Abbot to Hunt: “Every step has been taken to hurry forward…”

In April 1864, Brigadier-General Henry Hunt sent recommendations and instructions to form a siege train supporting the Army of the Potomac’s next campaign.  On the first day of May 1864, Colonel Henry Abbot sent an update on his preparations toward that end:

Fort Richardson, VA., May 1, 1864.
Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac:

General: Yours of the 29th ultimo is received. I will at once make requisition for the sand-bags, as you suggest. I propose to take ten 8-inch siege howitzers. I have the following ordnance, and ordnance stores afloat at the present time, and the list is daily increasing: 4 ½-inch guns–18 guns, 20 carriages, 10 sets implements, 10 platforms, 3,600 rounds; 30-pounder Parrotts–2 guns, 10 carriages, 10 platforms, 2,600 rounds; 10-inch mortars–10 guns, 10 beds, 1,000 shells; 8-inch mortars–20 guns, 8 beds, 2,290 shells; Coehorns–1,900 shells; 1 battery wagon (D); 1 forge (A); 1 large sling cart; with many smaller articles. Every step has been taken to hurry forward the remainder, and it is loaded as fast as received. I have now 7 schooners, about 200 tons each.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Henry L. Abbot,
Colonel First Connecticut Artillery.

Notice that Abbot chose to work with the slack Hunt offered in regard to the 8-inch siege howitzers (which Hunt accepted with reservations).  Instead of forty 4 ½-inch siege rifles, the siege train contained a mix of 4 ½-inch and similar caliber 30-pdr Parrotts.

Hunt wanted 1,000 rounds per gun.  But the number accumulated by May 1 fell far short of that goal.  Hard to believe in the vast storehouses and magazines around Washington and Baltimore there were not many thousands of these projectiles.  I would offer a similar observation about the battery wagon and forge.  Far more was needed for a siege train of the size requested.

But with seven schooners to transport the siege train, Abbot had the means to deploy this force at almost any point in tidewater Virginia.

(Citation from OR, Series I, Volume 36, Part II, Serial 68, page 320.)

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“with considerable annoyance to the garrison”: Fifth “minor” bombardment of Fort Sumter

On April 28, 1864, Federals on the northern end of Morris Island opened another concentrated bombardment of Fort Sumter.  This bombardment lasted for a week.  And if you are counting, according to Captain John Johnson this was the fifth minor bombardment of Fort Sumter by the Federal batteries.  This fifth minor bombardment consisted primarily of mortar fire.  As Johnson described, “…at the close of April, several days were distinguished by a novel discharge of mortars, eight or ten in number, firing in volleys, all together, at irregular intervals, and with considerable annoyance to the garrison.”

From the fort, Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Elliott described the start of the bombardment in his daily report:

I have the honor to report that the enemy opened on the fort at 2 p.m., firing from two 10-inch and one 13-inch mortars.  Fired 51 shots, of which 28 missed.

Tallying shots fired on April 29, Elliott provided another short summary on the morning of April 30:

Two hundred and thirteen shells fired at the fort yesterday and last night; no injury.

He supplemented that tally the next morning:

Brigadier-General Alexander Schimmelfennig described the purpose of these mortar volleys in a report to Brigadier-General John Hatch:

The bombardment has been confined to shelling from our mortars at irregular intervals, and at the rate of about 4 an hour; occasionally by volleys from all the mortars. About one-half of the shells explode in or immediately over the fort. The result within the fort is not known, but the steamers have discontinued to ply between the city and Sumter at night. This firing has been ordered to prevent the enemy from carrying on the work of repair, which they have been doing to a considerable extent during the past month.

The 3rd Rhode Island Heavy Artillery manned those mortars, and we looked at their practice earlier this month.

April3_29_64_mortarFire

According to the Rhode Islanders, they fired 192 shells on April 29.  Much of the discrepancy between Elliott’s count and that of the Federals is explained by different time frames for the report observations.  Elliot said about a third of the Federal shells hit the fort.  The gunners contended 45% of their shots were good.   The Federals described the weather on April 29 as windy. They also noted several problems with powder and fuses.

As with the earlier mortar bombardment that month, most of the projectiles hurled at Fort Sumter came from Batteries Seymour and Barton.

