150 Years Ago: A “Destructive Conflagration” in Richmond

On June 14, 1863, the remains of Thomas J. Jackson left Richmond by railroad proceeding to Lexington, Virginia where his funeral was scheduled for the next day. As if the tragedy of Jackson’s death were not enough, the City of Richmond arose on this day (June 15) in 1863 to another disaster.

The Richmond Daily Dispatch provided details the following day:

Destructive Conflagration – Burning of the Crenshaw Woollen Mill and a Portion of the Tredegar Works – About 2 o’clock yesterday morning a fire broke out in the Crenshaw Woollen Mill, of this city, resulting in one of the most destructive and disastrous conflagrations which the city has ever been called upon to suffer. The fire originated, and was first discovered, in the picking room of the Crenshaw Woollen Mill, situated on the canal.. such was the combustible nature of the material in the room that the flames spread with a rapidity that soon enveloped the whole building….

The article went on to point out the important war contributions of the mill – providing “2,000 yards of double width goods per week, with a capacity to manufacture annually goods sufficient to clothe from 40,000 to 50,000 men.” But next to the mill was Tredegar Iron Works:

From the woollen mill the fire rapidly spread to the valuable shops of Tredegar works, and before the flames could be arrested the machine shops, boring mills, pattern shops, blacksmith and carpenter shops of that extensive and valuable establishment were destroyed. The extend of damage done to machinery in these shops could not be ascertained yesterday, as much of the machinery was of an indestructible character, and may possibly not have received serious injury.

However, the rolling mills and casting shops of the works were not damaged. The report went on to say that several heavy guns were undamaged and ready for issue. Concluding, the article noted,

The loss to the proprietors of the works will be very heavy, and the delay in manufacturing guns will, to some extent, be felt by the Government, but as stated, it is not thought that this delay will protracted beyond a few weeks.

Problem is that a few weeks, in the the critical phases of 1863, was debilitating to efforts to equip and refit Confederate forces in the field. The day after the fire, Joseph R. Anderson, president of the company, forwarded a request Colonel Josiah Gorgas for equipment to replace losses.

Gorgas in turn forwarded the request to Major William Downer, Superintendent of Armories. Downer responded on June 3:

In short, Downer had some to spare and asked, “Shall I sell these machines to Mesrs Anderson & Co.?” The answer was affirmative. That was conveyed across this rather busy (and interesting!) cover sheet:

On the right side is Downer’s notation:

The machinery proposed to be sold consists of

1 Large Boring Lathe purchased at Raleigh.

2 Small hand Lathes.

4 or 5 small Lathes, partially finished, some, nothing more than the castings. Made at the Carbine Factory, which were commissioned by Robinson & Lester(?), for sale, & which we have no use for.

Oh, but first these equipments were referred to Captain R. M. Cary at Bellona Armory, who insisted he needed the lathes. Gorgas agreed with Cary on June 15. So even with all those notations, it is not clear if Tredegar eventually received any of these lathes.

But certainly the foundry was able to get back to the business of making cannons within weeks as predicted. As mentioned in Monday’s post, production fell off in April to just six Napoleons and four 10-inch mortars due to lack of gunmetal. On May 1st, the foundry poured one 10-inch columbiad, six Napoleons, and one 10-inch mortar. Not until May 28 did production resume with a 20-pdr Parrott and a Napoleon. In June, Tredegar made twenty-four castings, both field guns and heavy cannons. July saw fifteen more castings.

But keep in mind the cycle of casting, cooling, boring, preparing (Tredegar eschewed all unnecessary machining but had to turn trunnions and other exterior points), inspection, and delivery. Such could take a month or more, particularly for the larger weapons. From there, the Ordnance Department had the duty of transporting and issue to the field commands. Guns made in June might not be issued to a battery until late August… if all worked well.

Cannons are easy to track, to some extent. But about the production of shot, shell, and the various implements needed to use the guns in battle. Tredegar was supposed to be producing the materials needed for the Confederates to prosecute the war. Not beg for machinery to turn out those materials.

