Category Archives: Fort McAllister

Marching Through Georgia, December 13, 1864: The Taking of Fort McAllister, Part 3

Sometime in the evening of December 13, 1864, Major-General William T. Sherman sent this message to Major-General Henry Slocum, commanding his Left Wing:

Take a good big drink, a long breath, and then yell like the devil. The fort was carried at 4:30 p.m., the assault lasting but fifteen minutes. The general signaled from this side to the fleet and got answers, and the vessels were seen coming up from the sound….

Later in his official report, Sherman differed mainly on the time of the assault, citing 5 p.m., continuing “I witnessed the assault from a rice mill on the opposite bank of the river, and can bear testimony to the handsome manner in which it was accomplished.”  And that short description is usually enough to pass for most mentioning the event.  Closer to the action, Brigadier-General William B. Hazen recorded:

The grounds to the right of the fort being marshy, cut through by deep streams, rendered the deployment of that part of the line slow and difficult, and was not completely effected till 4.45 p.m., at which time, every officer and man of the nine regiments being instructed what to do, the bugle sounded the forward, and at precisely 5 o’clock the fort was carried. The troops were deployed in one line as thin as possible, the result being that no man in the assault was struck till they came to close quarters. Here the fighting became desperate and deadly. Just outside the works a line of torpedoes had been placed, many of which were exploded by the tread of the troops, blowing many men to atoms, but the line moved on without checking, over, under, and through abatis, ditches, palisading, and parapet, fighting the garrison through the fort to their bomb-proofs, from which they still fought, and only succumbed as each man was individually overpowered.

Not to sound like I’m jumping on a modern commercial catch-phrase, but fifteen minutes is all it took.  But we see, in Hazen’s report, that inside those fifteen minutes was a storm of destruction.  Hazen mentioned the torpedoes for good reason.  Most of his 24 killed were due to those mines.  And the veterans who lived through those fifteen minutes remembered them long after the war.

In a letter to the National Tribune in 1901, John Scott, Company I, 116th Illinois wrote:

Being on the right of the line, we entered the fort on the lower side.  I was knocked down by one of the torpedoes, and a piece of the limb that was attached to the torpedo stuck in the corner of my left eye, which when I pulled it out caused the blood to flow.  I was soon covered with blood from head to foot.

Later, in 1907, Eli A. Weekley of Company B, 53rd Ohio wrote of his experiences somewhat dismissing the torpedoes, going as far to say none fired during the assault.  Well this sparked what we might call today a “flame war” with responses.  I would offer that the great service of Weekley’s letter was to bring forward some vivid accounts of what those fifteen minutes were like.  J.S. Horner, Company D, 30th Ohio responded to say:

I am certain he is mistaken in this statement … I remember very distinctly of jumping over a pile of fresh earth while on the charge.  The man just behind me jumped over it all right, but the man behind him struck the cap of the torpedo as he ran and it exploded and blew off his foot above the ankle joint leaving the bone bare of flesh for two or three inches above the joint. When I heard the report of the shell I looked back and saw the poor fellow as he fell back in the hole the torpedo made when it exploded.

L.C. Huffine, Company C, 30th Ohio provided a similar response affirming the injuries due to torpedoes, adding

When we got up close to the fort we saw the wires above ground, and the boys sang out, ‘Watch out!’ One exploded at the head of my company blowing off the leg of Comrade Hiram Rooney, Orderly Sergeant. He was only a few feet from me when the explosion came and my eyes were full of sand. When I could get the sand out of my eyes, I looked and saw the boys on top of the fort shooting down into it.

And C.C. Degman, Company F, 70th Ohio likewise added his view of the damage from the torpedoes.  But in his letter he also described the effort required to cross the ditch and break through the stakes planted there.

This was a serious obstacle, as the stakes could not be moved except in a few cases.  Some got thru the small openings, some were held up by comrades, and fell over, others were helped over by those on the other side.  Finally all were over, and then the command came from Col. [Henry] Phillips: “Forward, boys!”  They fired one volley and then, with bayonet in hand, leaped forward and in only a few minutes after the torpedo line had been passed were on top of the fort.

And I know that many readers will recognize the style and tone of the National Tribune, with which we must place a grain of salt (as we sometimes have to do with letters found in the Confederate Veteran, or as with any veteran’s magazine were accounts are offered decades after the events).  But there is the emphasis on the torpedoes.  All seemed to think them ghastly.  And of course at the time, Sherman agreed.  Upon seeing the injury done by those weapons, he insisted, for the second time in a week, that Confederate prisoners be employed in the disarming of the torpedoes.

