Summary Statement, 4th Quarter, 1863 – 2nd Illinois Artillery

At the end of 1863, Colonel Thomas S. Mather remained the commander of the 2nd Illinois Light Artillery. Mather had been Chief of Staff for Major-General John McClernand. But with that officer’s relief during the Vicksburg Campaign, Mather had hitched his wagon to a falling star. Mather would go on to serve in other staff positions while remaining the colonel of the regiment. As for the rest of the regiment, batteries served in the Mississippi River Valley in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

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  • Battery A:  No report. The battery remained with First Division, Thirteenth Corps (minus one detached section).  Captain Herman Borris remained in command.  Starting the fall at Carrollton, Louisiana, the battery supported some campaigning in October and November through west Louisiana. At the end of December the battery was assigned to the Defenses of New Orleans. At some point in the fall, the first section of the battery, which had served on detached service in Missouri, rejoined the command.
  • Battery B: No report. Captain Fletcher H. Chapman commanded the battery, part of the Sixteenth Corps and assigned to the District of Corinth. The battery would move to Memphis when Corinth was abandoned in January.
  • Battery C: At Fort Donelson, Tennessee with four 3.80-inch James Rifles. Captain James P. Flood’s was assigned to Third Division, Reserve Corps, Army of the Cumberland. But with that corps disbanded with the army’s reorganization, the garrison was part of the District of Nashville, Department of the Cumberland.
  • Battery D: Indicated at Grand Junction, Tennessee with four 3.80-inch James Rifles. Captain Charles S. Cooper remained in command of this battery, then assigned to Fifth Division, Sixteenth Corps, out of the Memphis District.
  • Battery E: No report. In the previous quarter, this battery was at Carrollton, Louisiana with three 6-pdr field guns and one 12-pdr field howitzer.  Captain George L. Nipsel, promoted in the late summer, commanded the battery, which was assigned to Third Division, Thirteenth Corps, Department of the Gulf. After supporting campaigns in west Louisiana during the fall, the battery was assigned duty at Plaquemine, Louisiana, District of Baton Rouge. Lieutenant Emil Steger was acting commander at the close of the quarter.
  • Battery F: Indicated at what appears to be Hebron, Mississippi with two 6-pdr field guns and two 12-pdr field howitzers.  The battery was assigned to Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps with Captain John W. Powell in command. But with him serving as division artillery chief, Lieutenant Walter H Powell led the battery. During the fall, the battery participated in an expedition into Louisiana (Harrisonburg). Then returned to Nachez, which is the actual battery location at the close of the year. Hebron, may be a contraction of New Hebron and a place associated with the Meridian Campaign. Thus may allude to the battery location in February 1864, when the report was filed.
  • Battery G: At Columbus, Kentucky with four rifled 6-pdr (3.67-inch) guns. Captain Frederick Sparrestrom commanded this battery. After duty in Vicksburg and Memphis through the summer and early fall, the battery was assigned to District of Columbus, Sixteenth Corps (with duty at times in Union City, Tennessee).
  • Battery H: Reporting at Clarksville, Tennessee  two 6-pdr field guns and four 3.80-inch James Rifles. Captain Henry C. Whittemore remained in command.  With the reorganization of the department’s Reserve Corps, the battery was listed in the garrison of Clarksville, District of Nashville, Department of the Cumberland.
  • Battery I:  At Chattanooga, Tennessee, turning in an assortment of weapons for six 3-inch Ordnance Rifles.  Captain Charles M. Barnett commanded this battery, assigned to Second Division, Fourteenth Corps.
  • Battery K: No report.  This battery, under Captain Benjamin F. Rodgers, was at Natchez at this time of the war. A series of reorganizations brought the battery back to Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps. In the new year, the battery would be assigned to the Defenses and Post of Natchez.
  • Battery L: Listed at Vicksburg with four 3.80-inch James Rifles. Part of Third Division, Seventeenth Corps. Captain William H. Bolton commanded.
  • Battery M: No report. In the previous quarter, the battery reported four 3.80-inch James Rifles and a location of Greenville, Tennessee.  Captain John C. Phillips command this battery, which assigned to the Twenty-third Corps, Army of the Ohio. Confederate advances in east Tennessee, in October, forced the withdrawal of Federal forces east of Knoxville, and that included Battery M. And around that time, Phillips was recalled to Nashville on other duties, leaving Lieutenant W.C.G.L. Stevenson in command. The battery was sent out in support of two regiments of cavalry scouting for Confederate raiders. This force was camped four miles outside Rogersville, Tennessee on November 6 when attacked by Confederates under Brigadier-General William E. Jones. Ill-prepared, outnumbered, and outmaneuvered, the force was all but destroyed. The battery spiked their guns. Survivors who were not captured reassembled under Phillips and assigned duty at Camp Nelson, Kentucky. Such events explain the lack of reporting for this battery.