MorrisIslandBatteries

The bombardment continued on through the first days of May, adding roughly 570 to the total count of projectiles fired at Fort Sumter during the war.  Elliott’s count by day was:

  • April 27 – Six shells bursting over the fort.  (prior to the recorded start of the bombardment, and perhaps ranging shots by the Federals.)
  • April 28 – 51 shells with 23 hits.
  • April 29 – 213 shells.
  • April 30 – 142 shells with 50 hits.  Another 25 fired after dark with 12 hits.
  • May 1 – 14 shells.
  • May 2 – 45 shells.
  • May 3 – 61 shells.
  • May 4 – 13 shells with 3 hits.
  • May 5 – all quiet.

During this period, Elliott recorded only one casualty in the fort – “one negro severely wounded.”

Based on observations of Confederate ironclads maneuvering and practicing in the harbor, Schimmelfennig directed a few shots at Charleston.  “The firing into the city is continued at the rate of 2 or 3 shots in twenty-four hours, at irregular intervals and in different directions.”  The Confederate response from the James Island and Sullivan’s Island batteries was not recorded by the Federals.

For the next week, Federals continued intermittent fire on Fort Sumter.  While making more noise and ensuring the Confederates felt the presence of the garrison on Morris Island, there is no indication these fires delayed any troop movements.  On the night of April 30-May 1, the Confederates successfully switched out the garrison, replacing companies of Brigadier-General Johnson Hagood’s brigade, which were tabbed for movement to Virginia.

Thus was the fifth “minor” bombardment.  Well over 500 shells fired.  Any other place in the war that might be a major engagement with appropriate battle honors.  At Charleston, it was just another incident in a long siege.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part I, Serial 65, pages 52-3, 205-6; John Johnson, The Defense of Charleston Harbor: Including Fort Sumter and the Adjacent Islands, 1863-1865, Walker, Evans & Cogswell Company, 1890, pages 206.)

Henry Hunt on “short howitzers for vertical fire”

When discussing artillery’s ballistic properties, the terms “horizontal fire” and “vertical fire” come into play.  As the names imply, these refer to the path of the projectile relative to the earth’s surface.  Due to gravity and other natural forces, horizontal fire is not ruler-straight, but a flat curve.  Vertical fire, likewise, is not straight up (or one hopes not), but rather a tall curve.  The early gunners of the first artillery pieces learned that different trajectories offered advantages that could be applied to a tactical situation.  In a nutshell, horizontal fire worked well to batter an obstacle while vertical fire could put projectiles over and beyond the obstacle.  Tactical application of basic physics.

By the time of the Civil War, vertical fire had become somewhat a “specialty” technique.  Field artillerists were certainly aware of vertical fire and employed it on occasion.  But on the open battlefields, field artillery fired directly on targets – or horizontally.   The hausse sight saw more use than the gunners’ quadrant.

That in mind, consider correspondence from Brigadier-General Henry Hunt, Artillery Chief, Army of the Potomac, to Brigadier-General George Ramsay, Chief of Ordnance for the US Army:

Artillery Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
April 21, 1864.
Brig. Gen. George D. Ramsay,
Chief of Ordnance, Washington, D.C.:

General: I have at your request examined the proposition of Capt. [Adolph] Schwartz, aide-de-camp, for the introduction into our service of short howitzers for vertical fire.

As to the necessity, there are but few occasions in which the light 12-pounder gun will not, by reducing the charge and giving high elevations, perform the service required of the short howitzers. The caliber being smaller, a greater number of guns must be brought into requisition and a greater number of shells used, but these field batteries can supply.

In the few cases in which the 12-pounder field gun cannot accomplish the work of the proposed howitzers, from the enemy occupying hollows or low grounds which cannot be seen, or where he is behind works or cover at short ranges which the shells of the gun cannot reach, a few Coehorn mortars would answer the purpose required. These mortars form a part of our system of artillery. Four of them, with their bed, can readily be carried in a common wagon; they have ranges from 500 to 1,000 yards, and eight or a dozen of them, with 50 or 60 rounds each of ammunition, would, with the 12-pounders of an army corps or of an army, answer all the purposes likely to be required.

