Summary Statement, 3rd Quarter, 1863 – 1st Regiment, US Regulars

In our journey through the Summary Statements, we’ve arrived at the third quarter of 1863.  Readers well know the chronology of events for July, August, and September.  In some theaters, particularly the Eastern Theater and Trans-Mississippi, armies awaited the signal to resume campaigns.  In places such as Northern Georgia and the South Carolina coast, hard campaigning proceeded.  So we have the task of projecting the data into that time line, looking to correlate reports about cannon and shells to the actions.

For the quarter, there are a few changes to column headers.  Clearly the clerks in the Ordnance Department were adjusting to new “paradigms” with respect to ammunition usage.  But, ever watchful of the government’s expenditures, they opted to modify existing forms.

First in our queue is the 1st US Artillery and their twelve batteries:

0233_1_Snip_1stUS

Of those twelve, ten provided returns.  We see their service spanned from Louisiana, to the Carolina coastline, to Virginia:

  • Battery A – Reporting at New Orleans, Louisiana with two (down from four) 12-pdr Napoleons and two 3-inch rifles.  Captain Edmund C. Bainbridge remained in command of this battery, and also served as division artillery chief.  Battery was assigned to First Division, Nineteenth Corps. Bainbridge, who was actually a 5th Artillery officer, was reassigned to duty in Tennessee in October.
  • Battery B – Reported on Morris Island, South Carolina with four 12-pdr field howitzers, and adding two 3-inch rifles.  Battery B was assigned to Tenth Corps, Department of the South.  By late September, the battery had moved to Folly Island.  Lieutenant Guy V. Henry held command of this battery.  But after a short detail as the Department’s Chief of Artillery, Henry transferred to command the 40th Massachusetts Infantry.  Henry’s designated replacement was Captain Samuel Elder.  However, that officer would not arrive until later in the fall.  Lieutenant Theodore K. Gibbs was ranking officer in the battery through the transition.
  • Battery C – At Fort Macon, North Carolina and serving as infantry.  Lieutenant Cornelius Hook held command of the battery, assigned to the Department of North Carolina. However, a detachment from Battery C, under Lieutenant James E. Wilson moved to South Carolina and served in the Tenth Corps.  They would man Battery Stevens during the First Major Bombardment of Fort Sumter.   Sergeant Michael Leahy, in that detachment, later received a commission and served in Battery B.
  • Battery D – Located at Beaufort, South Carolina with four 3-inch rifles. Lieutenant John S. Gibbs commanded the battery, assigned to General Saxton’s Division on Port Royal Island.
  • Battery E – Reporting at Centreville, Virginia with four 3-inch rifles.  With Captain Alanson Randol moved to command the 1st Regular Brigade, Artillery Reserve, Army of the Potomac, Lieutenant Egbert W. Olcott had command.  The battery was assigned to 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery,  Army of the Potomac.
  • Battery F – At Camp Bisland, Bayou Teche, Louisiana with four (down from six) 12-pdr Napoleons. Captain Richard C. Duryea commanded.  This battery served Third Division, Nineteenth Corps.  Duryea is also listed as commanding the division’s artillery at this time. Lieutenant Hurdman P. Norris was the next ranking officer in the battery.
  • Battery G – No report.  Dyer’s has Battery G’s personnel serving with Battery E at this time.
  • Battery H – Reporting at Culpeper, Virginia with four (down from six) 12-pdr Napoleons. The battery remained under Lieutenant Philip D. Mason, in First Brigade, Artillery Reserve.
  • Battery I – No return.  But we are familiar with Lieutenant Frank S. French replaced Lieutenant George Woodruff, mortally wounded at Gettysburg, in command of this battery.  I believe they were reduced to four 12-pdr Napoleons, as they supported Second Corps, Army of the Potomac.
  • Battery K – Reporting at Warrenton, Virginia with six 3-inch Ordnance Rifles.   Battery assigned to Second Brigade, Horse Artillery.  With Captain William Graham in command of that brigade, Lieutenant John Egan was senior officer.
  • Battery L – Reporting at a plantation, which is illegible to me, in Louisiana with four 12-pdr Napoleons and two 10-pdr Parrotts. Captain Frank E. Taylor replaced the Henry W. Closson, who’d been brevetted to Major.  After Port Hudson, the battery transferred to the Nineteenth Corps’ artillery reserve.
  • Battery M – At Beaufort, South Carolina with four 12-pdr Napoleons.  Captain Loomis L. Langdon lead this battery,  assigned to the Tenth Corps.

