butler needed a scapegoat, and he was quick to lay blame.  The telegram sent, addressed directly to President Abraham Lincoln, read:

After much preparation I made a raid on Richmond to release our prisoners there. Everything worked precisely as I expected. The troops reached Bottom’s Bridge, 10 miles from Richmond, at 2.30 o’clock on Sunday morning, but we found a force of the enemy posted there to meet us, evidently informed of our intention, none having been there before for two months. They had destroyed the bridge and fallen trees across the road to prevent the passing of the cavalry. Finding the enemy were informed and prepared, we were obliged to retire. The flag-of-truce boat came down from Richmond to-day, bringing a copy of the Examiner, in which it is said that they were prepared for us from information received from a Yankee deserter. Who that deserter was that gave the information you will see by a dispatch just received by me from General Wistar. I send it to you that you may see how your clemency has been misplaced. I desire that you will revoke your order suspending executions in this department. Please answer by telegraph.

The report from Wister, mentioned in the telegram, read (emphasis mine):

Major-General Butler:
Private William Boyle, New York Mounted Rifles, under sentence of death for murder of Lieutenant Disosway, was allowed to escape by Private Abraham, of One hundred and thirty-ninth New York, the sentinel over him, four days previous to my movement. It is said he also told him that large numbers of cavalry and infantry were concentrated here to take Richmond. During my absence the commander here has learned that Boyle reached Richmond, and was arrested and placed in Castle Thunder. Boyle would have been hung long ago but for the President’s order suspending till further orders the execution of capital sentences. Abrams is in close custody. Charges against him went forward a week ago.
I. J. Wistar,

Words from William Boyle unraveled Butler’s plan.  And Butler laid out the chain of events that led up to the debacle, attempting to shift blame.  If only Private Abraham had been more attentive to his responsibilities guarding Boyle.  If only Lincoln had allowed these executions.  If.. If… If.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 33, Serial 60, page 144.)

150 years ago: An objection to the use of USCT troops in Virginia

Francis H. Pierpont is most remembered as the “Father of West Virginia.”  Lesser known is his role as the Governor of “restored” Virginia.  After West Virginia was admitted as a state in June 1863, Arthur I. Boreman became the state’s first governor. But Pierpont remained governor of the areas of Virginia, outside of West Virginia, under Federal control.  That area included parts of Northern Virginia (where the provisional capital was in Alexandria), Hampton Roads, Norfolk, and the Eastern Shore counties on the DelMarVa peninsula. Around this time 150 years ago, Pierpont raised an issue with the way Major-General Benjamin Butler had garrisoned those Eastern Shore counties (the Virginia counties were placed in his jurisdiction, and administered separately from the Maryland Eastern Shore for this time).  Pierpont raised those issues in a letter to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on January 27, 1864:

Hon. E. M. Stanton,  Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.:

SIR: It is with deep regret that I feel compelled in the discharge of my official duty, however humble, to call your attention to the occupation of Accomack and Northampton Counties with colored troops to act as a provost guard. I am informed that 600 colored troops are sent to those counties, I suppose to take the place of the white troops there. Two companies of white troops is a large estimate for those counties, and from the number of those sent, I suppose, as a matter of course, the white ones will be removed.

Discipline is the first requisite for troops of any color, but from my observation veteran troops soon lose their discipline when placed on a roving service such as required in those counties, and none but soldiers of the best habits should be placed on that duty. These colored troops are new recruits just from bondage. Their own welfare requires discipline, hence their place is in the field or fortification where they can be under the eye of their officers.

This disposition of troops will have a bad effect on the white soldier in the field. Evil-disposed persons will circulate the news through the army that colored troops are sent back for guard duty, where there is no danger, while the white man is sent into the front of the battle. Pardon these suggestions.

But the great objection is the positive insolence of these colored soldiers, undisciplined as they are, to the white citizen. It is at the risk of the life of the citizen that we make any complaint of their bad conduct. I know you would not leave your wife and daughters in a community of armed negroes, undisciplined and just liberated from bondage, with no other armed protection. My information is that it is a terrible stroke to the Union cause in that section. Union men are justly frightened for the safety of their families. The citizens there are disarmed. I am happy to say the Union cause was growing daily in those counties.

The Legislature of the State has ordered a State convention to abolish slavery in the State. The delegates are all elected, and I have not heard of a single man being elected who is not in favor of abolishing slavery. The people in Accomack and Northampton will lose from 6,000 to 8,000 slaves, but still they bear it–must bear it. A number of slave-holders are with us, and the Union cause growing. Is it right now to torture both parties with the terrible apprehensions that must haunt them by the presence of these troops, when all reflecting men must doubt the propriety of it, looking alone to the good of the soldier, the service, and the policy in reference to the white soldiers? The same state of affairs exists at Portsmouth.

It is painful to me to raise these questions, but I am sure the honor of your administration requires the correction of abuses where they exist. I am satisfied these things are not done by your orders.
I am, yours, &c.
F. H. Peirpoint [sic].

