Category Archives: American Civil War

Wainwright’s Diary, April 21, 1864: “We have two more warning notes of a start”

Another diary entry for Colonel Charles S. Wainwright.  Another report on the weather:

April 21, Thursday. Since Monday morning we have had fine, bright sunshine.  The peach trees are in blossom, and the leaves of the earlier forest trees bursting out from the buds.  Still the snow lies white along the ridge of the Blue Mountains, and the nights continue to be cold….

I would point out the weather for April 18 through 21, 2014 has featured “fine, bright sunshine.”

My monthly returned of yesterday shew an aggregate present of 1,611… for the troops around here.  We have two more warning notes of a start, viz: the shipment of the most sick today, and the regulation of supplies to be taken at the start and the means of carrying them.  Three days full rations in havrsacks, three small in knapsacks, and ten in waggons, or sixteen days supply in all.  Ten days forage is to be taken.  How absurd such orders are!  What are the animals to do the last six days? Or are they to live on nothing? From the start they are cut off from their hay fourteen pounds, and the allowance of grain reduced two pounds, so that they may be said to be placed on half allowance.  When will our commanders give up this penny-wise-and-pound-foolish plan? If their proposed operations require sixteen days’ food for the men, they should require the same amount for the animals….

The orders Wainwright referred to were derived from reccomendations by Brigadier-General Rufus Ingalls.  In a lengthy letter to Major-General George Meade on April 13, Ingalls governed the number of wagons needed by the Army of the Potomac based on the issue of rations, ammunition, and of course forage for the horses.  Ingalls adjusted his figures, slightly, from that used as a basis for General Orders No. 100, issued on November 5, 1863.  The point of contention, from Wainwright’s perspective, was Ingalls’ estimate of ten days forge for the animals.  From the perspective of those handling the guns, the arithmetic appears some of the “two-and-two-are-five” manner.  But Ingalls’ plan relied heavily on the depot train to provide forage on the march, particularly for the cavalry.  In some ways, Ingalls was an early adopter of the “just in time” logistics practice.

Some will point out that “just in time” really means “almost late.”

(Citations from Charles S. Wainwright, A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865, edited by Allan Nevins, New York: Da Capo Press, 1998, page 342.)

150 years ago: Beauregard leaves Charleston and heads north

Back in the fall of 1862, when General P.G.T. Beauregard arrived in Charleston to command the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, he saw the promise to lead in an active theater of war, with the expectation of Federal attack growing by the day.  After just over eighteen months, give or take, the situation changed to revert Charleston and the rest of the department to backwater status.  The Federals, having sent ironclads, shovels, and 200-pdr Parrott shells against Charleston, reduced their strength.  Beauregard’s primary adversary, Major-General Quincy Gillmore, had orders sending him and a corps-worth of men to Virginia.

While Beauregard could reflect with pride upon his defense of Charleston, and defense of other sectors of his command, he desired active field command.  Compounding this situation, the creole was still mourning the loss of his wife, Caroline, who had died in early march behind Federal lines in New Orleans.

But Beauregard was not long for the doldrums that had beset Charleston.  On April 15, 1864, he received orders sending him to Weldon, North Carolina.  Beauregard would receive a new command.  On April 20, he bid farewell to his old command:

Hdqrs. Dept. of S. Carolina, Georgia, and Florida,
Charleston, S.C., April 20, 1864.
Officers and Soldiers:

By an order of His Excellency the President I am relieved temporarily from the command of the department by Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones, to be assigned to another important command. I leave with the assurance that you will transfer to my successor, a meritorious officer of the armies of Virginia and Tennessee, that confidence and spirit of prompt obedience to orders which have contributed so much to your success heretofore. Should you ever become discouraged remember that a people from whom have sprung such soldiers as those who defended Wagner and Sumter can never be subjugated in a war of independence.