With those particulars established, we turn to the ammunition reported.  Starting with the smoothbore projectiles:

0235_1_Snip_1stUS

The tallies match to the reported cannon on hand:

  • Battery A: 15 shot, 34 shell, 10 case, and 12 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery B: 240 shell, 280 case, and 112 canister for 12-pdr field howitzers.
  • Battery F: 144 shot, 48 shell, 144 case, and 54 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery H: 188 shot, 68 shell, 192 case, and 64 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery L: 106 shot, 38 shell, 182 case, and 40 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery M: 466 shot, 111 shell, 469 case, and 88 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.

I’ve learned, through long reviews of the summaries, not to reach too far with speculations about the quantities of ammunition reported.  But we see the number of rounds for Battery A’s two Napoleons is but one chest.  On the other hand, Battery M had plenty.

Turning to the Hotchkiss projectiles next:

0235_2_Snip_1stUS

Here we have some explaining to do:

  • Battery A:  12 canister and 202 percussion shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery B: 106 canister, 396 percussion shell, 160 fuse shell, and 155 bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery D: 46 canister, 110 percussion shell, 85 fuse shell, and 158 bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery E: 60 canister, 90 percussion shell, and 340 bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery K: 72 canister, 311 percussion shell, and 300 bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery M:  12 canister, 12 percussion shell, 24 fuse shell, and 20 bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.

We see again Battery A was in short supply.  But the 3-inch rounds with Battery M, which had only Napoleons, stand out.  Battery M had a pair of Ordnance Rifles earlier in the year.  Couldn’t Battery M simply did not transfer this meager quantity of Hotchkiss rounds to Battery D (located on the other side of Beaufort)?  Probably some paperwork issue….

Before moving to the next page in the summary, let me call attention to a column header change:

Page 4 Header 1 0236

We see here the clerks erased a dividing line between the James and Parrott columns. They then put a new divider, two columns to the left.  And wrote in new column names:

  • 10-pdr Parrott Shot, 2.9 inch bore.
  • 20-pdr Parrott Shot 3.64 inch bore.

These replaced columns for James canister in calibers 3.80-inch and 4.62-inch, respectively.  We see the two columns to the left of those have hand written “canister,” but with no strike through of case shot.  These changes reflected the disfavor and declining use of James projectiles by the mid-point of the war.

And those columns are put to use for the 1st US (full page here):

0236_1A_Snip_1stUS

Two lines:

  • Battery L:  50 shot, 160 shell, 20 case, and 170 canister for 10-pdr Parrott.
  • Battery M: 40 case for 10-pdr Parrott.

Again, we see Battery M with rifled projectiles on hand.

The next page, for the Schenkl projectiles, also has some hand-written changes to the column header:

Page 4 Header 2 0236

In this case, we have six strike-through amendments as the clerks ensured the form remained current:

  • 6-pounder “Wiard” case, 2.6-inch bore.
  • 10-pdr “Parrott” case, 2.9-inch bore.
  • 3-inch wrought-iron gun case, 3-inch bore
  • 12-pdr “Wiard” or 20-pdr “Parrott” Case, 3.67-inch bore.
  • 6-pdr bronze rifled case, 3.67-inch bore.
  • 6-pdr “James” case, 3.80-inch bore.

These all replaced canister columns for their respective calibers.  This, I would submit, reflected the greater utility and use of case, vice canister.  At least for the bean counters in Washington, that is!