Moving on to the ammunition and stores reported, we begin with smoothbore rounds:

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  • Battery F: 184 shot and 135 case for 6-pdr field guns; 120 shell and 133 case for 12-pdr field howitzers.
  • Battery H: 166 shot and 140 case for 6-pdr field guns.
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  • Battery F: 28 canister for 6-pdr field guns and 31 canister for 12-pdr field howitzers.
  • Battery H: 42 canister for 6-pdr field guns.

On the right side of this page are the Hotchkiss columns for rifled projectiles:

  • Battery C: 100 shot and 68 shell (time fuse) for 3.80-inch James rifles.
  • Battery G: 566 shell (time fuse) for 3.67-inch rifles.
  • Battery H: 10 shot for 3.80-inch James rifles.
  • Battery I: 222 shell (time fuse) for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery L: 123 shell (time fuse) for 3.80-inch James rifles.

Additional Hotchkiss on the next page:

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  • Battery C: 385 shell (percussion fuse) and 346 canister for 3.80-inch James.
  • Battery G: 80 canister for 3.67-inch rifles.
  • Battery H: 32 canister for 3.80-inch rifles.
  • Battery I: 125 shell (percussion fuse) and 286 canister for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery L: 161 shell (percussion fuse) and 60 canister for 3.80-inch rifles.

Moving to the right, we see James projectiles also on this page:

  • Battery C: 7 shot, 24 shell, and 2 canister for 3.80-inch rifles.
  • Battery D: 45 shot, 203 (?) shell, and 60 canister for 3.80-inch rifles.
  • Battery H: 105 shot, 242 shell, and 214 canister for 3.80-inch rifles.
  • Battery L: 128 shell and 129 canister for 3.80-inch rifles.

On the next page we focus on the Schenkl projectiles:

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  • Battery D: 64 shot and 128 shell for 3.80-inch rifles.
  • Battery I: 252 shot for 3-inch rifles.

One last entry for Schenkl on the next page:

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  • Battery D: 64 case shot for 3.80-inch rifles.

Turning now to the small arms reported:

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  • Battery C: Seventy-four Colt army revolvers, four cavalry sabers, and six horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery F: Twenty-three Colt army revolvers and twenty-three cavalry sabers.
  • Battery H: Fifty-four Colt army revolvers and seven cavalry sabers.
  • Battery I: Thirteen Colt navy revolvers and fifteen horse artillery sabers.

Notice, no long guns…. On the next page there are cartridge bags reported:

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  • Battery C: 728 6-pdr or 12-pdr bags.
  • Battery D: 540 James rifle bags.
  • Battery G: 746 6-pdr or 12-pdr bags.

The last page lists small arms cartridges, fuses, primers, and other materials:

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  • Battery C: 1,880 army revolver cartridges; 1,150 friction primers; and 503 percussion caps.
  • Battery D: 222 navy revolver cartridges and 660 friction primers. (We might wonder if there are some un-reported revolvers with Battery D.)
  • Battery F: 1,010 army revolver cartridges and 365 friction primers.
  • Battery G: 566 paper fuses and 895 friction primers.
  • Battery H: 1,000 army revolver cartridges; 1,200 friction primers; 50 yards of slow match; and 500 percussion caps.
  • Battery I: 460 paper fuses and 1,694 friction primers.
  • Battery L: 800 friction primers.