A production slow down in the middle of 1863… just as the war reached critical turning points. As historian Charles Dew pointed out, fire at Tredegar and defeat at Gettysburg had some relation.

A shortage of guns, but no orders for Noble Brothers

As mentioned in earlier posts, in the winter of 1862-63 the Confederate Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida was desperate for guns capable of engaging the Federal ironclads.  General P.G.T. Beauregard’s command protected several ports of entry for blockade runners, representing the link to Europe.  But competition between projects (ironclad production, for instance) for resources and demand in other theaters for heavy ordnance meant the forts protecting Charleston, Savannah, and other ports were under-gunned.

Most histories point to Richmond, particularly Tredegar, with respect to the bottleneck on heavy ordnance.  But this overlooks other options that Beauregard and the Confederate Ordnance Department sought out.  With the fall of New Orleans, Nashville, and Memphis, several private manufacturers with at least the potential to produce heavy ordnance were lost.  And at this critical time of the war the Selma Naval Ordnance Works was just getting organized.  However at least one firm in Georgia had, on paper, the ability to meet the need for heavy ordnance.

I’ve mentioned Noble Brothers & Company, of Rome, Georgia, a few times with respect to field ordnance (6-pdr guns, 3-inch rifles, and 12-pdr howitzers in both bronze and iron).  But the firm also sought, and was sought out for, heavy ordnance contracts.  In April 1862 the firm delivered a battery of 8-inch howitzers to the state of Georgia for use at Savannah.  Noble Brothers began series production for the Confederate government at that time.  Situated in proximity to iron deposits in Alabama, the firm appeared ready to compete with Richmond’s gun maker.

But a series of events removed Noble Brothers from the picture.  In late April-early May, Colonel Abel D. Streight’s raid threatened Rome and disrupted work schedules (some of the facility’s workers were part of the local militia defending the city and foundry).  In August, a fire starting in a nearby rifle factory damaged some of Noble Brothers’ factory.  But those were but minor issues compared to what happened in October 1862.

While passing through on other business, Maynadier Mason, a representative of the Ordnance Department, stopped to inspect the Noble Brothers’ cannon manufacturing process.    Mason noted the castings used metal of poor quality, describing it as “white” and of weak strength.  But he withheld comment at the time. Later, Mason witnessed sharp disagreements when Captain L. Jaquelin Smith, the local ordnance officer, related specific instructions about gun carriages.  One of the Noble brothers said that, “all ordnance officers were fools and jackasses and that Smith was one of them.”

First Page of Mason’s letter – “the fools and jackasses report”

Mason indicated that Smith backed away from confrontation.  Mason,  intervening to aid Smith, became the target of the Noble’s anger. The Nobles apparently “worked over” Mason badly, as he complained of being bedridden for several days to recover.

Part of the Noble brother’s anger towards Smith may have stemmed from the ordnance officer’s earlier dealings with Noble Brothers.  In the summer of 1862, Noble Brothers & Company was working to produce columbiads.  The month prior to the “jackass” comment, Smith had informed Colonel Ambrosio J. Gonzales, chief of artillery in Charleston, of delays securing the requested columbiads.  Gonzales echoed that in an inquiry to Colonel Josiah Gorgas in Richmond:

I am directed by the major-general commanding to inclose to you the accompanying letter from Lieutenant Smith, and to say that as the complement of heavy guns promised for this department cannot be had from Rome, you have the goodness of providing them from Richmond, over and above the 10-inch columbiads which are to come from there. I have the honor further to state that it is the wish of General Beauregard, who has not yet assumed command, that the guns you supply from Richmond in lieu of those expected from Rome, Ga., be 10-inch instead of 8-inch columbiads, in view of the formidable character of the iron-clad ships preparing for the attack of Charleston.