But those “referbished” columns were of no mind to the 1st Artillery:

0236_2_Snip_1stUS

Three entry lines, again Schenkl patent projectiles here:

  • Battery A: 52 shell for 3-inch rifles,
  • Battery E: 92 shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery K: 144 shell for 3-inch rifles.

Turning to the last columns, we see that header is a mess of hand-written changes:

0236_3_Snip_1stUS

But that is typical for the small arms columns:

  • Battery A: Nine Army revolvers and forty-four horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery B: Ninty-six Army revolvers, nine cavalry sabers, and 130 horse artillery sabers!
  • Battery D: 121 Army revolvers, eight cavalry sabers, and 106 horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery E: Eight Navy revolvers and eight horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery F: Three Army revolvers, five Navy revolvers, forty cavalry sabers, and twenty horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery H: Twenty-one Army revolvers and sixteen foot artillery swords.
  • Battery K: Fifteen Army revolvers, twenty-nine cavalry sabers, and fifty-five horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery L: Four rifles (type not specified), forty-four Army revolvers, eight cavalry sabers, and 106 horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery M: 103 Army revolvers, nine cavalry sabers, and ninety-five horse artillery sabers.

In previous returns, the batteries in South Carolina and Louisiana reported a substantial quantity of small arms.  And this could be explained by the additional duties taken on by artillerymen in those locations – patrolling and garrison duties.  Though I would point out, Battery M turned in 77 Springfield rifles reported in June.

We’ll look at the 2nd US Artillery next.

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Command and Control going into the West Woods, September 17, 1862

About a year ago I posted about the nature of generalship and how that trait is, properly, assessed.  For the military professional, generalship means exercising command and control of a military unit.  Under my personal definition, I throw in a third skill to exercise – management.  But for today let’s just focus on the two “C’s” that most professional sources mention – command and control.   These two are often confused, conflated, and mashed into one when discussing generalship in historical terms. No more so than with the study of the Civil War.

So let’s lean back on the definitions.  First, command:

Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

There is, of course, more to it than this one sentence.  Please consult the earlier post for the full context.  In particular consider the three key elements of command – authority, decision making, and leadership.  In brief, command is the commander’s “charge”… that body of military force that he is responsible for… to include the responsibility of appropriate use.  We might say that command is an assignment.

Control, on the other hand:

… control is the regulation of forces and battlefield operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent.

The important elements of control are information, communication, and structure.  Again, the nuances and details of each of these elements is important, so please consult that earlier post as to how each is defined.  Control is more so exercised. The measure of control may be quantified as the amount of the battle a commander can influence.

But these two have a dependent relationship – commanders can only command what they can control.  And commanders can only control what they can command.  Somewhere there is a Venn diagram waiting to be drawn…..

Turning to the battlefield, there is a ready example of the nature of command and control… with an anniversary just around the corner.   Consider Major-General John Sedgwick’s divisional attack into the West Woods at Antietam, on the morning of September 17, 1862.  Sedgwick was in Second Corps, under Major-General Edwin V. Sumner.  Sedgwick commanded three brigades that morning:

  • 1st Brigade, Brigadier-General Willis Gorman with 15th Massachusetts, 1st Minnesota, 34th New York, and 82nd New York (and a couple companies of sharpshooters).
  • 2nd Brigade, Brigadier-General Oliver O. Howard with 69th, 71st, 72nd, and 106th Pennsylvania.
  • 3rd Brigade, Brigadier-General Napoleon J.T. Dana, with 19th and 20th Massachusetts, 42nd and 59th New York, and 7th Michigan.

And… of course Battery A, 1st Rhode Island and Battery I, 1st US Artillery… but they would not be part of the infantry formation going into the West Woods.

Sumner and Sedgwick chose a common attack formation with the division in a column of brigades in line of battle.  Something like this “wire frame”:

 

Formation1

Generally, that is, with the line of march to the left of view.  (If any of you Antietam experts find where I’ve put a regiment out of order, let me know.)  Gorman’s brigade up front.  Dana’s brigade, with five regiments, followed.  Then Howard’s with four larger regiments (in terms of men) trailed. Let’s add to graphics to depict the layers of command and the control exercised at each layer.