At the close of 1863 the 2nd Illinois was sort of at an organizational cross-roads. Batteries from this regiment had participated in several of the important western campaigns of the year, in some cases playing an important role. Some would continue at the fore of the 1864 campaigns. But many of these batteries were sent to garrison duties. Some, such as Battery M, would never serve as a battery again. By the end of the year, enlistments would come due. Instead of recruiting up to full strength, the state consolidated many of these batteries. So this “snapshot” by way of the ordnance summary is in some ways a last good look at the unit as a full organization.

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Mahan on Artillery Tactics, Part 4: More on the Defense

Let us continue the discussion of artillery as used on the defense, according to Mahan. And we again turn to Chapter II, verse 151…..

Those positions for batteries should be avoided from which the shot must pass over other troops, to attain the enemy. And those should be sought for from which a fire can be maintained until the enemy has approached even within good musket-range of them.

Outpost, 60-1.

Common sense at play here. Fuses are not fail-proof, no matter how good the quality control is at the arsenal. Short rounds were a concern then as they are today. A further concern was the ballistic path of the sabot used behind many projectiles. Though made of wood, that could still injure or kill. With the introduction of rifled guns, another concern entered play – the lead or soft iron sabots often sheered off after the projectile left the muzzle. Those fragments took less predictable paths.

The other part of this is the desired effect of allowing the cannon to engage right up to… and inside of… musket range. The “skirmisher” community will note that Mahan was writing this passage before the rifled-musket was in widespread use. However, we should note that well into the Civil War, 100 yards was still considered the effective range of those rifled-muskets, as the practitioners were focused on volley fire effects as opposed to the effective range of individual weapons.

Where the wings of a position are weak, batteries of the heaviest caliber should be placed to secure them.

Outpost, 61.

Another sensible suggestion here. But one that must play with earlier passages that dictated the bigger caliber pieces be placed on “the more retired points” as opposed to advanced positions. Looking back at the “taking away a course of action from the enemy” mindset, those batteries assigned to support the flanks would be there to remove an option to attack on a flank. Such implies, generally speaking, that in the defense the flanks should be tucked in or refused. I would not argue against that as a general application, but certainly not submit flanks should always be refused. Given terrain or other factors, one might extend a flank position to cover the front of the main defensive line…. you know… like in those simple entrenchments that Mahan wrote of in other volumes.

Thus far, Mahan has placed the light batteries (shall we say the “mounted” batteries?) and the heavy (or “foot”) batteries. What about the horse artillery?

A sufficient number of pieces – selecting for the object in view horse-artillery in preference to any other – should be held in reserve for a moment of need; to be thrown upon any point where the enemy’s progress threatens danger; or to be used in a covering the retreat.

Outpost, 61.

Stomp your feet here to ensure all the cavalrymen hear and heed this. Horse artillery, in the defensive, was not simply attached to the cavalry for support of the troopers doing what ever it is they do on the defensive. Instead, the horse artillery was a reserve force to be used when pressed. If we turn again to “taking away courses of action” then here we are considering how an enemy commander would follow up behind initial success. If that assault has indeed achieved a lodgement on the main defensive line, the next step would involve pressing reinforcements forward to enlarge gains and break the line. The counter, Mahan proposes here, is the rapid, flying batteries of horse artillery introduced to seal that fissure.

And if that cannot be attained, at least have those horse artillery batteries in position to dissuade the enemy from following up with a close pursuit. A handful of well placed shells from the horse artillery should at least cause pause.

Everything thus far we might summarize as “use common sense and good judgement.” But the next paragraph is where the armchair generals will set up and start typing comments….

The collection of a large number of pieces in a single battery, is a dangerous arrangement; particularly at the onset of an engagement. The exposure of so many guns together might present a strong inducement to the enemy to make an effort to carry the battery; a feat the more likely to succeed, as it is difficult either to withdraw the guns, or change their position promptly, after their fire is opened; and one which, if successful, might entail a fatal disaster on the assailed, from the loss of so many pieces at once.

Outpost, 61.

Yes, at first glance, Mahan is laying out an argument against massing artillery on the battlefield. And our latter-day Stonewall Jacksons are quick to point out massed artillery is often the key to victory!

The important part of this passage is “large number of pieces in a single battery.” This is a “battery” not as an organizational unit, but as a position. Reading as such, this is a warning about putting multiple batteries in one contiguous position. If those guns are not arrayed as discussed at earlier points in this discussion of artillery on defense, then such a collection would be a vulnerable, tempting target. Placing the guns hub to hub is not “massing the guns.” But arranging those guns, in accordance to the guides presented by Mahan, is.