As horrific as the obstacles were, the Federal casualties were small when compared to similar assaults on fixed positions – 24 killed and 110 wounded.  Part of the reason for this was indeed the faulty Confederate dispositions – the cannons en-barbette, gaps in the abitis, covered ground within musket range of the fort, and simply the small number of the garrison.  But we should not dismiss Federal success as a forgone conclusion.  Recall just over a week prior a similarly large Federal force was unable to break through at Honey Hill.  And many of the same men stopped at Cossawhatchie.  I submit the difference at Fort McAllister had to do with leadership.  Hazen ensured “every officer and man” knew what was needed.  He kept good communications with his superiors and with subordinates (with the possible exception of Second Brigade).  He used every bit of information and advice provided by Kilpatrick.  In fact, to the extent that Hazen’s attack might be called an “infantry” version of what Kilpatrick had suggested the night before.  In short, Hazen and his men deserved every accolade bestowed for success at Fort McAllister.

After the fort was taken, Sherman and Howard, along with some of their staff, crossed the Ogeechee and met with Hazen.  After a late dinner, the generals took to the water again in search of the fleet.  Soon they were on board the USS Dandelion. The next day Sherman would meet with Major-General John Foster and Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren (in that order, as Foster awoke him in the very early hours of the morning).  The Ogeechee attained, Sherman needed it cleared and opened for transports to supply his army.  He was at that moment focused on the prize of Savannah.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 44, Serial 92, pages 10, 110, and 704; National Tribune, September 12, 1901, page 3; March 14, 1907, page 6; June 20, 1907, page 6; July 11, 1907, page 6.)

Marching Through Georgia, December 13, 1864: The taking of Fort McAllister, Part 2

In part 1, earlier today, I offered some background on Fort McAllister’s attackers and defenders.  Looking now to the “moving pieces” we turn to King’s Bridge.  At around 5 a.m. on the morning of December 13, 1864, the engineers stopped their repair work on the bridge to allow Brigadier-General William B. Hazen’s division to cross.  Within a few hours march, the division reached Joseph McAllister’s Strathy Hall plantation.

There Hazen posted guards, even though Brigadier-General H. Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalrymen had already ransacked the house.  The infantry column pressed on to the turn off towards Genesis Point (just upstream from Fort McAllister).   Nearing Hardwick, at the base of a peninsula formed by a wide “bow” of the Ogeechee River, a signal team went out to establish a station and communicate with the station at Cheves Rice Mill to the north.  Hazen’s infantry continued on the road to Fort McAllister, skirmishing with Confederate outposts.  Along the way they encountered several buried torpedoes on the roadway.

While Hazen’s men were marching, several other pieces were in motion (Some of the arrows are positioned to simplify the map):


To Hazen’s front, Kilpatrick’s cavalry withdrew from Genesis Point, where they’d pressed the fort’s pickets back.  Kilpatrick spoke with Hazen, providing details of the Confederate dispositions.  With that, Kilpatrick’s men split up into two columns.  Colonel Eli Murray’s brigade moved into Liberty County, moving by way of Midway.  Colonel Smith Atkins moved his brigade further south on Bryan’s Neck towards Kilkenny Bluff.  The cavalry’s task was to seek out Federal blockaders in St. Catherine’s Sound, as a contingency against failure at Fort McAllister.

At Cheves’ Rice Mill, Major-Generals William T. Sherman and Oliver O. Howard arrived to take up an advance observation post.  Captain James M. McClintock, at his signal station, observed Hazen’s movement and searched, without luck, for naval activity on the Ogeechee.  Captain Francis DeGress maintained sporadic fire on Fort McAllister with no effect other than gain the Confederate’s attention.

The arrival of Captain William Duncan on the 12th prompted Major-General John Foster and Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren to start actively looking to establish positive contact with Sherman.  Foster sent Lieutenant George Fisher, an experienced signal officer, to reconnoiter the rivers south of Fort Pulaski.  Unfortunately, as Dahlgren noted in his diary entry for the 13th, the navy was simply stretched too thin.  Not until the morning of the 13th was Fisher on board the tug USS Dandelion, a fine vessel but not the sort of warship Sherman looked for.  Not knowing where Sherman’s men might be, they began searching along the Vernon River, and then into the Little Ogeechee River.  Although the ship’s captain was wary of Confederate batteries, he did provide Fisher a skiff to get into some of the smaller creeks to a point opposite Fort McAllister.   Hearing the sound of muskets across the marshes, Fisher:

… Looked about and saw, about thee miles northwest of where I was lying in the marsh, a flag upon the top of an old rice mill, but there being no air stirring, I was unable to make out of what nature it was. I could then indistinctly see persons through a broken part of the roof, one of whom, taking hold of the end of the flag, drew its folds out so that I could see our own glorious Stars and Stripes.

