“The city batteries were not manned”: Jones asks for the 18th Georgia to defend Charleston

Yesterday I made note of transferred troops from the Federal Department of the South, calling it an indication of the tight connection between theaters of war during the summer of 1864.  Let me turn now to a similar example from the Confederate side of Charleston harbor… and sort of the inverse of that of the Federals.

On August 19, 1864, Major-General Samuel Jones, commanding the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, wrote to General Braxton Bragg, serving as an adviser to President Jefferson Davis:

You no doubt remember that when you were here I brought to your notice the fact that the city batteries in Charleston were not manned, the outer batteries and lines requiring all my force. I have not heretofore urged the Department to send me re-enforcements because I knew, to some extent at least, the pressing demand for troops in Virginia and North Georgia, and appreciated the importance of successfully resisting the two chief armies of the enemy. But I have constantly felt and still feel the greatest anxiety for the safety of this place and Savannah. By the gallantry and good conduct of the officers, this place, under Providence, was successfully defended in the first ten days of July against an attack much more formidable than is generally supposed. The enemy’s plans were good, and if they had been carried out with more spirit and determination might well have resulted in serious disaster to us. The facilities for water transportation enabled the enemy, in a few hours, to concentrate his troops, without my knowledge, either to renew the attack on this place or attempt one on Savannah. I am, therefore, exceedingly anxious to have re-enforcements as soon as any can be sent.

Jones didn’t just need some unit, he preferred a unit that could handle the heavy artillery that was the main defense of Charleston.  And he had a specific unit in mind:

I desire, however, at present to bring to your especial attention the great need for instructed artillerists to man the city batteries here. The recent success of the enemy’s navy in Mobile Bay may encourage them to attempt to run past our outer batteries and take position in the Cooper or Ashley Rivers or both. They probably have information of the condition of our city batteries; and, if so, it will of course encourage them to make the attempt. I have, therefore, to ask if Major Basinger’s battalion, the Eighteenth Georgia, now I believe stationed at Mattoax, on the Richmond and Danville Railroad, can be sent to this place. That battalion is well instructed in the use of heavy guns, and has had much experience in that service both here and at Savannah. With it here to man the city batteries I do not think the enemy’s vessels could pass those batteries. Can you not supply its place at Mattoax by a force capable of using the small guns there and guarding the bridge as well as the Eighteenth Georgia? When we have so few men well instructed in the use of heavy artillery it seems like an injudicious use of good and scarce material to keep that battalion where it is when it is so much needed  here. I hope it may be found consistent with the public interest to send me Basinger’s battalion without delay, and if it cannot be sent now that it be sent as soon as it can be.

So was the 18th Georgia up for a return south?

Bragg circulated this request through offices in Richmond.  From the Inspector General’s Office came the reply, “The Eighteenth Georgia Battalion is in the Army of Northern Virginia and now at Petersburg.”  Secretary of War James Seddon added, “I am at a loss to afford re-enforcements unless from the reserves. Major Basinger’s battalion might, on need, be substituted.”

The fate of Charleston was now directly tied to the fate of Richmond, Petersburg, and Atlanta.  Another way to look at this – the Confederacy lost strategic mobility in the summer of 1864.  All marks were posted.  There were no more to call in.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, pages 612-3.)

August 19, 1864: “Receipt of heavy cannon by this department is insufficient” and the Ordnance Department wants more Rodman Guns

A theme I have researched for many years is wartime cannon production, on the Federal side, and how that reflected defense policy more so than wartime needs.  While the Confederate side of the story is largely “not enough capacity, make what we can,” the Federal side is much more complex.

One might guess, without consultation of the figures, that field guns would be in high demand during the war, with large numbers rolling out of the foundries throughout the war.  But the actual figures for weapons accepted by the Army point to a more complex story.  Field gun production dropped off after the second quarter of 1864, with no further Napoleon 12-pdrs accepted.  On the other end of the scale, production of large caliber weapons for seacoast defense increased greatly throughout the war.  Yet the Federals faced no direct, immediate threat of seaborne attack.  Only distant threats from Confederate raiders and ironclads… or the potential of European involvement.

On August 19, 1864, correspondence from Brigadier-General George Ramsay, Chief of Ordnance, to the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, provide some insight into the emphasis on heavy guns.

Sir: As the present receipt of heavy cannon by this department is insufficient for meeting the wants of the country, I desire to present for your consideration certain facts connected therewith, showing the propriety and importance of increasing the supply up to the maximum capacity of our iron foundries. As communicated to you in my letter of the 31st of December, 1863, the number of 8-inch, 10-inch, and 15-inch Rodman guns required for the proper armament of our fortifications on the coast and frontier is estimated, from the best data attainable, at 4,918. The capacity (Army share) of our foundries for this class of guns, in addition to their other work, was stated in the same letter at 612 for the year 1864, at which rate it would take seven years to produce the quantity required.

With no mention of a single Confederate threat, what are we to consider for the definition of “wants of the country”?  Certainly, as seen with requests for Rodman Guns at points like Pensacola, there was a need for such heavy weapons at points under threat of Confederate raiders.  Less threat, however, was present at far flung locations as California where more Rodmans were wanted.  The Army figured a need for nearly 5,000 of these guns to defend “the coast and frontier.”  And we have no mention here of a threat from the Confederates.  Ramsay’s letter is less about beating the guys in gray and more so about national defense policy.