What I’d contend is that Mahan was not arguing against what Henry Hunt would do at Malvern Hill. Just the opposite. Prior to July 1, 1862, Hunt organized and emplaced the artillery into a fine example of what Mahan encouraged through these couple of pages on defensive arrangements. Go through the checklist – good engagement ranges, cleared fields of fire, complementing postings, light batteries advanced, heavy batteries retired, wings protected, infantry kept clear of the guns, and all well supported. And that arrangement allowed Hunt to introduce fresh batteries and withdraw tired ones, with relative ease. Thus, what Hunt had at Malvern Hill was not a “large number of pieces in a single battery” but instead a massing of combat power on a good position which maximized the capabilities of the artillery. Famously, one year and two days later, Hunt will accomplish the same feat on another battlefield while defending Cemetery Ridge. We might easily turn to the other side of the war and point to good use of massed artillery at Fredericksburg.

I think what Mahan is arguing against in this passage is actually instances like Missionary Ridge. One might say the Confederate artillery positions on that ridge were well placed for a siege in which their fire would be focused on distant Federal lines. The problem was no proper adjustment was made when that position transformed, due to the shifting of tactical situations, to a defensive one. And so that checklist that Hunt met on those hot July days was not met on that autumn day outside Chattanooga – dead space under the guns even past musket range, no complementary postings, no advanced or retired positions, infantry lines interspersed with the artillery, and little room to move the batteries around. And if we circle back to the “taking away a course of action from the enemy” notion here, I’d posit this counter-intuitive thought with a wry smile: the position on Missionary Ridge was so bad that it invited Federal commanders to accept and pursue a direct assault as a course of action. And as a demonstration, at that!

The last paragraph in this section on defensive arrangements for artillery strikes to the logistics of keeping those guns feed:

In all defensive dispositions the ammunition should be most carefully husbanded. A fire should never be opened until the enemy is within good range; and, when once opened, be continued with perseverance and coolness up to the last moment in which it can be made effective.

Outpost, 61.

I’ve mentioned this a time or two before, expressed as “staying power” of the guns. By this I mean the time for which the gun can remain at a position and actively part of the battle before having to replenish ammunition. Obviously many factors come into play here. Not the least of which is the number of rounds in the ammunition chests (in other words, the smaller-bore weapons had more rounds to shoot, all things being equal… yet another reason to have those big guns at retired positions). As we alluded to above (and at other places on this blog), Hunt and other good artillery commanders mitigated this with a good system to rotate batteries in and out of the line. Hunt also devised a very healthy system to push full ammunition chests up to the points where needed. Such adds another requirement here to those “good position” checklists, in that we must also consider allocating space to allow all the traffic needed in order to maintain a position “up to the last moment.”

And I stress “staying power” over perhaps the cyclic rate of fire. More so than simple weight of metal, it was the paced, deliberate, and measured fire which was desired. So let’s cast off these notions that artillery was just there to belch out canister, send smoke into the air, and make a lot of noise. The impact of those big guns, particularly on the defense, was to shape the flow of the battle… taking away courses of action available to the enemy.

(Citations from Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-guard, Out-post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in Presence of an Enemy, New York: John Wiley, 1861, pages 60-1.)

Mahan on Artillery Tactics, Part 3: In Defense, artillery is the “principal part”

I started the examination of Dennis H. Mahan and artillery tactics earlier this year with an introduction and a word about the “place” of artillery. That latter referring to what artillery was supposed to do on the battlefield… not the physical place. Now resuming that conversation, let’s move from the somewhat theoretical side into how those ideas would be applied… again, according to Mahan. And that takes us from the “place” as in the role or occupation of artillery more towards “place” as in the actual position relative to the other branches. We start with the general guideline for placing artillery:

The manner of placing artillery and its employment must be regulated by its relative importance under given circumstances, with respect to the action of the other arms.

In the defensive, the principal part is usually assigned to the artillery; and the position taken up by the other arms will, therefore, be subordinate to those of this arm. In offensive movements the reverse is generally obtain[ed].

Outpost, pages 59-60.