Fisher immediately made his way back to the tug and asked the captain to proceed up the Ogeechee.  The time was around 2:00 p.m. with not much daylight left.

What had caused the musketry heard by Fisher was the arrival of Hazen’s lead elements at Fort McAllister’s outer line of defenses.  Skirmishers fanned out and started to engage the fort’s garrison with a purpose.  With the fort’s guns sitting above the parapets, instead of firing through embrasures, the Federal sharpshooters could harass the Confederate gunners and keep down their rate of fire.

Hazen needed time to deploy his division.  He wanted to first encircle the fort, using nine regiments (three from each brigade), backed up with three more regiments in reserve.  When all was in position, he’d launch a grand assault to overwhelm the defenders.  Hazen, as he did in most operations, did well to keep his subordinates informed as to the plan, setup control measures to reduce mistakes, and, above all, provide as much information as was available about the situation.

The plan called for Second Brigade, arriving first at the fort, to form a line anchored on the river to their left.  Next, First Brigade would sweep around to the far side of the fort and setup in position to assault from the south.  Third Brigade would file in to fill the gap  between.  The problem was, for Second Brigade, a creek cut across the line of march.  Thus the deployments were far too slow for Hazen’s, Howard’s, and Sherman’s likings.

While the infantry deployed, elsewhere the other parts of this “drama” were moving:


Kilpatrick’s cavalry moved to their new assignments.  In Liberty County, Murray dispatched the 5th Kentucky Cavalry to Sunbury (near the old Revolutionary War post of Fort Morris).  Likewise Atkins’ men reached Kilkenny Bluff.  Both forces searched for a way to catch the eye of the blockaders.

Fisher, by then back on the Dandelion, moved through “Hell’s Gate” into the Ogeechee.  The tug risked the big guns of Fort McAllister to a point just below a bend in the river.  There Fisher began attempts to signal the station at the rice mill he’d seen.

The time was around 4:30 p.m.  Tensions at Cheves’ Rice Mill ran high.  The sun was setting low in the west.  The planned assault of the fort was not yet ready.  And the fleet had not been seen.  In the words of more than one observer, Sherman was anxious if not outright nervous.  But this was right when all the moving pieces converged to turn the day for the Federals.  Observers at the rice mill noticed the smoke from the tug.  Soon Fisher was sending a query:

Who are you?
Fisher, Lieutenant.

McClintock, General Howard’s signal officer.

How can I get to you? What troops are at Fort McAllister?
Fisher, Lieutenant.

We are now investing Fort McAllister with Hazen’s division.
Howard, General.

General Howard:
What can we do for you? We are ready to render you any assistance.
Foster, General.  Dahlgren, Admiral.  Fisher, Lieutenant.

General Foster:
Can you assist us with your heavy guns?
Sherman, General.

General Sherman:
Being only a tug-boat, no heavy guns aboard.
Fisher, Lieutenant.

(And I’ve often wondered what Sherman’s real thoughts were, receiving that last line from a lowly lieutenant!)

The dialog cut short by Fisher’s last reply, McClintock now signaled to Hazen’s station:  “It is absolutely necessary that the fort be taken immediately. The Stars and Stripes must wave over the battery at sundown. Sherman, General.”  With that, Hazen knew he’d exceeded the time allowed for deployment.  He had to go in even if Second Brigade was not in position:


With some of the luck which had followed the men throughout the march, Second Brigade fell into position just as the bugles sounded to start the charge.

The assault was not a forgone conclusion by any means.  Nor was it simply a dash for the parapets.  The troops first had to close several hundred yards of cleared ground.  That reached, they had to wrestle through several layers of abatis and felled trees.  Exiting that obstacle, there were mines planted.  Then they had cross the ditch, breaking through the palisades in the way.  (Recall the photos from the earlier post.)

But these were hardened veterans who’d seen many assaults of this type in the past.  When the bugle sounded, they surged forward.  With that, allow me to pause and break this post up for ease of reading.  I’ll take up the assault and offer an assessment in part 3.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 44, Serial 92, page 753.)

