In February 1862, Major William Richardson Hunt approved receipt of over $2500 of ordnance from the Memphis firm of Quinby & Robinson.
The third item listed on the receipt records “1 6 pdr 3 in Rifle Gun” received on February 6 at a cost of $687.43. (Recall the nomenclature used for other Confederate 3-inch rifles incorporated similar references to the base 6-pdr caliber.) The 3-inch rifle was one of only a handful, perhaps only three, produced by Quinby & Robinson before the fall of Memphis that spring. Remarkably two of the guns survive today in Petersburg National Battlefield.
One is on display near the visitor center.
The other is located at Colquitt’s Salient opposite Fort Steadman.
At first glance the gun presents a clean appearance, with minimal moldings confined to the base ring and knob. The cylindrical rimbases attach directly to the gradually tapering barrel. Small numbers on top of the breech (#33 on the piece in front of the visitor center and #34 on the gun in the field) should correspond to a foundry numbers. The stamps on the right trunnion indicate the guns are indeed from Quinby & Robinson.
The year stamped on the left trunnion of each piece, 1862, puts the guns are in the range corresponding to the receipt shown above.
The thickness of metal at the muzzle suggests the original casting pattern was intended for a larger caliber weapon.
The bore features twelve left-handed twist lands and grooves. Remarkably, neither gun exhibits significant wear of the rifling.
The bore measures out at the prescribed 3-inches.
The breech profile incorporated a base ring, rounded breech face, and a rounded knob with rather thick fillet connecting to the breech.
The gun sight mounts are no longer attached. But the fittings indicate the use of a standard hausse seat in the rear and a spike front sight above the muzzle.
Of the pair, #33 definitely has more “character.”
The divot under the lower left of the barrel looks like a battle scar. But it could also be the result of mishandling. But it sounds so much more exciting to say some Yankee solid shot ricocheted off the barrel in the heat of some artillery duel. The damage deformed the interior of the gun and actually warped the bore.
Needless to say, #33 won’t be firing any more rounds.
Up until the recent refurbishment of the Petersburg artillery display, #33 sat on the rails between a James Type 2 14-pdr rifle and a Wiard 2.6-inch rifle, allowing for convenient comparison.
The Confederate rifle measures 61 inches long, compared to 74 inches for the James rifle and 52.5 inches for the Wiard.
The external appearance of these two Quinby & Robinson rifles, even if breaking with established patterns, is not unique. Another pair of 3-inch rifles at Petersburg, produced by A.B. Reading and Brother, from Vicksburg, Mississippi. I will examine them next.
In the tense days of December 1860, Captain William Maynadier became a central figure in the correspondence concerning the disposition of military stores. Maynadier, a West Point graduate of 1827, was at that time the assistant to the Chief of Ordnance, Colonel Henry K. Craig. Maynadier had served in that capacity since 1842. In November 1860, Craig was briefly relieved at the head of the Ordnance Department, with Maynadier then serving as a temporary chief. This made Maynadier the “man in the middle” as political leaders sought information about the status of forts, arsenals, and armories. Maynadier also issued orders in the name of the Secretary of War, John Floyd, and Colonel Craig.
One set of orders issued by Maynadier on December 22 called for Allegheny Arsenal, outside Pittsburgh and commanded by Major John Symington, to forward heavy guns to forts along the Gulf Coast. Order for Supplies No. 666 and No. 667 called for 10-inch and 8-inch columbiads along with 32-pdr seacoast guns to arm the forts at Ship Island, Mississippi and a fort at Galveston, Texas. After drafting these orders, Maynadier sent a note to Secretary Floyd confirming the action:
I have the honor to report that in compliance with your directions I have ordered forty-two columbiads and four 32-pounder guns be sent to the fort on Ship Island; also seventy columbiads and seven 32-pounder guns to the fort in Galveston Harbor. These cannons have been ordered from the arsenal near Pittsburg, and directed to be consigned to the engineer officer in charge of the respective forts, viz: Those for Ship Island to Lieut. F.E. Prime, and those to Galveston to Lieut. W.H. Stevens, of which these officers have been advised. These pieces of ordnance belong to the regular armament of the respective forts.1
This correspondence seems mundane on the surface. The Army’s top mission in those pre-war days was seacoast defense. So putting guns in forts was just normal business. But the forts mentioned in the correspondence were not complete by any measure. Furthermore, had theses guns been transferred as ordered, they would shortly have fallen into the hands of Confederates. Later, as events played out through 1861, Maynadier’s orders looked suspicious to say the least.
In July 1861, Representative John F. Potter, of Wisconsin, convened a select committee to investigate the loyalty of government employees. The committee considered some 550 charges made, including those against military officers. Maynadier’s pre-war orders came under scrutiny of the committee.