Even the most pedestrian, non-tactical study of the Civil War battlefield reinforces this notion. But there is a pitfall here that some novices will fall into. This is not to say that artillery’s importance was weighed to the defense, and was simply an add-on for the offense. Rather, what Mahan indicates here is that the defense, if properly organized, will center upon and be dependent upon the artillery for its strength. While the offensive arrangements would place emphasis on the “moving parts” with the artillery arranged best to support that component. In either case, the artillery placement requires just as much thought. It is simply a matter of which component the commander needs to carry the battle…. or… “relative importance under given circumstances.”

With the central role of artillery in the defense at the fore, Mahan then spoke to how those guns should be arranged:

In defensive positions the security of the batteries is of the last importance. Unless the batteries are on points which are inaccessible to the enemy’s cavalry and infantry, they must be placed under the protection of the other troops, and be outflanked by them.

Outpost, 60

By “last importance“, I believe Mahan was saying the defender should not avoid placing guns on less than idea terrain. The guns should be placed where their firepower would best achieve the mission of the defender. After all, those other arms were there to prevent a battery from being exposed… or at least supposed to be there.

As in the defensive, we should be prepared to receive the enemy on every point; the batteries must be distributed along the entire front of the position occupied, and on those points from which they can obtain a good sweep over the avenues of approach to it; the guns being masked, when the ground favors, from the enemy’s view, until the proper moment arrives for opening their fire.

Outpost, 60

Finally, we are pointing to the places to drop trail! The point I would emphasize here is this notion of masking batteries. In 1861, “masked batteries” were somewhat a boogie man, particularly on the Federal side. The very nature of selecting a good position should bring the officer to place artillery in masking positions. In effect all good artillery positions should be masked. But in reality, when those commanders of 1861 were writing about their fears of “masked batteries” they were referring to positions where their columns might be surprised or ambushed by the waiting enemy using concealed cannon. But before we go down the route of saying all good artillery positions were ambushes and such, we’ve got to take a step back and recognize the same word was being used with different intents.

Mahan’s masked batteries were not necessarily in unseen places. Rather, they were in places where anything which could be seen was within engagment range. Given the range of a 6-pdr field gun (the standard light piece at the time Mahan was writing), that translates out to 1,500 yards, or 0.85ths of a mile…. fine, round it to a mile. That’s a lot of space to work with. And given the average human’s perceptions at the range of a mile, that does not need to imply the battery is camouflaged or excessively concealed. We might double that “round about a mile” space when taking into account rifled artillery. But that’s about as far as I’d take it… range, in the Civil War context, had much dependency on target acquisition.

Taking in mind my interpretation of artillery’s role on the battle – “to take away or deny the enemy a course of action” – then we can start quantifying the value of a defensive position based on how much of that rounded up to a mile range the gunner can see when looking over the breech. Does it give full visibility of everything out to a mile? Give it a score of 100. Is there a rise or depression that prevents engagements at less than a mile? Start taking points off. That gives some measure of how artillery might influence the battle… or not… from a particular point.

Mahan continued with details about placing the trails of those cannon:

The distance between the batteries should not be much over 600 paces; so that by their fire they may cover well the ground intervening between them, and afford mutual support; the light guns being placed on the more salient points of the front, from their shorter range and greater facility of maneuvering; the heavier guns on the more retired points. Guns of various caliber should not be placed in the same battery. A sufficient interval should also be left between batteries of different caliber; to prevent the enemy from judging, by the variations in the effect of the shot, of the weight of metal in the batteries.

Outpost, 60

This paragraph lands at the intersection of technological development and doctrinal evolution. First let’s look at that distance between batteries. The Army (modern version.. but I submit this would be timeless) taught me that an average person’s “pace” is 30 inches… or 0.83ths of a yard. And 600 paces thus works out to 500 yards. ( 600 x 0.83 = 500…. don’t you like how the professor turned that into clean numbers?) That 500 yards is roughly a third the range of a 6-pdr field gun firing solid shot. And 500 yards is roughly half the range of a 12-pdr field howitzer. Thus, if the 600 paces rule is adhered to, even the smallest, lest powerful field pieces could easily support adjacent batteries.

Not much to expand upon with regard to placing those smaller pieces out front. That speaks of common sense. We’ll get into discussions of horse artillery and building a mobile reserve later.