I do not undervalue the howitzer for its special service, but I think the evil of adding to the number and variety of our kinds of guns and ammunition would outweigh the advantage.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Henry J. Hunt,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

“Captain” Adolph Schwartz was at that time of the war “Major” Adolph Schwartz, a staff officer serving in the Thirteenth Corps, posted on the Mississippi.  And Schwartz is an interesting character.  Early in the war Schwartz commanded Battery E, 2nd Illinois Artillery (though formed in St. Louis, Missouri).  He served with distinction on many early war battles in the west, in particular at Shiloh.  His wartime service was closely linked to Major-General John A. McClernand.  From Belmont to Vicksburg, Schwartz served as McClernand’s adviser, artillery chief, ordnance chief, and at times adjutant.  The congratulatory order issued after Arkansas Post, which angered William T. Sherman and to some degree U.S. Grant, came from Schwartz, by order of McClernand of course.   (However, I am at a loss to put together Schwartz’ pre-war background.  If any readers have leads, I would appreciate it.)

I’ve looked far and low for a copy of Schwartz’ suggestion.  As an “artillery historian” I have long wanted to see the details suggested and determine what tactical observations Schwartz offered.  And at the same time, this particular letter from Schwartz might help explain the context of Hunt’s response.  I suspect Schwartz suggested use of short-length howitzers of 24-pounder caliber (basing that on the details offered in Hunt’s response).

Because Hunt was asked to respond, one might assume the suggestion was directly addressed to the Army of the Potomac.  But the first strike against that is the reference to “Captain” Schwartz. I doubt that Hunt knew Schwartz directly.  And thus was probably using the rank he saw on the referenced document.  I’m not certain when Schwartz received promotion to major, but do know in January 1863 he was signing orders as a major.   Thus the suggestion likely dated from 1862 or earlier.

So was this a general observation offered by a lowly captain, sent directly to the Ordnance Department following field experience in the Western Theater?  Or was this a suggestion passed up the chain of command, slowly, and eventually landing at the Ordnance Department for comment?  Or does it really matter?  OK… I’ll leave that determination until Schwartz’s suggestion is available.

But let us focus on Hunt’s dismissal of the proposal.  He offered that 12-pdr Napoleons and Coehorn mortars would fill the needs.  And the bottom line, echoing Hunt’s experience from several major campaigns – there was no need to introduce yet another “system” to the field artillery.  He preferred to keep the guns, their trains, and their support arrangements very simple and uniform.

But wait… Coehorns?  Those were not part of the Army of the Potomac’s formal artillery park.  Hunt said, “These mortars form a part of our system of artillery.”  I read that to mean the “big Army’s system of artillery” as in that approved by the War Department and posted to the manuals.  I don’t think he is saying, as of that date, the Army of the Potomac had formally incorporated Coehorns into the artillery park.  There are several references, by Hunt, including Coehorns in the siege train setup to support the Army of the Potomac.  One of which was in April 1864, when Hunt requested twenty Coehorns set aside in Washington as part of the siege train to support the army.  But that siege train was not included with the force about to crash into the Wilderness, but rather a force held in reserve, should the situation call for formal siege operations.

So why am I picking on this response from Hunt about some letter written by an obscure artillerist from the west?  Here’s the point – Hunt didn’t have Coehorns on hand to “answer the purpose required” as a formal part of his artillery reserve when he wrote in April.  However, he did have Coehorns on hand in May.  To be exact, “eight 24-pounder Coehorn mortars with 100 rounds each of ammunition were served by a detachment of Fifteenth New York Foot Artillery.

So… did Schwartz’s suggestion have some influence on Hunt’s inclusion of two wagon loads of Coehorns?

(Citation from OR, Series I, Volume 33, Serial 60, page 935.)

“I would propose … the train be intrusted to Colonel Abbot”: Organizing a Siege Train for the 1864 Campaign

Earlier I posted about the reorganization, or if you prefer, consolidation, of the field artillery in the weeks before the start of the Overland Campaign.  Another organizational action, no less critical to the ultimate objective of the campaign, for the artillery supporting the Army of the Potomac was the re-creation of the siege train.  If the upcoming campaign were completely successful, and destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia outside of Richmond, then there would be little need for a siege train or any artillery.  But the most likely scenario (and what did come to pass) involved a siege of Richmond in some form.  Acting on prompts from his superiors, Brigadier-General Henry Hunt put forward his recommendations on April 16, 1864:

Artillery Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
April 16, 1864.
Major-General Humphreys,
Chief of Staff:
General: I have respectfully to submit the following proposition for the organization of a siege train, should one be required for service with this army near Richmond:

The train should be prepared in Washington, and as a minimum composed of forty 4 ½-inch siege guns, six spare carriages: ten 10-inch mortars, two spare carriages; twenty 8-inch mortars, four spare carriages; twenty Coehorn mortars.