First, Sumner at the corps level:

Sumner

The red arrow depicts Sumner’s command, through Sedgwick, of the entire formation.  Yes, Sumner had the authority to go all the way down to an individual private in his command. But he would normally work through his subordinates, in this case Sedgwick.  Plus, you’d have a really messy diagram with red arrows down to each individual regiment.  Keep in mind, Sumner had two other divisions under his command.  So imagine a couple more arrows pointing off the diagram.  Brigadier-General William French and Major-General Israel Richardson were, in many ways, out of the picture.

Sumner’s control was likewise exercised through Sedgwick, depicted here with a green oval. Sumner’s ability to control the situation was limited to what decisions and information he could communicate directly to subordinates, chiefly Sedgwick.  His “reach” extended only to how far Sumner could be heard, or extended by way of messengers.  Sumner, himself, moved forward when the fighting started, in some cases giving direct orders to brigades and regiments.  So his influenced extended very far forward.

But, that brings up French and Richardson again.  Some would argue that Sumner was unable to control those divisions to the extent the situation demanded, because “Bull Head” was not in a place to make his voice heard to them.

Sedgwick’s situation was a bit cleaner:

Sedgwick

All of Sedgwick’s subordinates were in front of him.  And we can assume Sedgwick did move about the formation to exercise control.  Indeed, he was severely wounded while doing just that!  But we still have the constraint that his “reach” is the sound of his voice, extended by way of messengers.  However, at the division level, that constraint was manageable.  Orders to a brigade commander might take five or ten minutes to pass.  The time taken for the brigade to execute those orders might take twice as much time off the clock.

For the brigade commanders, consider Howard:

Howard

 

Then Gorman:

 

Gorman

The red arrows are almost always within the green oval.  While not every single private in the brigade could hear the general, control was manageable by voice and messenger.  …. Well at least in the formation as it stepped out.  This will change.  Consider the actual “on the field” arrangements and how much space this division took up on the battlefield.  A visual, from the field, if I may:

Antietam 154 003

This is a panoramic photo taken at the 154th anniversary of the battle.  The rangers arranged the visitors to represent different regiments. Then aligned everyone in the brigade formations.  You’ll see some flags for the center of selected regiments.  I was standing in front of Dana’s brigade to take this photo.  The main point to stress was just how much distance those orders had to travel.  And yes, the brigade commanders would be mounted and move around the formation to best exercise control. Still, the time required to relate an order, be that in person or by messenger, was minutes.  And that must be balanced against the time needed to move a regiment, or battalion, or company.  At the brigade level, some changes – say a refuse to meet an enemy thrust, or a well timed charge – required quick responses.

Keep in mind, control is not just exercised simply by riding around barking orders.  Control also involves gathering and assimilating information.  And at that day and age, most of the intelligence presented to the commander came from his own eyes…. And, yes, you will need to use the zoom features on that pano photo to see the flags… get that inference?

And once the firing started, those formations would not remain so well dressed and orderly.  Turning to the Antietam map sets, consider the command and control problem facing Gorman with his brigade engaged:

GormanMap

A color switch to adapt to the map here – the commander’s name in “neon blue” so it stands out.  Green is the range of control, give or take, for our consideration.  And the light blue lines depict the command arrangements.  Gorman had three regiments close at hand, but the 34th New York was off on it’s own.  Days later, Colonel James Suiter, commanding the 34th, could only report, “For some cause to me unknown, I had become detached from my brigade….”  Thus we have to consider the area of influence exercised by Gorman as well as Suiter.  And in this case, we also have to consider what Gorman and Suiter could see, assimilate as information, and thus use when making decisions.

Dana’s brigade appears more intact on the map:

DanaMap

But this is deceptive.  As his brigade moved up, Dana noticed Confederate movements and called an “audible” in response.