But it’s this warning about mixed batteries which cuts across some of the doctrine in place when Mahan was writing. From the earliest times, the Army’s practice leaned toward mixed batteries. Even up to the writing of the 1860 tactics manual, the Army’s standard arrangement were batteries with two sections of field guns and one of howitzers. That applied for both light (6-pdr field gun / 12-pdr field howitzers) and heavy (12-pdr field guns / 24- or 32-pdr field howitzers). Yet, we know that early in the war senior artillerists advocated for uniform batteries. Mahan gives us a good tactical justification for uniform batteries. And we know Barry and Hunt would weigh in on this during the war years. I think the persistence of the mixed battery on the tables of organization has more to do with forces outside the artillery arm – namely the Ordnance Branch and the other two combat arms branches – and their perceptions of what the artillery needed in order to accomplish a mission. Not as acute, but along the same lines as the internal debate over tank destroyer types as the same US Army rushed into action during World War II.

These notions in mind to answer the question about where to place the artillery in the defensive, let’s circle back to this “taking away a course of action from the enemy” thing I keep talking about. If a defense, featuring artillery, is laid out in accordance to the principles Mahan stated in these paragraphs (and, if time permitted, placed in some of those fortifications, that we’ve discussed at length in the past) then the enemy would find a killing field that he would not be anxious to cross. The direct frontal assault, which is always the easiest and most efficient maneuver for an attacker to perform, would be off the table. Or at least should be off the list of options. We well know of many instances where a commander did not… and his men paid the price. But let’s save the discussion dynamic and flexible leadership for another day….

(Citations from Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-guard, Out-post, and Detachment Service of Troops, and the Manner of Posting and Handling Them in Presence of an Enemy, New York: John Wiley, 1861, pages 59-60.)

Summary Statement, 4th Quarter, 1863 – 1st Illinois Artillery

I contend the 1st Illinois Artillery Regiment punched well above its weight during the war. Not just in terms of where they served or battles fought. Though, from a western theater perspective, batteries from this regiment always seemed in the tick of the fight. But the regiment’s impact was beyond just the metal it threw around in battle. This regiment produced several officers who went on to serve in important positions outside the regiment. In last quarter’s post, I mentioned Colonel Joseph D. Webster, the regiment’s first commander, who served as a chief of staff for both Grant and Sherman. Colonel Ezra Taylor, who replaced Webster in May 1863, was dual-hatted as Sherman’s chief of artillery from Shiloh through Vicksburg (in the latter, formally the Chief of Artillery, Fifteenth Corps). Major Charles Houghtaling, who would later become the regimental Colonel, served a similar role for the Fourteenth Corps, in the Army of the Cumberland. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles H. Adams left the regiment for the top spot in the 2nd Tennessee Heavy Artillery, forming at Memphis. Major Allen C. Waterhouse lead the artillery brigade of the Seventeenth Corps, at times filling in as Artillery Chief. And those are just a few notables. As we look down to the battery officers, many very capable officers with fine records stand out. Let’s look at a few of those as we walk through this summary:

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  • Battery A: Larkinsville, Alabama, with five 12-pdr Napoleons and one 10-pdr Parrott.  The battery remained with Second Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, with Captain Peter P. Wood in command.  The battery was part of Sherman’s force sent to relieve Chattanooga, and later sent to relieve Knoxville. They would winter in north Alabama.
  • Battery B: Also at Larkinsville, Alabama, with four 6-pdr field guns and one 12-pdr field howitzer. Like Battery A, this battery was also assigned to Second Division, Fifteenth Corps.  Likewise, the battery supported the reliefs of Chattanooga and Knoxville. Captain Israel P. Rumsey remained in command.
  • Battery C:  Reporting at Chattanooga, Tennessee, now with six 3-inch Ordnance Rifles, being refitted after the campaigns around that city. Captain Mark H. Prescott remained in command, but the battery transferred to the First Division, Fourteenth Corps as the Army of the Cumberland reorganized in October.
  • Battery D: At Vicksburg, Mississippi, now reverting back to reporting four 24-pdr field howitzers, vice four 3-inch Ordnance Rifles reported the previous quarter… which implies a transcription error. Regardless, battery remained with Third Division, Seventeenth Corps, and part of the occupation force at Vicksburg. The battery participated in a couple of expeditions out of Vicksburg in the fall. Then moved, with the division, to duty on the Big Black River, east of Vicksburg. Lieutenant George P. Cunningham was promoted to captain of the battery in December 1864.
  • Battery E: At Corinth, Mississippi, with five 12-pdr Napoleons and one 3.80-inch James Rifle.  Lieutenant John A. Fitch remained in command, and the battery remained under Third Division, Fifteenth Corps. The battery participated in a couple of expeditions across Mississippi during the fall. The division reached Corinth as part of the movement to Chattanooga, but was not forwarded. In November, the division, along with the battery, moved to Memphis (part of the rundown of the Corinth garrison at that time).
  • Battery F: No report. Captain John T. Cheney remained in command of this battery.  As part of Fourth Division, Fifteenth Corps, the battery was part of the reinforcement sent to Chattanooga. Like the other Fifteenth Corps batteries, Battery F played a supporting role at Chattanooga and later at Knoxville.
  • Battery G:  Serving as siege artillery at Corinth, Mississippi, with four 24-pdr siege guns. The battery was assigned to Second Division, Sixteenth Corps.  Captain Raphael G. Rombauer remained in command. When the Corinth garrison was disbanded, Battery G moved to Fort Pickering, in Memphis, in January.
  • Battery H: At Bellefonte, Alabama with three 20-pdr Parrotts.  Assigned to Second Division, Fifteenth Corps, Lieutenant Francis DeGress remained in command of this battery (he would receive promotion to captain in December, after Captain Levi W. Hart was discharged).  As with the other Fifteenth Corps Illinois batteries, DeGress’ were setup to support Sherman’s crossing of the Tennessee in the ill-fated assault on Tunnel Hill. After the march to Knoxville, the battery returned to north Alabama with the division.
  • Battery I: At Scottsboro, Alabama with four 3.80-inch James Rifles. The battery came to Chattanooga as part of Fourth Division, Fifteenth Corps. However, Captain Albert Cudney, who had taken over the battery in June, was not present. Lieutenant Josiah H. Burton, of Battery F, led the battery in support, alongside Battery H (above).  After the relief of Knoxville, the battery followed the division into winter quarters in northern Alabama.
  • Battery K: No return. This battery was stationed at Memphis, Tennessee as part of Grierson’s Cavalry Division, Sixteenth Corps. Recall this battery was, at least up through the spring, equipped with Woodruff guns. Without a return, the equipment at the end of 1863 cannot be confirmed. Captain Jason B. Smith remained in command. 
  • Battery L: In Washington, D.C., with two 12-pdr Napoleons and four 3.80-inch James Rifles. Captain John Rourke commanded this battery, assigned supporting Mulligan’s Brigade, Scammon’s Division, then in West Virginia. So the location given for the return is in question. 
  • Battery M:  Reporting at Loudon, Tennessee with six 3-inch Ordnance Rifles (losing its Napoleons and converting to a uniform battery of rifles). Captain George W. Spencer, promoted in September, commanded this battery. With the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland, the battery transferred to Second Division Fourth Corps.

Those particulars out of the way, we can look to the ammunition reported for this varied lot of cannon. Starting with the smoothbore:

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  • Battery A: 207 shot, 80 shell, and 270 case for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery D: 177 shell for 24-pdr field howitzers.
  • Battery E: 163 shot, 159 shell, and 246 case for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery G: 314 shot and 120 shell for 24-pdr siege guns.
  • Battery L: 70 shot and 504 shell for 6-pdr field guns; 385 shot (unprepared) for 12-pdr “heavy” guns; 134 shot and 639 case for 12-pdr Napoleons; and 189 shell and 48 case for 12-pdr field howitzers (a wide array of ammunition types perhaps reflecting garrison duty in West Virginia).

We’ll split this next page into groupings for the rest of the smoothbore and then the first columns of rifle ammunition:

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Smoothbore:

  • Battery A: 69 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery D: 140 case and 33 canister for 24-pdr field howitzers.
  • Battery E: 158 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.
  • Battery G: 72 case, 89 canister, and 113 stands of grape for 24-pdr siege guns.
  • Battery L: 255 canister for 12-pdr mountain howitzers; 923 canister for 12-pdr Napoleons.