By the time the committee began investigations, Maynadier was a Lieutenant-Colonel at Frankfort Arsenal, very much involved in the war effort. So you can see where this might cause some embarrassment at the War Department. The committee would review two main charges against Maynadier. The first centered upon the transfer of ordnance mentioned above. The second regarded the sale of obsolete muskets to parties associated with the secessionists. This later charge, much like the first, stemmed from Maynadier’s administrative role in the Ordnance Department. In the 1850s the Army realized the need to upgrade its stock of arms. In an effort to salvage what it could, stands of old arms were sold to provide supplemental funding. The charge was Maynadier worked deals to sell those arms, in excess of what was directed and at low prices.2
Regarding the forts, Horatio Wright, who’d been a captain at the time of correspondence but was a brigadier general of volunteers in the summer of 1861, testified that he had conversed with Maynadier in December 1860. Specifically, Wright recalled he had pressed the point about the status of the forts, stating the Ship Island fort was incomplete and at Galveston ground hadn’t even been broken. To arm forts, the Army normally waits until the works are completed, then dispatches the guns (makes sense – build the house first then move in the furniture). In this case, the process was apparently being reversed. This prompted Wright to inquire with his boss, General J.G. Totten.3 Effectively the evocation of such red-tape voided any orders by Maynaider.
The sale of obsolete muskets was a bit more complicated. Craig, an old and sometimes cantankerous veteran of many years of bureaucracy, happily pointed out that in his absence from the Ordnance Department, Maynadier had sold large quantities of muskets to southern interests. Reviewing the testimony, the committee reached the conclusion,
Here, then, we have incontrovertible evidence that, within a month after Major Maynadier was placed at the head of the ordnance department, 20,000 stand of arms were sold to the rebel enemies of the country; and that 100,000 to 250,000 stand were bargained for, evidently with the expectation that they were to go into the same hands.4
On the surface, these charges seemed to hold water. The War Department had little choice but to suspend Maynadier. In the face of these charges, Maynadier sent a reply to the committee in February 1862. The gist of his defense was, “I was acting under orders.” Regarding the arming of the unfinished forts, Maynadier reasoned:
The order was a legal one, and the full and perfect authority of the Secretary of War rightfully to give the order was unquestionable. It would have been a high military crime to have refused or neglected to execute the order, and it would have been an act of gross impertinence and insubordination in me to have questioned the Secretary of War, as to his reasons or motives for sending the cannon. In truth, it never entered my mind, at that time, that there could be any improper motive or object in the order; for, on the question of Union and secession, Mr. Floyd was then regarded, throughout the country, as a strong advocate of the Union and opponent of secession.5
Maynadier went on to disagree with Wright on several particulars regarding their coordination. But the basic details remained – the forts, being unprepared, did not receive guns.
Maynadier’s response to second charge continued the “I was ordered” defense. He pointed out the laws and regulations governing the sale of condemned, obsolete weapons. And he continued by indicating the particulars of transactions from 1857 to 1861. The Army first offered, as Maynadier indicted, the arms up for bid to perspective buyers. None of the bids met with the Army’s approval. At that point, Secretary Floyd authorized sales at a price more acceptable to the Army. With regard to the bargaining for 100,000 or so muskets, Maynadier pointed out a proposed sale of weapons to a Mr. A. A. Belknap was at a unit cost below what the Secretary had set. When Maynadier brought that issue to the fore, the deal fell through.6
Maynadier’s defense also speaks to the internal politics within the Ordnance Department. Craig, a long serving officer of the ‘old-old Army’ was at odds with some of the younger set (we might put Rodman in that company, but certainly must put the likes of Joshia Gorgas in that set). Maynadier firmly pointed the finger at his boss, inquiring why similar charges were not levied “against Colonel Craig for obeying the orders of the same person to sell 20,150 [muskets], mostly to the States of Virginia and Alabama, and to a firm in Louisiana.?”7
Closing his defense, Maynadier noted his long and continuing service to the country. He further added that two of his sons, and a son-in-law, were serving the country, at that time (Henry E. Maynadier was in command of the Mississippi Mortar Boats at the time of writing. And His son, William Murray, went on to serve with some distinction, in particular at Antietam.). While it would be a nice, romantic notion to say that carried the day, reality is changes in the political winds and war situations worked in Maynadier’s favor.
Secretary Simon Cameron, the target of some of the congressional heat, resigned in January, having spoken in favor of arming slaves. His replacement, Edwin Stanton, offered some sacrificial lambs to the Potter Committee without giving up useful hands, such as Maynadier. At the same time, with Floyd making blunders in the field (Fort Donelson), on balance anything lost to wrong-doing in 1860 was seeming like a fair trade.
Maynadier continued to serve in the Army. In his late fifties by that time, he was too old for field service and continued with postings at arsenals. By 1864 he was the inspector of arsenals and depots. He died in 1871 and was buried in Washington, D.C.’s Oak Hill Cemetery.
The correspondence is enclosure 3 of a set provided to the Potter Committee on October 28, 1861. See the Official Records, Series I, Volume 53, Serial 111, pages 504-505.