There are so many different threads to follow here.  Not the least of which is the presence of USCT units in an area where slaves were still held.  The sound of a record needle scratching the vinyl should be going through your head in that last paragraph.

But as I like to focus on the Emancipation Proclamation as an executive order with a decided focus on military operation and policy, let me take up that line.  The troops mentioned were the 10th USCT.  Lieutenant-Colonel Edward H. Powell, commanding the regiment, reported arriving and relieving parts of the First Maryland (Eastern Shore) on January 21, 1864.  When Butler sent Powell to the Virginia Eastern Shore, he provided instructions which read in part:

The officer in command of the Tenth U.S. Colored will caution all his officers that there must be the strictest diligence and vigilance that no outrages of any sort are committed by his troops, for both he and his officers will be held personally responsible by me if any such are committed. The inhabitants there fear greatly the quartering of negro troops in their midst. I depend upon him and the good conduct of his troops to correct that misapprehension, for I assure both him and them that the most summary punishment will be visited upon them for any breach of discipline, especially any that shall affect peaceable men. The commanding officer will immediately take measures to recruit his regiment to the fullest extent. He will give receipts to all loyal men who have taken the oath prescribed by the President’s proclamation for any slave which may be recruited. He will report to me immediately any deficiency in his officers, incompetency, or any vacancy that may exist, that the one may be taken notice of and the other filled….

Clearly Butler was aware of the issues later raised by Pierpont.  In fact, he addressed such in a letter to Elizabeth Upshur, a resident of Northampton County, on January 10, responding to her inquiry about rumors concerning a USCT garrison:

 If I could believe for a moment any of the consequences would follow which you detail it certainly should not be done. Experience, however, has shown that colored troops properly officered are less aggressive than white ones in the places where they are quartered, from the fact that they have been accustomed from their childhood to give up their will to the will of those who are over them.

Butler spent a paragraph assuaging her fears and dismissing reports of poor conduct by the regiments in North Carolina.  He concluded the letter, “Therefore calm your fears.  I will hold myself responsible that no outrage shall be committed against any peaceful citizens.

Again, looking at this as a military extension of the Emancipation Proclamation, consider the twist.  In a county that was except from militarily enforced abolition, emancipated slaves, which were formed into a regiment authorized by the Proclamation, were ordered to perform garrison details.  There was still significant reluctance, despite the performance of USCT regiments in the summer of 1863, to place those regiments on the front lines in the major field armies.  And as noted above, there was reluctance to have the USCT perform garrison duties in some areas to relieve white soldiers.  At some point, due to weight of numbers if nothing else, the USCT would have to be used for something.

Considering Butler’s remark about the “properly officered” USCTs, I am reminded of similar conclusions from Morris Island in September.  That’s where the “military thread” leads in this case.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 33, Serial 60, pages 371, 375, 432-3.)

150 Years Ago: The turning of the leaves and changes of command

After the Confederate campaigns into Maryland and Kentucky petered out in the fall of 1862, there were several changes in the lineup of Federal field commanders. I suspect most readers are familiar with the relief of George McClellan, replaced by Ambrose Burnside, which occurred this week 150 years ago. At the end of last month, I wrote about William Rosecrans moving to command the “new” Department of the Cumberland which was really the “old” Army of the Ohio.

But there was another change of command queued up for the fall of 1862, and it also occurred, on paper at least, during the early days of November:

Washington, November 8, 1862.
By direction of the President of the United States Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks is assigned to the command of the Department of the Gulf, including the State of Texas.

By order of the Secretary of War:
Assistant Adjutant-General.

And with General Banks then in charge of the Department of the Gulf, who was on the outs?

More explicit orders came the next day from General Henry Halleck:

… The President of the United States having assigned you to command of the Department of the Gulf, you will immediately proceed with the troops assembling in transports at Fort Monroe to New Orleans and relieve Major-General Butler….

McClellan, Buell, and Butler…. all going on the bench. Burnside, Rosecrans, and Banks now taking the field. And meanwhile some fellow named John McClernand was traveling west with these orders in hand:

Washington City, October 21, 1862.
Ordered, That Major-General McClernand be, and he is, directed to proceed to the States of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those States and to be raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be designated by the general-in-chief, to the end that, when a sufficient force not required by the operations of General Grant’s command shall be raised, an expedition may be organized under General McClernand’s command against Vicksburg and to clear the Mississippi River and open navigation to New Orleans.
The forces so organized will remain subject to the designation of the general-in-chief, and be employed according to such exigencies as the service in his judgment may require.

Secretary of War.

On the outside, it appeared that even General U.S. Grant was also vulnerable (although through the lens of history we know better).

Were all these changes an indication of failures in the field by these generals? Or was it a change in direction, emanating from the chief strategist in the White House? Or a little of both?

(Citations above from OR, Series I, Volume 15, Serial 21, page 590 and Series I, Volume 17, Serial 25, page 282.)