First off, let me update the map provided in part 1 of this set (looking at the situation outside Charleston in late April 1863):
Second, let me better describe Brigadier-General Vogdes’ command. The brigade consisted of 6th Connecticut, 36th Illinois, 4th New Hampshire, 100th New York, 62nd Ohio, 67th Ohio, and 85th Pennslvania infantry regiments. The Third Battalion of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry (Companies I, K, L, and M) accompanied the brigade. Also attached to Vogdes’ command was one company of the 3rd New York Light Artillery, two companies of the 3rd Rhode Island Artillery, and Battery C, 1st U.S. Artillery. Rounding out the formation was three companies of the 1st New York Engineers.
On Seabrook Island, just off the map to the left, Brigadier-General Thomas Stevenson had the 10th Connecticut, 24th Massachusetts, 56th New York, and 97th Pennsylvania, along with additional supporting troops. All told, nearly 7,500 Federals occupied the barrier islands south of Charleston.
On the Confederate side, General P.G.T. Beauregard’s calls for assistance, prior to and after the April 7 ironclad attack, resulted in an increase in troops around Charleston. On March 21, Brigadier-General Roswell Ripley’s 1st Military District (Charleston, Fort Sumter, James Island, St. Johns Island, and posts to the north of Charleston) numbered 12,345 troops present, up from 8,663 reported at the middle of the month. On April 7, when the ironclads attacked, that number was roughly the same. But by April 23, Ripley reported 18,351 present for duty. But this was a temporary increase in strength.
Although not engaged in any major fighting, the troops were far from idle. In the weeks after the April 7 attack, Beauregard feared a Federal landing at Bull’s Bay might expose the flanks of Sullivan’s Island. One brigade shifted to Christ Church Parrish in response. At the same time, Beauregard ordered Brigadier General S.R. Gist to occupy Black Island, behind Morris Island, with field artillery (see the map above for location). Fear was that Federals might occupy that island and take in flank both the Morris Island defenses and Secessionville (Fort Lamar). But to fortify these points the Confederates needed time and labor. As mentioned before, they were coming up short on the later.
By the first days of May, troops were departing Charleston for other threatened sectors. Among those departing were the brigades of Brigadier-Generals S.R. Gist and W.H.T. Walker. Pressed to send Brigadier-General Nathan Evan’s Brigade on top of that, Beauregard argued with some success to retain at least 13,000 troops in front of Charleston (both 1st and 2nd Military Districts).
Reflecting on the situation and the results of the April 7th engagement, Beauregard offered advice to Colonel John Forsyth, responsible for the defenses at Mobile Bay:
I place great reliance, however, on three things – heavy guns, Rains torpedoes, and, in deep water, rope obstructions. I have also introduced here Lee’s (one of my officers) spar torpedoes, attached to row-boats, which ought to be used in flotillas on all our large rivers.
In the days after the attack, Beauregard had followed his own advice. He temporarily held up some heavy guns, including Brooke rifles, moving by rail to Savannah. But unable to retain those, he looked about for other options. One was to modify more of the heavy smoothbores into rifled guns – particularly the 8-inch columbiads which had little effect on the ironclads – in a manner similar to the 42-pdrs. This program eventually expanded to 10-inch columbiads. But the process took time. None of the guns would appear in the harbor defenses until mid-summer at the earliest.
The number of rifled guns in Beauregard’s entire command as of the end of April was 113, as indicated on an April 24 report:
The majority of rifled guns were field artillery, and an odd assortment at that (Wiards, Blakelys, Parrotts, James, and Whitworths). The converted 42-, 32- and 24-pdrs were marginal at best. Of the Brookes, three of those from the report were earmarked for the CSS Atlanta at Savannah.
But the Charleston defenders would receive, as the spoils from the victory on April 7, two additional heavy guns. With the USS Keokuk sunk in shallow waters (see the blue mark just to the lower right of the map), Confederate engineers deemed it possible to salvage the ship’s XI-inch Dahlgrens. That work took place between mid-April and the first week of May. As result, Beauregard added the heaviest guns in all of the South to his defenses. (I promise more details on that operation in posts to follow.)
While working the wreck, the Confederates needed to support the salvage crew from any Federal interference. At least twice during the salvage, Confederate ironclads moved up to cover the operation. On April 20, the CSS Chicora exchanged shots with the Federals. Guns on Morris Island also covered the operation, particularly a Whitworth field gun. Although of light caliber, the gun could fire a solid bolt accurately to extreme ranges. Beauregard wanted a second gun of this type, but was denied.
With respect to torpedoes, after the ironclad attack the Confederates wanted to determine the reason for the “big torpedo” failure. As related earlier, the determination was excess cable played out during the laying of that weapon, thus rendering it incapable of firing. That issue identified, the defenders soon placed more of the large torpedoes.
But Beauregard was most interested in employing the spar torpedoes. Writing to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper in Richmond, he lamented that, “The work on the marine torpedo ram is at a stand-still for want of material and money.” The funding for the project was expended and more was needed. While the Confederate navy provided some materials, much of the needed iron-plating went to the ironclads then under production in Charleston. Pressing the point, Beauregard added:
Meantime the great value of the invention has been demonstrated so as to secure general conviction, and Captain Tucker, commanding Confederate States naval forces afloat on this station, declares unhesitatingly that this one machine of war, if finished, would be more effective as a means of defense and offense than nearly all the iron-clads here afloat and building, a fact of which I am and have been fully assured. Had it been finished and afloat when the enemy’s iron-clads entered this harbor several weeks ago but few of them probably would have escaped.
In early May, Confederates in Charleston received reports of “400-500 tons of iron mailing plates” in Nassau. Circulars went out offering up to $1,500 per ton to blockade runners transporting the iron. Beauregard went to the extreme measure of denying cotton to any runner who refused to carry the iron.
During the lull through the end of April, Confederates angled for an opportunity to mount a row-boat spar torpedo attack on the Federal vessels anchored in the Stono River near Folly Island. But these efforts came to naught. Naval crews sent to Charleston in anticipation of capturing a monitor were soon sent back to Richmond.
As April closed, both sides maintained a stalemate outside Charleston. Yet as both sides shouldered for leverage on the coastline, particular points gained prominence for future operations. Folly Island would be the toe-hold needed to secure Morris Island. Morris Island would thence become the key to reducing Fort Sumter. Beauregard’s spar torpedoes would indeed succeed in damaging the Federal ships outside the harbor. And the stationary torpedoes would keep the fleet out of the harbor. The stalemate in April was but a brief respite before the next round of operations. There would be few such respites in the next two years of war as Charleston became a very active theater.
(Citations and table from OR, Series I, Volume 14, Serial 20, pages 906, 917, and 927.)