April 21, 1865: “… making fair contracts in writing with the people to cultivate the land…” in South Carolina

On April 21, 1865, there were several matters competing for Major-General Quincy Gillmore’s attention. The day before Gillmore received word of Major-General William T. Sherman’s truce with General Joseph E. Johnston, which thus governed operations in the Department of the South.  Also arriving was news of Abraham Lincoln’s assassination.  The former prompted adjustments to Gillmore’s active field operations.  The latter prompted General Orders No. 48 informing the command of Lincoln’s death.

Gillmore had many active field operations, the most important of which was Brigadier-General Edward Potter’s expedition.  Potter’s instructions were to march to Georgetown or Charleston, as best accommodated the situation.  Sherman’s latest correspondence put on hold a planned follow-on expedition to Augusta, Georgia.  Instead, Gillmore was content to detail Colonel Henry Chipman’s 102nd USCT to guard the railroad bridge over the Santee River, and serve as an advanced force protecting the area north of Charleston.

Gillmore updated instructions for interacting with the civilian population, given the arrival of news.  Colonel Stewart Woodford, Gillmore’s Chief of Staff, provided those in writing to General John Hatch on April 21 (and thus the third person “he” in the instructions):

[Gillmore] directs that our forces in this department cease all further destruction of public and private property. While you are to execute this order literally, still the major-general commanding directs that you suppress every manifestation of rebellious or disloyal feeling within your command. He has learned, unofficially, that there are some expressions of gratification in Charleston at the cruel murder of our late President, and that you summarily arrested the offending parties. He commends this action and desires you to compel a decent and quiet behavior on the part of all residing within your lines.

But that area north of Charleston – specifically that of Charleston County between the Cooper and Wando Rivers in St. Thomas’ Parish – was of keen interest to Gillmore and Hatch.  St. Thomas’, and in general the area north of Charleston, contained several large plantations and thus now had a large recently emancipated population.  Hatch wrote to Gillmore about this two days earlier asking for instructions to deal with the issues arising:

The immense number of negroes flocking into the city threaten us with a pestilence and them with starvation. No adequate steps are taken by General [Rufus] Saxton for their removal and establishment. He complains of want of transportation. Something should be done without delay. I propose to issue a letter to the planters on Cooper and Wando Rivers–in it to state that slavery being extinguished, all who desire to be loyal citizens and to reside on their plantations will be allowed to do so, making fair contracts in writing with the people to cultivate the lands in shares for this season. Those who do so will be encouraged and protected as far as military necessity will allow. I do not care about taking this step without the approval of the general, but I think if something is not done, and that immediately, we will have starvation among the freedmen.

Saxton was at that time charged with managing resettlement of emancipated slaves onto confiscated lands in accordance with Sherman’s Field Order No. 15, as issued in January of that year. But Saxton faced some serious logistical problems, given the limited amount of shipping and other transportation, moving the former slaves to the designated areas.  Furthermore, Saxton was running out of “40 acres” to provide for all those now free, given the spectacular success of Federal operations.

On April 21, Woodford forwarded Gillmore’s response to the crisis Hatch identified:

I am directed by the major-general commanding to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 19, 1865. He desires me to inform you that the steamer Canonicus, after having returned from Darien, Ga., will be at the disposal of Brevet Major-General Saxton, and sent to him with the least possible delay. I am furthermore directed to inform you that you are authorized to issue a letter to the planters on Cooper and Wando Rivers, north of Charleston City, for the purpose and according to the tenor mentioned in your communication of the 19th instant. You will be careful not to act upon the question of the settlement of the freedmen within the territorial limits prescribed in General Sherman’s Special Field Orders, No. 15, dated headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, in the Field, at Savannah, Ga., January 16, 1865, that matter within these limits having been by this order specially placed under General Saxton’s charge.

Thus, the military policy for the moment, given the lack of direction from Washington on the issue, allowed for two systems.  Saxton’s, operating under Sherman’s “40 acres and a mule” policy, continued for the selected confiscated lands, mostly on barrier islands.  And with Gillmore’s consent, Hatch would allow any planter, who took the oath of allegiance, to offer “fair contracts” to freedmen for their labor.  Woodford elaborated on that second system in a message to Saxton, just to make sure nobody’s toes were stepped on:

The major-general commanding directs me to inform you that he has received a letter from Brigadier-General Hatch, commanding the Northern District of the department, in which he states that he proposes to issue a letter to the planters on the Cooper and Wando Rivers, and to state therein that slavery being extinguished, all who desire to be loyal citizens and to reside on their plantations will be allowed to do so, making fair contracts in writing with the people to cultivate the land on shares this season, and that those who do so will be encouraged and protected so far as military necessity will allow.

Woodford added, for clear delineation, that the lands designated by Gillmore for Hatch’s purview were beyond those designated by Field Orders No. 15.