There was no time to wait for orders; the flanking force, whatever it was, was advancing its fire too rapidly on my left.  I permitted the three right regiments to move on, but broke off the Forty-second New York Volunteers, with orders to change front to the left and meet the attack….

I’d highlight two points from this passage. First, the situation called for immediate decisions, orders, and movements.  Dana could not wait for Sumner’s command and control to reach down through Sedgwick.  It was hard enough just to get his own command and control through to the 42nd New York!

Second, writing that passage two weeks after the battle in his after-action report, Dana still had no idea what hit him from the woods.  Only decades later, did the likes of Ezra Carmen piece the situation together.  (And one might argue even more study is still needed!)  Part of control, by way of handling information, is forming a common operating picture.  Where that common operating picture is ill defined, the commander has trouble making sound decisions.  Such makes those green ovals a little smaller, or perhaps a shade dimmer.

Howard, however, had it really bad:

HowardMap

By the map, there is no brigade formation.  Of course, the reports speak of “good order” and such.  As with Dana’s description, the full story would begin to unfold decades later as the veterans re-told their stories.  Add to that another twist – shuffling command under fire.  When Sedgwick was taken from the field, Howard assumed command of the division.  In Howard’s place, Colonel Joshua T. Owen, 69th Pennsylvania, assumed command of the brigade.

Sumner was in this fight and taking personal command.  But how much could Sumner control?   Howard added an interesting remark in his after action report:

Nearly the whole of the first line in good order stood and fired some 30 or 40 rounds per man, when word came that the left of our division had been completely turned by the enemy, and  the order was given by General Sumner in person to change the position of the third line.  He afterward indicated to me the point where the stand was to be made, where he wished to repel a force of the enemy already in our rear.  The noise of musketry and artillery was so great that I judged more by the gestures of the general as to the disposition he wished me to make than by the orders that reached my ears.

Emphasis mine.

In this short paragraph we have a glimpse of how command and control played out in combat during the Civil War.  “Word came down” about a threat.  Orders were given “in person.”  And those exact orders were not audible even to someone in close proximity! Gestures.  That’s how command and control was accomplished that day!

When examining the fighting in the West Woods – especially after the problems of command and control are laid out – the natural question arises:  Did the division take a bad formation into battle?

Perhaps.  And this question takes us into the “management” component that I alluded to in the opening.  As we have seen from the “wire frames,” maps, and some after action reports, when the division was under fire there were limitations on control.  An “armchair general” case might be made for having the brigades formed with regiments, in battle formation, stacked in column, with a three brigade front.  That would have allowed each commander to “fight” a narrow brigade sector.

But…. that also means the commanders would be working in a “stove pipe” without much influence on what happened outside of a regimental front.  And how much combat power would then be stacked up waiting for the order to commit?

A similar situation faced the Marines who assaulted Tarawa on November 20, 1943.  There, the 2nd Marine Division attacked, with an initial force of three regiments, landing abreast.

tarawa1

Inside those regiments were battalion landings, essentially in successive lines. If I “wire framed” the formation, it would look a lot like the opposite of Sedgwick’s.  Command and control faced serious problems that day too.  Though I would point out Major Generals Holland M. Smith and Julian C. Smith selected the formation for good reasons, based on an incomplete assessment of Japanese defenses and other factors.  The same qualifier can be used with respect to Sumner and Sedgwick selecting a formation on September 17, 1862.

Bottom line, there is no “one way” to assault into woods or across a hostile beach held by an unknown force.  The textbooks and manuals are not written that way.  Instead, the military professional has to study the situations and events of the past, looking for lessons that might apply to future scenarios.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 19, Part I, Serial 27, pages 306, 316, and 320.)