Marching Through Georgia, December 13, 1864: The Taking of Fort McAllister, Part 1

Fort McAllister… a topic for which I cannot restrain myself to a single blog post, and I won’t!  My fascination with this battle dates back to my Army days. Being stationed a short drive from the battlefield, it was a “quick run.” Later, when tasked to provide a staff ride for our unit, I married my “ground research” with primary and secondary sources.  An ally in that task, Roger S. Durham, who was then working at the Fort Stewart Museum, has written the definitive work on Fort McAllister, with several chapters on the battle.  I cannot top that here.  Instead let me offer some background, the short version of the events, and along with that some of the points that I stressed for that tour (two decades ago).  So for “Part 1” today, let me provide some of that background.

Consider the “storyline” of this battle by components.  Let me start with the the parts in contact – Brigadier-General William B. Hazen’s division and Major George A. Anderson’s garrison.  Hazen’s order of battle on paper was:

  • First Brigade, Colonel Theodore Jones: 55th, 116th, and 127th Illinois; 6th and 8th Missouri; 30th and 57th Ohio.
  • Second Brigade, Colonel Wells S. Jones: 111th Illinois, 83rd Indiana, 37th, 47th, 53rd, and 54th Ohio.
  • Third Brigade, Colonel John M. Oliver: 48th, 90th, and 99th Indiana; 15th Michigan; 70th Ohio.
  • Artillery: Battery H, 1st Missouri Light and one section of Battery H, 1st Illinois Light Artillery.

The Federal force totaled ar0und 4,000. I don’t list Briagdier-General H. Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry here.  But the cavalry played an important role early in the day.  The cavalry pressed within a mile of Fort McAllister and, while denying Anderson any information of what was going on, was able to pass valuable information about the fort’s layout and defense to Hazen.  After Hazen moved up, Colonel Eli Murray’s force moved south into Liberty County.  Colonel Smith Atkins’ Brigade moved to Kilkenny Bluff.  There they would attempt to reach the blockaders operating in St. Catherine’s Sound.

On the balance, Major Anderson had about 200 men within the confines of Fort McAllister.  The fort contained three 10-inch columbiads, one 8-inch columbiad, one 42-pdr gun, one 32-pdr rifled gun, four 32-pdr smoothbores, one 24-pdr howitzer, two 12-pdr Napoleons, six 6-pdr guns, two 12-pdr mountain howitzers, and one 10-inch mortar. Anderson’s garrison included a platoon of  infantry under Captain George Nicoll (25 men), two companies of the 1st Georgia Reserve Regiment (D and E), and Captain Nicholas Clinch’s Light Artillery Battery.

The fort had shrugged off attacks by the monitors, carrying the heaviest ordnance around, in 1863.  But the heavy guns in the fort faced the river. The land-facing sides featured the smaller caliber guns.  And those were mounted en-barbette, or on firing platforms looking over the parapet.  This exposed the gunners to fire from attackers, a point not lost on Kilpatrick and in his report to Major-General William T. Sherman on December 12.


However, while the guns were not placed to maximize firepower, there were several obstacles placed to make any attacker pause.  Thanks to the photographers who arrived at the fort after the battle, we know how those looked.  From the perspective of the Federal troops advancing at the fort:

Notice the open expanse of cleared ground, mostly sand.  Then a ring of abatis, in the form of felled trees with branches pointing out.

At passage points out of the abatis, Confederate engineers placed torpedoes or mines.  I cannot say this as an absolute certainty, but I think this photograph captures some of those:

Look to the right center at the two beams placed across what appears to be a path:


See the objects between and beside the beams?  My speculation here (and that is all, so take it for what that’s worth) is that the beams were placed there to deter some absent minded wagoner from driving over the mines.  Though by the time these photos were taken, all should have been disarmed.  Maybe a precautionary measure?  (I know it to be modern practice to leave warning signs up around hastily cleared minefields just to keep those passing on the corridors.)

Once past the abatis the attackers had to traverse a deep ditch with palisades:

Keep in mind these are the “after” photos.  To get past these “sticks” the attackers had to break down passageways through the line of palisades… and then climb up the steep walls to the left of view.  I don’t know about you, but every time I look at this photo, I imagine my feet slipping on that sandy embankment.

The mortar battery had been pulled in by the time of the battle.  But the position of the earthworks and causeway leading to the battery remained intact.  Part of that is seen in this photo:

Once at the fort’s walls, the attackers assailing the rear-center of the fort faced a cross fire from the bastions:

To negate this cross fire, Hazen wanted to attack with three columns, with the aim to hit all along the rear wall of the fort.