With the proper implements and equipments, tool wagons, sling carts, battery wagons and forges, mortar wagons, &c., the eight 4½-inch siege guns of Abbot’s regiment (First Connecticut Heavy Artillery), lately sent to Washington, to constitute a part of the train. If the material can be brought by water or rail to within a reasonable distance of the point at which the train is to be used, the horse teams of the two siege batteries and those of the Artillery Reserve would be available for transporting the guns, and such additional mule teams as are required to bring them up can, it is supposed, be furnished from the quartermaster’s trains. The ammunition trains of the Artillery Reserve and artillery brigades attached to corps can be employed for the transport of the ammunition.

There should be provided for each siege gun 1,000 rounds of ammunition: for each siege mortar 600 shells: for each Coehorn mortar 200. Of this ammunition 200 rounds per piece should be brought up before opening fire; the remainder to be near enough to enable the supply to be kept up. At least 500 sand-bags should be supplied for each gun and mortar of the train, with an equal number in reserve.

I would propose that the organization of the train be intrusted to Colonel Abbot, First Connecticut Artillery, whose regiment served with the siege train at the siege of Yorktown. That the work may proceed with the utmost rapidity, another regiment of foot artillery (Kellogg’s, Warner’s, or Piper’s) might be added to Colonel Abbot’s command. Colonel Kellogg served with credit in the First Connecticut Artillery at Yorktown and is familiar with the duties. The two regiments of foot artillery in the reserve will be available as reliefs, guards for working parties, fabrication of gabions and fascines, filling sand-bags, &c.

The instruction of the regiments with the train in the mechanical maneuvers, laying of platforms, &c., should commence at once. A thorough knowledge of these duties will save much time when every hour is valuable. The material and working directions for constructing magazines, one for every four guns, should also be prepared in advance, that workmen drawn from the foot artillery regiments with the army may assist the engineers or construct them themselves.

It is understood that there are rifled 32-pounders, 4-inch caliber, in the works at Richmond. Should it be considered necessary to oppose to them guns of corresponding power (100-pounders) the ordnance officer should be instructed to prepare them and their material. This would be a timely precaution.

In case it should be thought necessary to move the train by water up the Pamunkey to the neighborhood of Hanover Court-House, instructions should be given to load the material on barges, double-decked ones if possible, such as are used on the Hudson River for transportation of flour, and do not draw more than 5 feet. This depth I understand is found as far up as the bridge at Widow Lumpkin’s, near Crump Creek, and within 5 miles by land of the railroad. The depth of water and the nature of the road from the bridge to the railway should be ascertained positively before procuring the barges. A decked scow or two and 100 or 200 feet of trestle bridging, similar to that prepared by Major Duane for the pontoon train, but of stronger dimensions, should be provided to enable landings to be effected at any point.

Henry J. Hunt,
Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.

Hunt knew exactly the make of weapons he wanted in the siege train.  Notice he still preferred the 4.5-inch rifles over the Parrotts of similar caliber (30-pdr).  And for someone who had worked primarily with field artillery over the last three years, Hunt knew the value of high angle mortar fire in siege operations.  Lower in the proposal, he turns to the heavy 100-pdr Parrotts, but only as a counter to similar caliber Confederate weapons.  Such leads me to believe Hunt saw the artillery’s primary role during any such siege to be firing in support of the engineers advancing parallels, and not demolishing enemy works.

Hunt called for 500 sandbags per gun, with another 500 in reserve.  Given the number of sandbags used the previous summer on Morris Island, I would say his estimates were low.

Notice also, in the last paragraph, how Hunt called out specific locations from which to base the siege trains and how they might be moved forward.  The lessons from the 1862 Richmond Campaign hold up while planning for 1864.

And Hunt knew exactly who he wanted manning the guns and leading those gunners.  Two batteries of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, armed with 4.5-inch rifles, had performed well as part of the Army’s artillery reserve.  And the 1st  Connecticut earlier served with the Army of the Potomac in the 1862 campaign against Richmond.  The man to lead the siege trains was Colonel Henry L. Abbot.  Hunt knew exactly what he was getting there.  Abbot was one of the best artillerists of the war, though you’ve probably never heard of him because his specialty was heavy artillery.  For those unfamiliar with Abbot, I hope to introduce him and his work over the last year of the sesquicentennial … that is if Brett does not beat me to it!