Certainly these two concurrent policies were not the “end state” that would apply to the question of freedmen and lands.  That would take us into a discussion of the post-war period and bring in the Freedmen’s Bureau.  My point in mentioning these orders issued on April 21, 1865 is to call out what would become a major issue during the Reconstruction period, as it was being evolved as part of a military operation.

Step back a bit further for a moment.  One of the considerations when assessing Reconstruction from the historian’s perspective is the nature of how the policies set forth by leaders – be they Lincoln, Johnson, or Grant – were implemented at the ground level.  We can all point to current events where that same factor holds play.  In the case of Reconstruction, much of that policy, at least for the initial phases, was implemented as part of a military operation.  A fascinating military operation, in context with American military operations since World War II, I would add.  Yet, I sense that in our rush to provide a simple description for the period, while rushing off to things like the Gilded Age, Robber Barons, and the run-up to World War I, that appreciation for the military aspects of Reconstruction is lost.

And with Reconstruction having a military component in play, there must be analysis of what could and could not be accomplished… operationally, in military terms.   You know, some of those “reach and grasp” discussions which often boil down to practical application of arithmetic and logistics.  Yes, there is a military history component… a very important military history component… to reconstruction.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 47, Part III, Serial 100, pages 256, 273, 274.)

Sam Jones: Call out the militia “against deserters, and to retain and maintain proper subordination among the slaves”

On April 20, 1865, Major-General Samuel Jones, commanding the Confederate District of Florida, responded to a request from the Governor of Florida, A. K. Allison, for more troops to defend homes and property of the citizens of Florida:

Governor: I was absent when your letter of the 7th instant was received at my headquarters here, or it would have been sooner answered. I deeply regret that the force at my command is not sufficient to enable me to give full protection to the section of country you designate. I propose, as soon as it can be done, to give a small additional force to the commander of the First Sub-District, which will enable him to give some additional protection to the section of country in question. I am convinced that a portion of the militia force of the State should be placed on duty for the special service you refer to, and called on your predecessor for it, but it seems that, in his judgment, the militia laws of the State were so defective that the militia could not be employed for that service; that is, for the protection of their own homes and property, not from a formidable body of the enemy’s troops, but chiefly from their own slaves and deserters from our service. I respectfully bring this matter to Your Excellency’s notice, with a request that a portion of the militia of the State be called into service to protect the property and homes of the people against deserters, and to retain and maintain proper subordination among the slaves.

Jones had fallen from grace somewhat over the span of a year.  From commanding the entire Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, by the first of 1865, his command was just Florida.  After Sherman took Savannah, Jones was somewhat on an island.  While communications were open to other parts of the Confederacy, the lack of railroads and telegraph left the sector somewhat isolated.  Florida was not, however, a major Federal objective.  Jones’ force was for the most part left to die on the vine, pending events unfolding elsewhere.

That background aside, what I find interesting with Jones’ response is that it lays out several issues facing Confederate leaders at the end of the war.  In some ways demonstrating the whole collapse of the system of government by April 1865.  In one part we see the contention between “state” and “national” authority, though unlike the cases where the governors of Georgia, North Carolina, and other states resisted the use of state troops under Confederate authority, in the case of Florida, the governor was calling upon Confederate troops to fill an obligation which the Confederate authority felt should fall to the state.  The Florida militia could be called out to defend against the “Yankee invader” but not to police its own countryside.

And how about “police.”  Yes, that is the sum of what Allison had asked for (I don’t find his correspondence in the records, but assume so from the tone of Jones’ response).  Allison needed some force of arms to counter the lawlessness that had broken out.  Jones does not mention or address Federal raiding parties here.  He could have.

The main Federal garrisons in Florida did send out expeditions and scouted the areas near their lines.  But these were limited due to the need to economize the troops assigned.  However, do recall the Florida (US) Cavalry forces which operated in part as partisans.  Indeed, I missed a promised  sesquicentennial post back in March with respect to William W. Strickland’s operations and death.    (I shall have that as a writing assignment into the post-sesquicentennial.)

Instead, the issue facing Allison and Jones was not some Federal incursion, but rather the lawlessness as the pieces of the Confederacy were falling about them.  Through the war years, considerable effort was placed on policing the home front.  But those resources were pulled, inevitably, to the front lines… or perhaps a better way to view it, the home front became the front line in many parts of the South.

Perhaps it is simply a word choice in play, but Jones did not mention “former slaves” be they run-aways, “contraband,” uniformed USCT, self-emancipated or otherwise. Rather he references “their own slaves.”

And entering his last week of formally being in command of a Confederate department, Major-General Sam Jones’ most pressing task was protecting people and property from “deserters, and to retain and maintain proper subordination among the slaves.”

(Citation from OR, Series I, Volume 47, Part III, Serial 100, page 819.)