Once over the walls, the defenders could fall back to magazines and behind traverses to fire upon the parade field:

Though I would quickly point out, in that event, the fort was lost already.  The defenders would only be trying to make the attacker pay a little more in blood for the victory.

The fort’s profile was generally good.  But there were places where the engineers had not improved the lines.  One of which was along the river, upstream side:

Here, at low tide, an attacker could rush up directly against the walls, with no abatis or palisades in the way.

I thought about offering some “then and now” views of the fort.  But will hold off pending a dedicated photo analysis post.  But you can get a “grand tour” of the fort as it looks today… from the air:

Having described the defenses of the fort and the “nut” which Hazen’s men had to crack, let me turn in the next post to a description of the operation – how Hazen moved up his command, his plan of attack, and some of the other “moving parts” that turned around as the plan was executed.



Marching Through Georgia, December 12, 1864: Focus on Fort McAllister

On December 12, 1864, a fast steamer headed north out of Port Royal Sound.  On board were messages from Major-General John Foster and Rear-Admiral John Dahlgren, both citing messages carried by Captain William Duncan from Major-General Oliver O. Howard.  Word of Major-General William T. Sherman’s arrival at Savannah would bring some authoritative information for the newspapers which had been speculating upon speculation.  More important, the news triggered actions at the bases in South Carolina and Georgia.  At Hilton Head depots and on boats in Port Royal Sound were supplies of all sorts, all earmarked for Sherman’s men.  But to get those supplies to Sherman, the Federals needed a port facility, even a small one.  While the forces off shore might transport the goods, it was up to Sherman’s men to force a break in the Confederate coastal defenses through which those could flow.  The focus thus turned to Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River.

But that is not to say the rest of the lines around Savannah were inactive.  To the contrary, December 12 was a day of much activity.  On the Savannah River, Colonel Ezra Carman’s brigade supported the slow movement of the 3rd Wisconsin to Argyle Island.  Having only one raft capable of carrying 12 men at a time, the process had taken nearly a full day, and was still not complete that morning.  However, the Federal raft was not the only vessel plying the river that morning.

Earlier on December 10th, Flag-Officer William W. Hunter passed up the Savannah with the CSS Sampson and CSS Resolute, with orders to guard the Charleston & Savannah Railroad bridge.  There, Hunter joined with the CSS Macon, which had been harassing the Federals on the march.  On the 11th, Hunter received orders to destroy the bridge and retire to aid in defense of Savannah.  After destroying the bridge that day, Hunter waited until 7 a.m. on the 12th to descend the river:

When opposite Argyle Island we obtained information from a man on shore that the Yankees were at a mill farther down, grinding.  He stated that he did not think there was any artillery. As we went along we saw at the different places smoking ruins. After we passed the mill, at Tweedside, situated on a back river a short distance, where we saw the enemy, as above stated, we were opened upon by one or more light batteries of Parrott guns, posted upon a bluff in the bend of the river, which we had to approach head-on, and entirely commanding the channel, apparently supported by infantry, and about 1,000 or 1,200 yards distant.

The guns firing at Hunter’s gunboats were those of Captain Charles Winegar, Battery I, First New York Light Artillery.  They were stationed at the Colerain plantation just below a sharp bend of the main river channel:


Winegar later reported:

On the morning of the 12th day of December, about 8 o’clock, the enemy’s gunboats made their appearance…. After an engagement of about three-quarters of an hour, from 2,400 to 2,700 yards, they were forced to retire up the river, leaving their tender behind disabled, together with her officers and crew, numbering about 30, our expenditure of ammunition being 138 rounds.

Although Hunter’s gunboats carried rifled 32-pdr guns and certainly had the weight of firepower to their advantage, the river channel prevented them from bringing that to bear.

Winegar was able to engage almost immune from any broadsides. Attempting to retire upriver, Hunter’s boats ran into each other.  As result, the Resolute was disabled and drifted to Argyle Island.  The vessel proved to be a valuable addition for the Federals and was soon employed transporting troops and forage across the river.  Hunter, however, retired his remaining gunboats up to the cover of Wheeler’s Cavalry.  Yet another combat force was taken off the map for the Confederates, unable to influence the events to follow.