(Citation from OR, Series I, Volume 33, Serial 60, pages 880-1.)

Mortars at night against Fort Sumter: Another “minor” bombardment

Although not at the rate seen the previous fall, shot and shell still fell around Charleston as the spring season arrived.  Federals on Morris Island continued what is best described as “harassing fire” on Fort Sumter.  Usually no more than a handful of mortar or Parrott rifle rounds.  But on the afternoon of April 3, the pace of fire picked up.  Reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Elliott, the fort’s commander, reflected this increase.  His report on the morning of April 3 noted the previous night’s activities:

Fort Sumter, April 3, 1864.
Sir: Eight shots were fired while the obstructions were being taken in before daylight this morning; 6 struck, but did no damage, No further change.

Later, after dark, he sent another report:

Fort Sumter, April 3, 1864.
Enemy commenced firing slowly from two mortars at 5 o’clock this afternoon.

And the following morning, he offered this summary:

Fort Sumter, April 4, 1864.
Sir: I have the honor to report the firing continued up to 5 a.m. There were 66 mortar and 1 Parrott shell fired at the fort, of which 57 struck. One negro killed; no injury done to the work.

A “minor” bombardment for Charleston.  Yet anywhere else, that many heavy projectiles would have solicited more than a few casual lines in a report.  Elliot’s carried a humdrum tone.  On the other side of the channel, the Federals might have contested his round count.  The 3rd Rhode Island Heavy Artillery reported firing 80 shots that day from two 10-inch mortars:

April3_29_64_mortarFire

The table includes figures for fires on April 29, which I’ll turn to at the appropriate time.  The 3rd’s regimental history described the weather at the time as calm.  The two mortars firing on April 3 were in Battery Seymour, just outside Fort Chatfield.

MorrisIslandBatteries

Given the Federal mortarmen knew better what they fired, I go with 80 shells fired, propelled by 490 pounds of powder, to a range of 1,800 yards.  Seventy five of those hit Fort Sumter with five falling short.  Yet, for all that effort, no serious damage to the fort and only one casualty – one of the laborers at that.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part I, Serial 65, pages 199-200; Frederic Denison, Shot and Shell: The Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery Regiment in the Rebellion, 1861-1865, Providence, R.I.: Third Rhode Island Artillery Veterans Association, 1879, page 239.)

150 Years Ago: An inspection of the batteries on Sullivan’s Island

One aspect of the operations of Charleston that I like to present is the evolution of fortifications around the harbor (Federal and Confederate).  In my opinion, one should study such to appreciate the tactical aspects. Many authors will write on the subject as if a “battery” or “fort” was static and unchanged through the war, and thus representing a generic “unit” of force.  However, I would offer the level of detail offered in reports and correspondence during the war indicate the participants saw no small importance in the evolution of those defenses.  In other words, if the participants in 1864 thought it important to mention the different caliber of weapons, then 150 years later we should lend that aspect some manner of interpretation.

In the case of Sullivan’s Island, one can easily trace the evolution of the works from the very first days of the war, through improvements prior to the Ironclad Attack on Fort Sumter, changes after the fall of Morris Island, and all the way up to the fall of Charleston in 1864.  A report posted by Major George Upshur Mayo on March 29, 1864 provides one of several “snapshots” describing the works on Sullivan’s Island on that time line.  The entire report, including endorsements, is close to 3,000 words with three pages of tables, including a count of all munitions (the report appears in the ORs, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, pages 383-6).  For brevity, allow me to present portions of the main report with additional annotations where needed.  And for reference, these are the works in review:

Sullivans_Island_Batteries

Starting from the western-most battery:

Battery Bee, upon the western extremity, is not yet quite completed, though a number of laborers are engaged upon it. Its armament is in an effective condition, the guns all working well and protected by merlons. The magazines are dry and kept with neatness. The ammunition in them, as far as could be judged without examining each cartridge, is in good order; the implements new. There are three chambers which have no cannon, which, I presume, will be furnished when necessity or opportunity requires.