If Smith informed Gonzales that Noble Brothers couldn’t deliver the guns, he had a reason.  I would speculate that Mason’s “while I’m here” inspection of the facilities was not just happenstance. There’s enough circumstantial evidence, particularly given Mason’s alarm about the metal quality, to say Noble guns were not measuring up to Smith’s inspections.  And of course Smith would have reported such to the Ordnance Department.

The hostile treatment and poor quality control did not set well with authorities in Richmond.  Colonel Josiah Gorgas suspended payment to Noble Brothers until the matter was worked out.

Although the Noble Brothers apologized for the altercation and offenses, the firm’s standing with the Confederate government suffered.  Although the firm continued to deliver pig iron and other materials, no cannons came from the Noble Brothers after that time.  In May 1863, the firm wrote Gorgas about five 8-inch siege howitzers on hand and ready for delivery.

Gorgas’ response appeared on the cover for this note.  He said the howitzers were probably made with cupola iron and would not be received. (Lesson learned here with respect to the Confederate Citizens Files – always look at the cover sheets!)

There were other concerns beyond just the “jackasses” comment and bad quality control.  Several of the Noble brothers had unionist leanings (although apparently not enough to prevent them from accepting Confederate money).  I’ll save that aspect for another day… and to Robert’s favorite research topic, this does involve a rejected claim for compensation).

The Confederate government later acquired some of the Noble Brothers & Company equipment. I will say “acquired” as some might consider it outright confiscated, with compensation.  That too is a longer story deserving a separate post.  The equipment went to the Confederate owned works to continue supporting the war effort.

In retrospect, even during the height of the war with the Confederacy so desperate as to impress old English guns into service, one could not call a Confederate officer a “jackass” without certain repercussions.

A battle over bands: The Childs-Ripley Incident at Chareston Arsenal

As it is improper to mention a lesser known incident of the war and not provide sufficient details, allow me to follow up yesterday’s post with more information about the Childs-Ripley incident at Charleston Arsenal in late November 1862.  So a bit of background on the principles to start.

The son Thomas Childs, a distinguished War of 1812 officer, Major Frederick L. Childs graduated West Point in 1855.  He briefly served at Fort Monroe, Florida, West Point, and Fort Moultrie before posting to the Texas frontier.  In March 1861, Childs resigned and offered his services to the Confederacy.

Captain Childs, C.S.A, commanded Castle Pinckney in April 1861, playing a minor role in the bombardment of Fort Sumter.  Later that spring he served at posts around Wilmington in his native state of North Carolina.  But in July Childs returned to Charleston in command of the arsenal, detailed to the Ordnance Department.  In this capacity, Childs came into frequent contact with Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, who commanded troops in the Charleston area.

Ripley – sporting a post-war mustache

Not a southerner by birth, Ripley graduated seventh in the West Point class of 1843, a good bit ahead of fellow Ohioan Ulysses S. Grant.  He received two brevet promotions for service in the Mexican War.  After brief assignments in Florida during the Seminole Wars, Ripley reported to Fort Moultrie.  There he courted the wealthy widow Alicia Middleton.  Shortly after marriage, Ripley left the army and entered the private sector, no doubt with his wife’s estate providing a significant step up.  Ripley remained active in military affairs, joining the state militia.  That capacity placed him at the fore of operations at the start of the war.  He played a significant role in operations against Fort Sumter and the establishment of the defenses of Charleston afterwards.  But in the spring of 1862, Ripley’s notion of a forward defense of the city conflicted with his superiors (at first General Robert E. Lee, then later General John C. Pemberton).  Granted a transfer, Ripley took command of a brigade in General D.H. Hill’s division in Northern Virginia.  After serving through the summer campaigns, Ripley was wounded leading his brigade at Antietam.  On recovery, authorities requested his services again at Charleston – which again placed him in contact with Childs.  In mid-October Ripley assumed command of the First Military District at Charleston.