Summary Statement, 2nd Quarter, 1863 – 1st Regiment, US Regulars

So to start the review of the summary statements from the second quarter, 1863, the First Regiment of the US Artillery is appropriately at the front of the queue:

0168_1_Snip_1stUS

The batteries of the First were detailed to assignments across various theaters of war, though not to the Trans-Mississippi.  Looking at the administrative details by battery:

  • Battery A – Reporting at Port Hudson, Louisiana with four 12-pdr Napoleons and two 3-inch rifles.  A location change from the previous quarter, but their charges remained the same. Captain Edmund C. Bainbridge remained in command of this battery, assigned to First Division, Nineteenth Corps. Of note, Bainbridge also served as the division’s artillery chief.
  • Battery B – At Hilton Head, South Carolina with four 12-pdr field howitzers, and adding two 3-inch rifles (over the previous quarter’s report).  Lieutenant Guy V. Henry commanded this battery, assigned to Tenth Corps.  Henry temporarily served as the Chief of Artillery, Department of the South, from around June 19 through the first week of July.  But no “fill in” battery commander is indicated on the records.
  • Battery C – At Fort Macon, North Carolina with a dim annotation I interpret as “inf’y service”.  However, the line does not tell the whole story. A detachment from Battery C, under Lieutenant James E. Wilson, served in the Tenth Corps, and would be active in South Carolina.
  • Battery D – No change from the previous quarter.  At Beaufort, South Carolina with four 3-inch rifles. Lieutenant John S. Gibbs assumed command of the battery.  Though co-located with Battery M, the two were officially listed separately in organizational returns.
  • Battery E – Reporting at, if I am reading this right, Manchester, Pennsylvania with four 3-inch rifles.  If my read of the location column is correct, this is an excellent “snapshot in time” of a battery on campaign… at least for the location column, keeping in mind the return was not received until August 11, 1863. Of course, Captain Alanson Randol was in command of this battery, which was merged with Battery G (below), as part of the 2nd Brigade of Horse Artillery, Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.
  • Battery F – Port Hudson, Louisiana with six 12-pdr Napoleons. Under Captain Richard C. Duryea, this battery served Third Division, Nineteenth Corps.  Duryea is also listed as commanding the division’s artillery at this time.
  • Battery G – No report.  Dyer’s has Battery G’s personnel serving with Battery E at this time.
  • Battery H – At Warrenton, Virginia with six 12-pdr Napoleons. The location is an obvious error.  The battery had moved from Third Corps to the Artillery Reserve after Chancellorsville. So the location might more accurately be Frederick, Maryland.  Captain Chandler P. Eakin commanded the battery.  Though just two days into the next quarter he was severely wounded, with Lieutenant Philip D. Mason assuming the role.
  • Battery I – No return.  But we are familiar with Lieutenant George Woodruff’s battery, which brought six 12-pdr Napoleons into action at Gettysburg.  They were assigned to Second Corps.
  • Battery K – Another difficult to read location entry.  I cannot make out the town, but the state is “MD”.  So we might also presume this to be a report reflecting an “on campaign” position, as of June 30.  The battery reported six 3-inch Ordnance rifles.  -Also with 2nd Brigade of the Horse Artillery, supporting the Cavalry Corps, Captain William Graham was the commander.
  • Battery L – Reporting at Port Hudson, Louisiana with four 12-pdr Napoleons and two 10-pdr Parrotts. Captain Henry W. Closson’s battery was in Forth Division, Nineteenth Corps.
  • Battery M – At Beaufort, South Carolina with four 12-pdr Napoleons (losing two 3-inch Ordnance rifles from the previous quarter).  Captain Loomis L. Langdon lead this battery,  assigned to the Tenth Corps.

As mentioned in the preface, as the transition between the second and third quarter of 1863 came at a critical stage of the war, we need to consider the “receipt at ordnance office” date with these details.  For the 1st US batteries providing returns, six were not received until August of that year.  Two more arrived in September.  Another in December.  And not until April 1864 did Battery F’s return arrive at the Washington offices.  (As indicated above, there were two missing battery returns.)

All of which is good background to keep in mind.  The particulars that were not tracked on the form speak to how the data arrived for entry into the form.  With that in mind, let us look at the tallies for projectiles.  Starting with the smoothbore ammunition:

0170_1_Snip_1stUS

The preponderance of entries were for 12-pdr Napoleon rounds.