Elsewhere along the lines the Federals continued to press up close to the Confederate lines in order to gain the measure of the defenses.  The Right Wing continued to adjust lines due to the shift prompted by the late arrival of the Fourteenth Corps.  Likewise the Fourteenth Corps had to develop their place in line. Though some commanders at the brigade and division levels saw opportunities and asked for permission to attack, none were granted.  Very clear was Sherman’s intent, perhaps seasoned from experiences earlier in the war.  Sieges were operations of patience and time.  Sherman would act to ensure his army had plenty of both.

The one commodity that Sherman did worry about running low on was fodder for his animals.  Orders went down on December 12 to dismount anyone not absolutely necessary for operations.  Various men who’d mounted themselves during the march turned in horses.  In addition, all those animals needed in supply operations would be centrally held.  Typical were the orders for the Fifteenth Corps:

All the teams and cattle will be ordered up to their respective divisions, and will be parked and corralled with a view to the convenience of forage.  As the article will become very scarce during our stay, the greatest economy in the use of it is recommended, and the collecting and distributing of the same must be well systematized within the divisions to prevent waste.

As for the troops, while many complained the columns still had plenty of issue rations – hardtack and such – for the men.  Of course, the men were in preference to what Georgia had provided during the earlier weeks.

Further south, Brigadier-General H. Judson Kilpatrick had Colonel Eli Murray’s brigade of cavalry slip over the Canoochee River.  Murray reached McAllister’s plantation and pushed scouts out to within a couple miles of Fort McAllister.


Later in the day, Kilpatrick reported to Sherman:

I met the enemy’s picket near the railroad, and chased Major Anderson, the commanding officer at Fort McAllister, back to his fort. From one of his escort captured, I learn that the fort is garrisoned by five companies, two of artillery and three militia; in all, about 200 men none of whom, however, have ever been under fire. There is a deep broad ditch to cross on entering the fort, and considerable opposition no doubt, will be met with. There is a low swamp about one mile this side the fort; a battery of four guns covers the road leading through this swamp…

Kilpatrick went on to suggest his forces might force their way into the fort:

… by forcing this battery to retire, a charging party could follow it directly into the fort, and the affair would be over. I did not intend, general, to attempt the capture of the fort by a sudden dash, but I intended to deliberately storm the works. I have old infantry regiments, armed with Spencer rifles, who could work their way up to within easy range and force every man to keep his head beneath the parapet, and, finally, force my way into the fort–of course, I intended to maneuver my troops as infantry.

Sherman, however, wanted Kilpatrick to begin scouting further south and look to possibly making contact with the fleet at one of the other riverways along the coast.  The cavalry chief took those orders and moved out the next day.

Opposite Fort McAllister, some distance away, the signal station at Cheves’ rice mill remained vigilant watching the Confederates while at the same time looking for the Federal fleet.  Throughout the day, a section of 20-pdr Parrotts from Captain Francis DeGress’ Battery H, 1st Illinois Light Artillery, supported by part of Battery H, 1st Missouri Light Artillery, sparred with the Confederate gunners.  Neither side did little more than annoying the other.

Instead of a cavalry rush, Sherman wanted to use the infantry to ensure the act was completed quickly.  Howard detailed Second Division, Fifteenth Corps, under Brigadier-General William B. Hazen, for the task.  The selection had significance.  The core of that division were a few veteran regiments which had served in Sherman’s division at Shiloh back in April 1862.  It had subsequently been part of Fifteenth Corps, under Sherman, during the Vicksburg Campaign.  Among the division’s previous commanders was Major-General Frank P. Blair, Jr., by then in charge of the Seventeenth Corps.  Not only was the Second Division somewhat “Sherman’s own” but it embodied the long story that was the Western Theater.  To battle honors that included Shiloh, Corinth, Chickasaw Bluffs, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Resaca, Kennesaw, and Atlanta, the division would add another the next day – Fort McAllister.

Considering the March by way of Markers, today there are two entries discussing specific events on December 12.  One at Port Wentworth discusses the gunboat-artillery fight.  Another at Richmond Hill notes Kilpatrick’s scout.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 44, Serial 92, pages 357, 685 and 698; ORN, Series I, Volume 16, page 357.)

The Monitors at Fort McAllister: Technical Intelligence for the Rebels

Following the March 3rd attack on Fort McAllister, Captain John McCrady, Chief Engineer State of Georgia, filed a very detailed report of the action. His main focus was upon the fortifications and how those stood up to the bombardment. But he included several details about the Federal activity, particularly the monitors. Lacking the actual names of the monitors, McCrady referred to them as “No.1,” “No.2,” and “No.3” each identified by colored bands around their turret tops and smoke stacks. Since the Federals practiced a bit of subterfuge and repainted these prior to the battle, McCrady mistakenly identified No.1 as the USS Montauk, when it was more likely the USS Passaic.

