A 10pdr Parrott Rifle from Macon? Well maybe

A couple years back when discussing the Regarded Parrott rifles, I mentioned Macon Arsenal as another source for Confederate Parrotts.  As I said then, I’ve never seen a “confirmed” Macon 10-pdr.  But every visit to Chancellorsville I give one particular gun extra scrutiny hoping it might give away some clues.

10-pdr Parrott Rifle, possibly from Macon Arsenal

Recall Macon Arsenal was among the facilities built by the Confederate government during the war.  In that case, the nucleus of the arsenal was a rented shop.  Although Macon’s biggest production runs were 12-pdr Napoleons, the cannon foundry produced at least a dozen 10-pdr Parrotts.  Of that lot, the registry of surviving guns lists two that are around today.  One is in private hands.  The other is tentatively identified as the gun pictured above.

The Parrott rifle in question appears a closer match to early Federal 10-pdrs (2.9-inch) than the Tredegar guns.  There is a noticeable “step” in front of the trunnions, much like early Federal guns.

Step in front of the trunnions

Notice the casting seams running dorsally down the gun.  As I’ve mentioned before, this is often seen on Confederate guns where the foundry kept machining to a minimum.

The rimbases are squared, as was the fashion with both early Federal and Tredegar Parrotts.

Trunnions and rimbases

The trunnions themselves are badly weathered.

Trunnion face

There’s little hope gathering markings off those trunnion faces.  Nor from the breech face.

Breech face

Damage flattened the underside of the knob.  Certainly something to be expected from a century and a half of handling.

The band exhibits lateral lines, suggesting but welding as was done with the Tredegar Parrotts.

Profile of the Band and Breech

However, the band is shorter than those seen on Tredegar Parrotts, by nearly two inches.  There’s no bevel at the front of the band.   However there is a raised section at the front of the band, which seems to indicate the surface under the band is likewise raised.

Raised section under the band

The muzzle has a swell, again not unlike Federal Parrotts.

Muzzle profile

Of course early Tredegar Parrotts had similar muzzle swells.

But what about the muzzle face?  Any markings that might suggest the origin of this piece?

Muzzle face

I’ve looked this muzzle face over in different lighting conditions, always looking for traces or hints of stamps or markings.  The most I’ve ever seen clearly is a “2″ at the top of the muzzle face.

Number 2 on muzzle face

That photo was taken in the early morning light, with the dew providing moisture to highlight the dents, dings, and number.

Notice also the three groove rifling.  That rifling extends into the bore but is worn down.

The best I can offer is that “2″ is similar in font and size to that used on Macon 12-pdr Napoleons.  For example number 28 at Gettysburg.

Close up of “No. 28″ stamp on Macon Napoleon

Of course, all that might prove is that a couple of foundries used the same type of dies when stamping the guns.

Several factors, particularly the lack of machining, point to a Confederate origin.  The “2″ is the only other clue there.  Much smaller than those seen on Federal Parrotts.  Still, pending a readable marking or some paper trail on the gun, I’ll still say “maybe” from Macon.

150 years ago: Arm citizens for defense of Charleston?

By mid-May 1863 two brigades, those of Brigadier-General S.R. Gist and Brigadier-General W.H.T. Walker, had left the Atlantic coast to reinforce Confederate forces in Mississippi.  The departure of these two brigades, pending transfer of more troops, and reallocation of heavy guns left many in South Carolina and Georgia feeling nervous.  Were their needs being overlooked, again?

Congressman William Porcher Miles, along with others to include Charleston Mayor Charles Macbeth, pressured Richmond to reverse the shift of troops and resources.  On May 13, 1863, Secretary of War James Seddon responded to these demands:

Gentlemen: Your telegrams remonstrating against the orders of the Department withdrawing troops from Charleston for the defense of Vicksburg and the Mississippi have been received with much concern and have caused anxious inquiry and reflection. You cannot doubt that the utmost solicitude is felt for the adequate defense and protection of your city, both for its intrinsic importance and the political significance that attaches to it, and that without the gravest consideration neither the apprehensions of its citizens would be awakened nor any portion of its gallant defenders be withdrawn. We are not however, unfortunately, so supplied with forces that we can retain them at all points we would wish to preserve without the sense of insecurity, but are obliged to employ them where great and pressing danger imperatively demands their presence and succor.