Ramsay pressed to make sure the nation’s coastal defenses were well armed.  And at the rate guns were being accepted, he worried that would take many long years:

The following table exhibits the deficiency in the number of these guns expected to be received in the present year to date, and based on the estimated capacity of the founders engaged in the manufacture:

RodmanGunProd1864

And why was the Army behind in equipping the forts?

This deficiency is chiefly attributable to the fact that in consequence of the high prices asked by Messrs. Charles Knap & Co., C. Alger & Co., the principal founders, it was not deemed advisable by the War Department in March last to accede to their terms, and such guns as they have delivered in the present year were due on order given prior to January 1, 1864.

Messrs. Seyfert, McManus & Co., of Reading, Pa., accepted a contract for seventy-five 8-inch and 10-inch guns at 10½ cents per pound, which they have nearly filled. We are now paying 13 cents a pound for 8-inch siege mortars and howitzers.

Not only did Ramsay want to spread the work among multiple vendors, he also wanted to engage in what we’d call today “fixed priced contracting” as a measure to block profiteering and benefit to the government:

I inclose a memorandum from the Navy Ordnance Bureau showing the prices now being paid by them for heavy guns. As the magnitude of the work is such as will require years to execute it, and as its accomplishment is of vital importance to the defense of our harbors and sea-ports, I think no time should be lost in expending the money appropriated by Congress for the armament of fortifications, in order to avoid any further rise in the price of material and labor; and I request that I be authorized to make contracts for a definite number of guns to be delivered in specified times, and on the most favorable terms I can negotiate after due investigation, to be approved by you. As the want of a Government establishment of this kind makes us entirely dependent upon private parties, whose capital and experience enables them to exercise a monopoly of this kind of work, I consider the interests of the Government will suffer far more from the interruption in the supply of guns than from any dubious excess in the gains of the manufacturers.

Now there is a bit of a back story involving politics at the Ordnance Department.  I’ll offer the short version, as most readers are no doubt more interested in the guns themselves than bickering among cannon inspectors.  Ramsay was not on good terms with Stanton.  When he took the post of Chief of Ordnance in September 1863, Captain George T. Balch, whom Stanton preferred, was the de facto chief in many respects.  Within a month of this letter to Stanton, Ramsay would request to be relieved from the post.

But the friction between Ramsay and Stanton aside, the fact of the matter is heavy ordnance production increased substantially through the last year of the Civil War.  Those guns were not purchased with a mind to aid in the suppression of a rebellion.  Instead these were procured for “the wants of the country” as defined in engineering surveys of the coastlines.  The Civil War saw Federal military expenditures on a level never seen before in the United States (and at a level not exceed for another half century – during World War I).  And a substantial amount of that expenditure was to ensure the nation’s defenses were brought up to a healthy state… while the Congress was willing to keep writing the checks.

(Citation from OR, Series III, Volume 4, Serial 125, pages 626-7.)

August 18, 1864: Foster’s evaluation of the POW issue – It’s all about the exchanges

Major-General John Foster’s report of August 18, 1864 to Major-General Henry Halleck might have opened with discussion of troop transfers.  But the next subject Foster touched upon was the prisoner of war issue which had developed at Charleston through the summer.  With 600 Federals held as prisoners in Charleston, Foster was preparing facilities to house 600 Confederates on Morris Island in response.  Considering all the information at his disposal, Foster evaluated the issue:

About the exchanges I have sent on full documents. The rebels are anxious to exchange. They say that their desire is that two old regular officers like Jones and myself may have charge of the matter, so that it may be fairly done without any political jars and interruptions. They desire to have all exchanged, both officers (1,800) and men (37,000). Although the men are not now in General Jones’ command, he can have them sent forward at any time. Jones seems well disposed, so our released prisoners say.

It was all about facilitating more exchanges.

[Jones] sent an apology to General Wessells for placing the 600 officers under fire in Charleston. He stated that he did not place them there to be under fire, but that they were merely en route. The truth is they are so short of men as guards that they have no place to put their prisoners in except Charleston and Savannah.

So, here we see another aspect of the manpower shortage for the Confederates.  Foster closed this portion of his report by stating his preferences as the prisoner issue continued:

If an exchange is authorized I shall specify that those in Charleston be first exchanged, and that no others be placed there. As far as injury to them goes there can be none, for I know their exact position and direct the shells accordingly. As soon as the rebel officers arrive I shall place them immediately on Morris Island between Wagner and Gregg.

There was one other prisoner-related subject, which Foster did not mention in this report of August 18.  Concerned with reports from Andersonville, Foster inquired with his opposite number on the Confederate side, Major-General Samuel Jones, in regard to sanitary and other supplies needed by the prisoners.  Foster offered to provide supplies to the prisoners, but for obvious reasons insisted a Federal officer in the camps be in charge of distribution.  That inquiry floated about until a response came later in the month.  Foster’s proposal is of note – particularly when considering the retaliatory measures taken later against the 600 Confederate prisoners confined at both Morris Island and Fort Pulaski.

(Citation from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, page 247.)