That mistaken identity aside, McCrady consolidated reports and interviews from several observers of the action. Lieutenant E.A. Elarbee, of the Hardwick Mounted Rifles, provided McCrady an “up close” description of the monitors:

Lieutenant Elarbee and 4 men of Captain McAllister’s company went over into the marsh opposite the fort the night before on a call for volunteers for that purpose. They attained a position from 200 to 250 yards from Monitor No. 1. On the officer stepping out of the turret to ascertain the effect of his shot one rifle was fired at him, but missed, upon which he immediately turned to re-enter the turret, but was shot in the act, stumbling forward, and at last entering only with difficulty. No. 1 fired grape or canister at the men in the marsh immediately after this and once subsequently, but without hurting one of them. Lieutenant Elarbee, from his position, had a nearer view of No. 1 than any one has yet had of one of the monitor fleet. No. 1 is supposed to be the Montauk. He reports that her ports are always open; that her guns run in and out of battery, and that they are loaded from the muzzle. He could distinctly hear the words of command, “In battery,” &c., and saw the hands of the men and the staff of the rammer protruded through the port in loading. He also reports that in No. 1 the muzzle of the gun when in battery protrudes about 6 inches from the port. He could see nothing of the same kind in Nos. 2 and 3. He could observe no injury done by our shot to the turret, the only observable effect being a whitish streak on the iron. The shot either glanced or were broken to pieces. One of our shot is reported to have struck about 6 inches from a port. According to Lieutenant Elarbee’s observations, and also Mr. McAlpin’s, the turret of No. 1 during this engagement turned only one way, the revolutions being to an outsider uniformly from left to right. Lieutenant Elarbee also observed that the motion of revolution was not even and continuous, but affected by a marked trip at regular intervals. The turret appeared to be sometimes arrested temporarily in its revolutions; whether from design, imperfect machinery, or injury from our shot could not be ascertained.

Clearly John Ericsson’s turret, while advanced for its day, was still somewhat cumbersome to use.

CW Confrence 10 Mar 12 070

Reproduction of the Monitor’s turret at the Mariners’ Museum

With no protective port covers, the crews had to turn the turrets away from the enemy during loading. Loading the guns from the muzzle in the cramped space was time consuming. The need to rotate the turret consumed even more time. And when the turrets rotated, those down range had ample warning to seek cover.

Elarbee’s observations provided the Confederates with a badly needed close up view of the monitors. While not quite a walk around tour, at least particulars about the operations and performance under fire. It is what we’d call today a technical intelligence report.

(Citation from OR, Series I, Volume 14, Serial 20, page 221.)

150 years ago: A privateer meets an untimely end on the Ogeechee

The steamer Nashville came to a fiery end on this day in 1863.

The ship began her career as the US Mail Steamer Nashville doing service between New York and Charleston. In that capacity on April 11, 1861 she entered Charleston harbor (having been fired on by the USRC Harriet Lane in the process). After the firing on Fort Sumter, Confederates seized the Nashville, turning her into an cruiser. The CSS Nashville was the first warship to fly the Confederate flag in Europe, making a run to England. On return, she was sold for service as a blockade runner, and a turn under the name Thomas L. Wragg. But she ran too deep in the water for that role. So she began a refit for service as a privateer, and received a new name – the Rattlesnake. By early 1863, the Rattlesnake sat upstream of Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River.

Regardless of the outfit, her Federal opponents knew her as the Nashville. And they considered her a great threat that must be be neutralized if not destroyed. On the morning of February 28, 1863, Commander John Worden took the ironclad USS Montauk into familiar waters near Fort McAllister, followed by a few wooden the USS Seneca, USS Wissahickon, and USS Dawn – all veterans of the earlier bombardments of the fort.

By moving up close to the obstructions in the river I was enabled, although under a heavy fire from the battery, to approach the Nashville, still aground, within the distance of 1,200 yards. A few well directed shells determined the range, and soon [we] succeeded in striking her with XI-inch and XV-inch shells. The other gunboats maintained a fire from an enfilading position upon the battery, and the Nashville at long range. I soon had the satisfaction of observing that the Nashville had caught fire from the shells exploding in her several places, and in less than twenty minutes she was caught in flames forward, aft, and amidships. At 9:20 a.m. a large pivot gun mounted abaft her foremast exploded from the heat; at 9:40 her smoke chimney went by the board, and at 9:55 her magazine exploded with terrific violence, shattering her in smoking ruins. Nothing remains of her.