  • Battery A: 40 shot, 56 shell, 110 case, and 33 canister for 12-pdr Napoleon.
  • Battery B: 400 shell, 500 case, and 100 canister for 12-pdr field howitzer.
  • Battery F: 448 shot, 300 shell, 382 case, and 200 canister for 12-pdr Napoleon.
  • Battery H: 288 shot, 96 shell, 288 case, and 96 canister for 12-pdr Napoleon.
  • Battery K: One (1) shot for 12-pdr Napoleon.  As this battery had only 3-inch rifles, we have to ask if this is just a stray mark… or the battery lugged around a single Napoleon shot for… perhaps… bowling?
  • Battery L: 236 shot, 8 shell, 182 case, and 40 canister for 12-pdr Napoleon.
  • Battery M:  475 shot, 138 shell, 494 case, and 96 canister for 12-pdr Napoleon.

Aside from the question about Battery K, there is also a question about some reported quantities.  As related in the preface to this quarter, we have to ask for the batteries in action at Gettysburg if these are quantities on hand June 30?  Or for some other point after the battle?  And I would submit that question need be assess on a battery-by-battery basis.

Moving to the rifled projectiles, we note the number of Ordnance rifles results in a healthy sheet for Hotchkiss patent types:

0170_2_Snip_1stUS

Looking down by battery:

  • Battery A: 12 canister and 202 percussion shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery B: 280 canister, 422 percussion shell, 227 fuse shell, and 275 bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery D: 86 canister, 50 percussion shell, 176 fuse shell, and 150(?) bullet shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery E: 60 canister, 180 percussion shell, and 360 bullet shells for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery K: 60-canister and 56 bullet shells for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery M:  12 canister, 12 percussion shell, 24 fuse shell, and 20 bullet shells for 3-inch rifles.

First off, Battery M must have retained a small quantity of rounds on hand after transferring it’s 3-inch rifles to another battery.

The other question that springs to mind is regarding the low numbers reported for some batteries, such as Battery K.  We might speculate if that reflects the quantity on hand after a battle or major campaign.  But that’s speculation.

For the next page, we can cut down to the colums on the far right:

0171_1A_Snip_1stUS

Let us focus first on the Parrott columns:

  • Battery L: 150 shell and 220 canister for 10-pdr Parrott.
  • Battery M:  130 case for 10-pdr Parrott.

Once again, we find Battery M with ammunition that will not fit its guns.

Moving over to the right, there is one entry here for Schenkl projectiles:

  • Battery L: 20 shot for 10-pdr Parrott.

Then on the next page of Schenkl projectiles, two numbers to consider:

0171_2_Snip_1stUS

  • Battery B: 100 shells for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery K: 127 shells for 3-inch rifles.

This explains some of the shortages noted on the Hotchkiss page.  But we see batteries mixing the two types of projectiles, against the better wishes of General Hunt.

Lastly we move to the small arms:

0171_3_Snip_1stUS

Yes, we see a bunch of write-in column headers here!  Only one of which applies to this set of batteries:

  • Battery A: Nine Army revolvers and 119 horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery B: One-hundred Army revolvers, seven cavalry sabers, and 153(?) horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery D: 123 Army revolvers, eight cavalry sabers, and 107 horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery E: Nine Navy revolvers and nine horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery F: Ten Army revolvers, forty-seven cavalry sabers, and twenty horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery H: Twenty-one Navy revolvers and sixteen horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery K: Sixteen Army revolvers, thirty-six cavalry sabers, and seventy-eight horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery L: Four Springfield .58 caliber muskets, sixty-two Army revolvers, eight cavalry sabers, and 107 horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery M: Seventy-seven Springfield .58 caliber muskets, 104 Navy revolvers, nine cavalry sabers, and ninety-five horse artillery sabers.

We’ve discussed in earlier posts the peculiarities of small arms issue to field artillery batteries. Service in the Department of the South, were batteries were detailed to perform many non-artillery tasks, was one factor here.  Still, the batteries of the 1st US Regiment would seem to be armed to the teeth!