Mayo indicated Battery Bee included one 11-inch Dahlgren (salvaged from the USS Keokuk), four 10-inch columbiads, one 10-inch rifled columbiad, and one 8-inch columbiad. In the magazines were 241 11-inch shot, 97 11-inch shell, 671 10-inch shot, 435 10-inch shell, 50 10-inch grapeshot, 25 10-inch canister, 45 10-inch (rifled) bolts, 6 10-inch rifled shells, 338 8-inch shot, 134 8-inch shells, 30 8-inch canister, 124 11-inch cartridges, 626 10-inch cartridges, 180 8-inch cartridges, 2,496 pounds of common powder, 1,587 friction tubes, and 985 paper fuses.  Interesting, though, Mayo rated Battery Bee as incomplete even at this late date with open gun positions.

On to the next battery in the line:

Battery Marion, connected with Battery Bee, is neatly policed. The platform for the 7-inch Brooke gun has settled from its true position; the parapets in one or two places have a disposition to slide on account of the shifting character of the sand. Dampness begins to ooze through one place in the passage, not as yet sufficient to affect the ammunition, which is in good order.

Colonel [William] Butler complains of a defect in the powder sent from the naval ordnance bureau with or for the Brooke gun, saying experience has proven it to be defective in strength. To the eye it appears good; analysis can only disclose the reported defect. The same officer requests that efforts be made to procure for the guns in his command a small quantity of bar steel to repair the eccentrics of the columbiad carriages, which repairs, when necessary, can be made at the island. The battery is connected with Fort Moultrie by a sally-port.

Mayo tallied Battery Marion’s armament as three 10-inch columbiads, one 8-inch columbiad, and five 10-inch seacoast mortars; but he didn’t count the triple-banded 7-inch Brooke which was not mounted at that time.  In the magazines were 318 10-inch shot, 261 10-inch shells, 23 10-inch canister, 256 10-inch mortar shells, 125 7-inch rifle shells, 522 7-inch bolts, 16 7-inch hollow shot, 252 10-inch cartridges, 201 8-inch cartridges, 207 7-inch cartridges, 8,800 pounds of powder, 1,900 friction primers, and 600 paper fuses.

Mayo gave only a brief report on Fort Moultrie:

Fort Moultrie, next in order upon the island, has now no quarters inside, which gives a good parade within its walls. It is well protected by a system of traverses and the guns in effective condition. The magazine is in good order and neatly kept. In the rear of the fort are a number of broken canister, which might be removed for renewal to Charleston. The ammunition in good order.

The fort’s armament at that time consisted of four 10-inch columbiads, two 8-inch rifled columbiads, one 32-pdr banded and rifled, two 24-pdr smoothbore guns, and one 10-inch seacoast mortar.  Munitions in the fort included 660 10-inch shot, 269 10-inch shells, 36 10-inch canister, 33 10-inch spherical case, 90 8-inch shot, 53 8-inch shells, 190 8-inch rifled bolts, 274 32-pdr shells, 120 32-pdr rifled bolts, 553 24-pdr shot, 83 24-pdr grapeshot, 89 24-pdr canister, 450 10-inch cartridges, 255 8-inch cartridges, 485 32-pdr cartridges, 168 24-pdr cartridges, 18,275 pounds of common powder, 130 pounds of rifle powder, and 4,510 friction tubes.

Continuing, Mayo reached Battery Rutledge:

Battery Rutledge in good order, with its ammunition dry and well cared for. The batteries from Bee to this one constitute one continuous parapet, well protected with traverses and spacious, well arranged bomb-proofs, and in some instances with amputating rooms for the medical bureau; these of course were not visited.

Battery Rutledge contained three 10-inch columbiads, one 10-inch columbiad rifle, and three 10-inch seacoast mortars.  The magazines contained 396 10-inch shot, 125 10-inch shell, 7 10-inch grapeshot, 26 10-inch canister, 11 10-inch caseshot, 58 10-inch rifled bolts, 22 10-inch rifled shells, 40 10-inch mortar shells, 126 6-pdr canister (fixed), 29 6-pdr (fixed) shot, 236 10-inch cartridges, 4,000 pounds of common powder, and 2,300 pounds of damaged powder.