Now, while we can understand and appreciate the anxieties felt by yourselves and your fellow-citizens, yet we cannot think they rest on such foundations as ought to deter from the use of the force in your department on a field of more imminent danger and not less importance.

The prestige of your late brilliant victory will itself avail much to deter the enemy. Besides, we have satisfactory assurance that, a large portion of the enemy’s forces has been withdrawn from the vicinity of Charleston–first to North Carolina, and, since the late battle of Chancellorsville, to re-enforce Hooker. The near approach, too, of your sickly season and the present sultry weather give added confidence of no serious danger of attack on Charleston.
The enemy cannot have more than 10,000 or 15,000 troops at the at-most near you. Now, on inspection of the last returns (near the close of April) from your military department, it appears that after all deductions from the number of effectives then returned for the troops sent back to North Carolina and ordered to Mississippi, there will be left for the defense of Charleston and Savannah more than 15,000 troops of all arms; of these I have directed 5,000 should be tried infantry. Surely, with this force you can be in no serious danger, considering the superiority of spirit and valor in your soldiers and the advantages of intrenchments, from a force probably not equal, certainly not superior, of the Yankee enemy.

This being the real condition, I beg you to reflect on the vital importance of the Mississippi to our cause, to South Carolina, and to Charleston itself. Scarce any point in the Confederacy can be deemed more essential, for the “cause of each is the cause of all,” and the sundering of the Confederacy would be felt as almost a mortal blow to the most remote parts. Surely, if even some risk were incurred the end would justify it. You do not know, and I could be scarcely justified in stating, the causes that preclude succor from General Lee’s army and other points to General Pemberton, but you may rely upon it that only on the fullest consideration and under the gravest necessity is the draft made on Charleston and persisted in, despite the earnest remonstrance of gentlemen so highly esteemed as yourselves.

I can only add, in conclusion, that I would advise the organization, at least by mustering and arming, of all citizens among you capable of bearing arms. A force very effective behind intrenchments might thus be added to your military defenders.

In the middle of 1863, Seddon sounded a lot like General Albert S. Johnston had in the winter of 1862.  Maybe not the same assessment, but similar conclusions.  Seddon, and by extension the top leadership in Richmond, felt the Mississippi had priority of effort.  Charleston, after all, was under much less pressure.  A recent victory had set the Federals back on their heels.  He felt for sure the Yankees had shifted troops north to bolster the Army of the Potomac after defeat at Chancellorsville.  His estimate of the Federal strength was not far off, as returns dated May 10 indicated only 16,259 men in the Department of the South (although that was just a temporary “dip” in numbers).  And, as he put it, the “sickly season and the present sultry weather” would dissuade the Federals from major operations.

Sure, we know well with a century and a half of hindsight that Virginia and Mississippi were the important sectors at that stage of the war. No disputes there, save those South Carolinians.  But it is that last paragraph that stands out to me – “...I would advise the organization, at least by mustering and arming, of all citizens among you capable of bearing arms.”  That sounds close to Johnston’s call for the “greatest effort.”

General P.G.T. Beauregard’s Department would have to defend Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia with the meager resources on hand.  And at the same time expect to forward more troops as required to shore up lines elsewhere.  What was not expected is Federal troops opposing Beauregard rose to 24,737 troops by early June.  And the Federals were indeed planning offensive operations in spite of the summer weather.

More importantly, consider Seddon’s response here in context of other happenings at the close of May and early June in Mississippi and Virginia.

Breaking News: CWT update on Brandy Station – just $193,000 needed for Fleetwood!

Civil War Trust provided an update on efforts to purchase Fleetwood Hill at Brandy Station. The Trust has secured over $3.4 million of the $3.6 million needed! Just $193,000 more left!

Trust president Jim Lighthizer provides more details in a letter posted to their website. The goal must be met by August 7, however.

Having pushed and campaigned for this both in public and private, I’m most pleased at the progress. More to follow. Let’s make short work of what remains. Join me in making a contribution to secure what is without doubt a piece of significant, hallowed ground.