And the other half of this section covers rifled projectiles:

  • Battery C: 448 Hotchkiss time fuse shell for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery E: 93 Hotchkiss time fuse shell for 3.80-inch James rifles.
  • Battery L: 580 Dyer’s case for 3-inch rifles; 1005 Hotchkiss time fuse shell for 3-inch rifles; 186 Hotchkiss shot and 144 Hotchkiss time fuse shell for 3.80-inch James rifles. (Apparently Battery L was managing an ammunition dump.)
  • Battery M: 343 Hotchkiss time fuse shell for 3-inch rifles.

Hotchkiss and James Projectiles on the next page:

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The remaining Hotchkiss first:

  • Battery C: 238 percussion fuse shell, 11 bullet shell, and 252 canister for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery E: 17 percussion fuse shell for 3.80-inch James rifles.
  • Battery H: 49 canister for 20-pdr Parrott.
  • Battery L: 232 bullet shell and 268 canister for 3.80-inch rifles; and 115 percussion fuse shell and 504 canister for 3-inch rifles.
  • Battery M: 232 percussion fuse shell, 409 bullet shell, and 29 canister for 3-inch rifles.

And the James columns:

  • Battery E: 50 canister for 3.80-inch James rifles.
  • Battery I: 64 shot, 214 shell, and 256 canister for 3.80-inch James rifles.
  • Battery L: 387 shot, 106 shell, and 19 canister for 3.80-inch James rifles.

Parrott and Schenkl on the next page:

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First the Parrotts:

  • Battery A: 121 shell, 24 case, and 16 canister for 10-pdr Parrott.
  • Battery H: 163 shell, 77 case, and 17 canister for 20-pdr Parrott.

Then Schenkl:

  • Battery L: 300 shell for 3-inch rifles; and 282 shell for 3.80-inch James rifles.

On to the small arms:

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  • Battery A: Three Colt army revolvers, thirty Colt navy revolvers, and four horse artillery sabers.
  • Battery B: Six Colt navy revolvers and two cavalry sabers.
  • Battery C: Seven Colt army revolvers, ten Colt navy revolvers, and ten cavalry sabers.
  • Battery D: Five cavalry sabers.
  • Battery E: Two cavalry sabers.
  • Battery G: Sixty .58 caliber Springfield muskets and thirteen cavalry sabers.
  • Battery I: Eleven Colt navy revolvers and three cavalry sabers.
  • Battery L: Seventeen Sharps carbines, twenty-eight Colt army revolvers, and 148 cavalry sabers.
  • Battery M: One Colt army revolver and one cavalry saber.

Lots of cartridge bags, cartridges, and fuses over the last two pages:

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  • Battery C: 33 cartridge bags for case shot (field guns or howitzers).
  • Battery E: 161 cartridge bags for James rifles.
  • Battery G: 120 cartridge bags for 24-pdr siege guns and 2,400 musket cartridges.
  • Battery I: 515 cartridge bags for James rifles.
  • Battery L: 2,283 cartridge bags for James rifles and 765 cartridge bags for case (for 12-pdr Napoleons)
  • Battery M: 872 cartridge bags for 3-inch rifles.
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  • Battery A: 550 army caliber and 900 navy caliber pistol cartridges.
  • Battery B: 120 navy caliber pistol cartridges and 1,336 friction primers.
  • Battery C: 344 paper fuses and 275 friction primers.
  • Battery D: 500 friction primers.
  • Battery E: 1,750 friction primers and four portfires.
  • Battery G: 2,620 pounds of cannon powder and 569 friction primers.
  • Battery H: 1,410 paper fuses, 1,850 friction primers, 19 yards of slow match, and 48 portfires.
  • Battery I: 240 navy caliber pistol cartridges and 556 friction primers.
  • Battery L: 3,000 army pistol cartridges, 609 paper fuses, 4,540 friction primers, and 3,600 percussion caps (pistol).
  • Battery M: 1.096 paper fuses, 628 friction primers, 250 percussion caps (musket?), and 10 portfires.

That covers the 1st Illinois Artillery. We’ll pick up the 2nd Illinois in the next installment.