However Worden was incorrect. Something did remain of the Nashville. And those remains are on display at Fort McAllister today.

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Salvaged parts of the CSS Nashville

The Montauk almost came to ruin herself. While backing down from the obstructions, she encountered a Confederate torpedoe. At 9:35 a violent explosion under the Montauk prompted the evacuation of the starboard side of the engine room. Damage included bent ribs, sheared rivets, and buckled plates under a boiler.


Engineer’s Diagram of the Damage

Despite fears, the boilers did not burst. Although taking in water, the crew managed to pump out enough to get the boilers re-fired. That afternoon the Montauk made safe anchorage in the sound.

While the Federals were able to repair the Montauk, the Nashville, or Rattlesnake if you prefer, was but an obstruction in the river.

(Citation from Naval OR, Series I, Volume 13, pages 697-8.)

150 Years Ago: “the 15-inch shell a partial failure” at Fort McAllister

One-hundred and fifty years ago today (February 1) once again elements of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron entered battle. This time activity took place in the Ogeechee River south of Savannah, Georgia. After an ineffective bombardment of Fort McAllister on January 27, 1863 Commander John Worden withdrew the monitor USS Montauk to resupply ammunition. On the morning of February 1, he again lead a force comprised of the gunboats USS Seneca and USS Wissahickon, with the mortar schooner USS C.P. Williams towed by the USS Dawn. By 7:30 a.m. the Montauk anchored some 600 yards below the fort with the gunboats positioned downstream to support. Fifteen minutes later, Worden ordered his ironclad to resume firing on Fort McAllister.

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View from Fort McAllister, looking downriver

About forty-five minutes into the bombardment, the Montauk scored a hit. A shot passed through an embrasure, disabling a 32-pdr gun and killing Major John B. Gallie, commander of the fort. Captain George Anderson replaced him and continued to direct fires against the Federal ships. The Confederates concentrated fire upon the Montauk, claiming to hit the ironclad at least eighteen times. Shortly after noon, by Anderson’s report, the Federals slipped downstream, opening the range. Later the Montauk’s turret ceased revolving, leading to speculation that one of those hits had scored a critical hit on the ironclad. Fort McAllister’s guns could not range the other vessels downriver. Furthermore, Anderson complained “Our rifle projectiles are miserable.”

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Reproduction 32-pdr at Fort McAllister

On the receiving end of these Confederate shots, Worden reported, “We were struck by projectiles forty-eight times, to wit, sixteen times on turret, three times on pilot house, seven times on smokestack, seven times on side armor, eight times on deck armor, once in gig, once in cutter, twice on boat’s spars, once on spare anchor, and had two flagstaffs shot away.” As the tide ebbed, Worden wisely let the Montauk slip downriver to avoid grounding. By mid-day, he was out of range and ceased fire.


Assessing the damage to the Montauk, Worden’s engineer reported dents but no fractures. “No effect was perceptible inside except in one instance, when two X-inch shot struck in rapid succession within 6 or 8 inches of each other near the base of the turret, immediately after which it was found difficult to revolve the turret until it was raised by driving in the key three-fourths of an inch, when it again revolved quite freely.” In short, the ironclad stood up well to anything the Confederates threw her way.

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Replica Columbiad at Fort McAllister

On the other side, the Confederates seemed likewise unimpressed with the monitor’s capabilities. Inspector General Major Henry Bryan reported:

The iron-clad seems to have fired principally 15-inch shell, one of which went directly through the parapet (17 feet thick) in front of a 32-pounder on the left. At this point the parapet was mostly built of marsh mud, which I infer cannot offer sufficient resistance to these missiles. Two shells seem to have struck near the same point on the parapet (made of sand) in front of the columbiad and tore away about a third of it, covering several men with sand; one or two were dug out. The resisting power of sand is very great, and after thick iron it makes probably the protection most desirable. So far as demolishing earthwork goes I am inclined to think the 15-inch shell a partial failure. I think a concentrated fire of smaller guns would have been more destructive to us. Had they burst better, however, the result might have been different.

Heavy Confederate guns could not seriously damage the monitors. And the monitors could not reduce earthwork forts. In the waterways around Savannah that translated to stalemate.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 14, Serial 20, pages 212-216 and ORN, Series I, Volume 13, pages 627-32.)