The direct trail to the contention between Childs and Ripley began with Special Orders No. 229 issued by General P.G.T. Beauregard’s headquarters (Department of South Carolina and Georgia) on November 21, 1862, which read in part:

III.  The commanding general of First Military District has authority to direct and order the rifling and banding of such guns as require it within his command to the extent of the capacity for doing the work effectually, and may make requisitions directly upon the Charleston Arsenal or other proper source through his district ordnance officer for the necessary material for the work.

As mentioned in the previous post, Beauregard sensed peril at Charleston, particularly a growing threat from the Federal fleet. From his perspective, Beauregard complained of extensive delays modifying old smoothbore ordnance into at least partially acceptable rifled guns. Working through Childs, the turn around time was four weeks.  Ripley, perhaps bypassing much red tape, claimed the process could be done in half the time.

But the nature of this order put Beauregard’s command at odds with the Confederate Ordnance Department. Childs’ authority at the arsenal covered the requisition, or modification, of ordnance.  Yet Order No. 229 gave Ripley authority in that regard.  While Ripley negotiated directly with Eason & Brothers, Childs sought to bring another Charleston firm, that of Cameron & Company, to bear on the problem.  Towards that end, Childs had earmarked a set of 42-pdr bands for a contract with Cameron, and asked for Ripley to send one of those weapons there.  Ripley, on the other had, had at least one 42-pdr gun at Eason awaiting bands.

This came to a head on November 26, 1862.  Ripley arrived at the arsenal with armed guards and demanded Childs release the bands for immediate use at Eason’s shop.  Childs refused on the grounds the iron was obtained from Atlanta, under the Ordnance Department’s authority, not the local command’s.  In a three page report (first page seen below), Childs noted, “… the bands have been waiting for the guns and it was every intention to give them either to Eason or Cameron…” but Ripley had not turned the appropriate guns over to the arsenal for the work.  Ripley, on the other hand, claimed he’d already sent the guns where the work was to be done which would save time in the process.  Childs, somewhat resentfully added, “There can be no proper reason for the Easons not working as well for me as for General Ripley…”

Ripley had Childs arrested, citing the failure to fill valid requisitions with the supply on hand.  And of course the bands went over to Eason.

For what it was worth, Beauregard fully recognized the conflicting issues, noting, “… the chiefs of ordnance of this department and district, relying too much on the supplies of the arsenal, of which they are not fully informed, often make requisitions at too short notice, thereby causing unnecessary delays and confusion.”  His offered solution was a relocation of the arsenal to “a place in the northwestern part of this State” selected by Major Childs.  The Ordnance Department’s response, if any, was not recorded.  Childs remained under arrest, but was allowed to continue his work at the arsenal, confined to Charleston, awaiting a court-marshal.

The contention for iron feeding into the defense of Charleston continued in spite of the arrest.  By late December Colonel Ambrosio J. Gonzales, Beauregard’s chief of artillery, pressed the Ordnance Department for more munitions, particularly projectiles for the 32-pdr and 42-pdr rifled guns.   Gonzales complained he had less than 50 rounds per gun at Forts Sumter and Moultrie.  In response forwarded on January 6, 1863, Colonel Josiah Gorgas cautioned, “It would be well to consider the question of a supply of rifle projectiles before going too far with the rifling and banding of 32-pdrs.  The want of proper iron for casting these shells is very serious.”

That last sentence sums up so many problems facing the Confederate war effort – a want of iron.  Gonzales, Ripley, and Beauregard needed supplies in Charleston.  And likewise J.R. Anderson called for supplies in Richmond.  (And let’s not forget what the Confederacy lost just a year prior.)   Gorgas’ went on to suggest, “Send me a full statement of all you want and cannot get at Charleston, limiting your requisition to, say, 150 rounds per gun.”

As for Childs, by February the Ordnance department reassigned him to other posts.  After temporary duty at Augusta Arsenal, Childs went on to command the Fayetteville Arsenal in North Carolina.

(Sources:  Frederick Childs’ Confederate service record; OR, Series I, Volume 14, Serial 20, pages 685, 689-692, and 746.)