Mayo did not include a narrative assessment of Fort Beauregard, but listed the armament as one 10-inch columbiad, one 8-inch rifled and banded columbiad, one 8-inch smoothbore columbiad, two 32-pdr banded and rifled guns, one 32-pdr smoothbore gun, two 24-pdr smoothbore guns, and three 8-inch seacoast howitzers.  In Fort Beauregard’s magazine were 106 10-inch shot, 3 10-inch canister, 416 8-inch shot, 111 8-inch shell, 79 8-inch grapeshot, 113 8-inch canister, 169 8-inch shell, 69 8-inch rifled bolts, 101 32-pdr shot, 12 32-pdr shells, 80 32-pdr grapeshot, 69 32-pdr canister, 166 32-pdr rifled bolts, 7 32-pdr conical rifled shot, 156 32-pdr rifled shells, 229 24-pdr shot, 156 24-pdr grapeshot, 2 24-pdr conical smoothbore shell, 130 24-pdr canister, 749 unfixed cartridges of various sizes,  1,800 pounds of common powder, 1,150 pounds of “Rodman” powder (presumably “Mammoth” powder), 200 pounds of damaged powder, and 1,529 friction tubes.

Mayo turned next to the four numbered, and unnamed, batteries between Forts Beauregard and Marshall.

Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, two-gun batteries extending along the south beach at an average distance of about 500 yards apart, covering the space between Forts Beauregard and Marshall and intended seemingly as a protection against boat assaults, are small open works with no traverses. There being no magazine in this cordon of works, the ammunition is kept in chests, exposed to the weather. Some of the chests need repairs and tarpaulins as a protection.

Mayo suggested improvements to the parapet of No. 1; mentioned a carriage in No. 3 that required repair; and damages to the parapet of No. 4. Mayo also suggested these works needed iron traverse circles to replace wood circles then in place.  Colonel Ambrosio Gonzales overruled, saying the 24-pdr guns should be mounted on siege carriages to allow redeployment where needed on the island.  Mayo noted the “disparity” in the ammunition for each of these batteries:

  • No. 1:  Two 32-pdr smoothbore guns, 104 32-pdr shot, 15 32-pdr shells, 77 32-pdr grapeshot, 78 32-pdr canister, 93 32-pdr cartridges, and 176 friction tubes.
  • No. 2: two 24-pdr smoothbores, 84 24-pdr shot, 100 24-pdr grape, 32 24-pdr canister, 69 24-pdr cartridges, 140 friction tubes, and 5 signal rockets.
  • No. 3: Two 32-pdr smoothbores, 34 32-pdr shot, 9 32-pdr shells, 48 32-pdr grape, 50 32-pdr canister, 46 32-pdr cartridges, and 49 friction tubes.
  • No. 4: Two 24-pdr smootbores, 88 24-pdr shot, 14 24-pdr shells, 111 24-pdr grape, 99 24-pdr canister, 29 24-pdr cartridges, and 41 friction tubes.

The last work on the line inspected by Mayo was Fort (or Battery) Marshall, at Breach Inlet:

Battery Marshall, at Beach Inlet, is as yet in an incomplete condition, though the guns are all in working order. A large bomb-proof, in addition to those already complete, has been commenced, upon which a force is now at work. One of the 12-pounders has wheels of different sizes, and in another the cheeks of the carriage are not upon a level. These two defects in these two carriages should be remedied. The magazines are in good order, and dry, as well as the ammunition, but roaches, by which they are infested, cut the cartridge-bags. It would therefore be as well to keep the powder in the boxes and barrels until a necessity arises for use, so that the bags may be preserved. I noticed the passage-way to one of the magazines much encumbered with shell. A room constructed for such projectiles is decidedly to be preferred.

Fort Marshall, at this time, included one 8-inch columbiad, one 8-inch shell gun, one 7-inch Brooke rifle, one 32-pdr rifle, two 12-pdr rifled guns, two 12-pdr smoothbores, one 4-inch Blakely on naval carriage, and three 8-inch seacoast howitzers.  The magazines, improper as they were, contained 95 8-inch shot, 225 8-inch shell, 71 8-inch grapeshot, 90 8-inch canister, 156 7-inch conical rifled bolts, 19 32-pdr shells, 12 32-pdr grapeshot, 16 32-pdr canister, 32 32-pdr rifled shot, 100 32-pdr rifled shells, 292 12-pdr shot, 124 12-pdr grapeshot, 124 12-pdr canister, 25 12-pdr conical rifled shot, 62 12-pdr conical rifled shells, 32 4-inch Blakely shells, 28 4-inch Blakely grapeshot, 21 4-inch Blakely canister,  866 cartridges of various sizes, 2,800 pounds of common powder, 500 friction tubes, 35 paper fuses, 190 Girardey fuses, and 92 McAvoy igniters.

Mayo went on to discuss Batteries Gary, Kinloch and Palmetto on the mainland. But to serve brevity in a post already beyond my preferred word count, I will save those for later.

Mayo expressed concerns about unmounted and unassigned guns on the island.  “A 32-pounder banded rifle not mounted is laying upon the beach,” he noted.  He also mentioned several 6-pdr field pieces not under any direct control of the battery commanders.  In general, Mayo felt the guns needed “lacquer and paint” to improve appearances and protect against the elements.  Lastly, he noted the presence of bedding in the magazines, but left that matter to the discretion of local commanders.

I plan, as part of my documentation of each individual work, to examine these batteries in detail.  So please check back for follow up posts in regard to specific arrangements in each fortification.

Battery Reynolds and Mortars on Morris Island

When the sesquicentennial moment was proper for the discussion of Battery Reynolds, I lacked the right photo.  Well since it is Fortification Friday, I’ll throw this one in. (I’ll post a proper Fortification Friday later, gotta get the graphics right!)

As first built, Battery Reynolds contained mix of field and siege guns, facing Battery Wagner at a range of 1,335 yards. On July 14, 1863, Colonel Edward Serrell turned over this diagram showing Battery Reynolds and other works that would be come the First Parallel.

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The mix of two 30-pdr Parrotts, six 10-pdr Parrotts, four 3-inch Ordnance Rifles, two 3.67-inch Wiard Rifles, and five 8-inch siege mortars in that version of Battery Reynolds supported the July 18 assault on Battery Wagner.  No photos, to my knowledge, exist of Battery Reynolds in that configuration.

In late July, as engineers transformed that original line into siege batteries to engage both Battery Wagner and Fort Sumter, the trace of the works changed.

BatteryReynoldsMap

The Navy Battery took over some space on the First Parallel.  However, five field gun platforms remained on the right side of the battery close to the beach (and were used early in the siege operations). And the five mortar positions remained on what became the left side of Battery Reynolds. Earlier, I discussed the operations of these mortar batteries along with those in Battery Weed.

We have a photograph showing four of those five mortars in Battery Reynolds:

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The mortar on the right has a crew about to load a shell.

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I think the fifth mortar in the battery is actually to the right of this one, and blocked by one of the three traverses in this section of the line.

The crew on the center two mortars seems to stand awkwardly… yes staged awkward.

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Notice the line draped off the breech of the mortar on the right.  We’ll come back to that.  Also notice the platforms here.  These do not look like Major Thomas Brooks’ improved platforms.  Rather those appear to be the standard type described in the Army manuals.  The mortar on the far left also has a standard type bed.

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I bet those guys are getting tired holding that shell by the thongs.

Going back to the line mentioned earlier. The other end of that line extends up the parapet to an aiming post.

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Looking back to the right, the traverse on that side has a splinter-proof for the crews.

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Boxes, muskets, and accouterments stacked somewhat orderly against the sandbags.  These were men of Companies H and D, Seventh Connecticut Infantry, commanded by Captain Benjamin F. Skinner.

At each position are regulation type baskets, with gunners quadrants and other required items.

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To pinpoint this photo’s location in the Key Maps, I referenced something in the background:

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That’s one of the Whitworth Rifles in the Navy Battery.

And what is that setting on the far side of the gun?

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Looks like a pair of boots to me.  Maybe these boots?

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This photo also shows the wide array of headgear in use on Morris Island.  There’s this rather skinny fellow holding his end of the shell and wearing what appears to be a Hardee Hat made for someone with a much larger head than his.

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Most of the hats are kepis.  To the front of the mortar, this fellow’s kepi has a complete set of hat brass.

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Personally, if I were stationed on a hot, sandy Morris Island in the summer, I’d want a slouch hat.  Sort of like what these fellows on the left are sporting.

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There you have it – The Battery Reynolds photograph, mortars and fashion show.

[Photo Credit: Hagley Museum and Library collection of Haas & Peale photographs, ID Number 71MSS918_026.tif ]