G. T. Beauregard,
General Commanding.

Three days later, Beauregard posted orders assuming his new command:

Pursuant to instructions from the War Department, I assume command of the Departments of North Carolina and the Cape Fear. The two departments thus consolidated will be known as the Department of North Carolina and Southern Virginia, and will embrace that portion of the State of North Carolina east of the mountains and that section of the State of Virginia south of the James and Appomattox Rivers. A prompt obedience of orders, a mutual good understanding, and a cordial support of one another are enjoined on both officers and men as indispensable to success. Violations of regulations and orders must be promptly reported in order that discipline, so necessary, may be maintained.

Beauregard inherited command in a theater fresh from the promising victory at Plymouth, North Carolina.  And the CSS Albemarle gave the Confederates some tactical alternatives beyond just waiting for a Federal offense.  But Beauregard once again had command of a broad theater with far few men to defend it.  His primary responsibility was not to reject the Federals occupying the coastal regions, but to defend the railroads feeding supplies to Richmond, Virginia and General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  Not exactly the “field command” which Beauregard preferred.

Beauregard mentioned the defense of Battery Wagner and Fort Sumter in his farewell on April 20.  I’ve always found interesting that many of the defenders of Morris Island later found themselves defending Petersburg, Virginia in 1864 – From Beauregard down to the ranks.  Likewise, Gillmore and many of the Federal veterans from Morris Island operations were once again opposing them in what would evolved into yet another siege.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 33, Serial 60, pages 1307-8; Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, pages 444-5.)

 

“I have tried them … and have found them very serviceable.”: Hale’s Rockets over Charleston

In my opinion, Brigadier-General Alexander Schimmelfennig’s Civil War career is unfairly marked by his Gettysburg experience.  In the Gettysburg-centric view of the Civil War, he is best known for hiding with the hogs behind the Garlach House while the battle raged. But while not ranking as one of the war’s great generals, Schimmelfennig’s war experience offers more substance than just those three days in July, 1863.

On this day (April 18) in 1864, Schimmelfennig, commanding the garrison on Morris and Folly Islands, reported positive results from trials of Hale’s War Rockets:

Headquarters Northern District,
Folly Island, S.C., April 18, 1864.
Lieut. Col. E. W. Smith,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the South:

Colonel: I have the honor to report that I have tried Hale’s war rockets in regard to their correctness of flight, power of penetration, and the best methods of handling and discharging them. I have tried them against targets and against the enemy and have found them very serviceable. I have armed all the outer forts in which I did not wish to expose artillery with these rockets. I have organized a common rocket battery (the men are instructed and drilled), and am now organizing a boat rocket battery to accompany expeditions, &c. I regret to say that there are but 700 rockets on hand, and that they are of the large size (3¼-inch, nearly 32 pounds weight), which are less serviceable than the smaller ones. I beg that the major-general commanding will instruct his ordnance officer to obtain without delay for this district:

First. Three thousand 2¼-inch Hale’s rockets, old construction, with rotation holes in the rear end and a 4-second fuse. With these I require no stands.

Second. One thousand 3 1/4-inch rockets, with 10 stands.

A. Schimmelfennig,
Brigadier-General, Commanding District.

Earlier, I posted a report from the Confederate side, discussing the trials directly against their picket line and some observations of the rockets themselves.  The sizes mentioned by Schimmelfennig correspond to the Ordnance Manual’s 2- and 3-inch rockets, however he was citing the outside diameter of the projectile while the manual used the inside diameter.  The British inventor of this rocket, William Hale, offered several variations of the exhaust vent arrangements as he worked to perfect the weapon.  In A Course of Instruction in Ordnance and Gunnery, James G. Benton offered this diagram of the rocket:

HaleWarRocket1

This diagram resembles the description offered by Major Edward Manigault on April 16, 1864.  But with so many variations with Hale’s rockets, I’m not going to call that a positive identification.

The Ordnance Manual of 1862 listed the following particulars for the 3-inch rocket:

  • Whole length of the rocket – 16.9 inches
  • Length of finished case – 14.2 inches
  • Exterior diameter of case – 3.25 inches
  • Interior diameter of case – 3 inches
  • Weight of rocket, complete – 14 pounds

I suspect “weight complete” did not include the propellant or explosive charges.  And adding those two would increase the weight closer to the 32 pounds mentioned by Schimmelfennig.

The stands used for these rockets was a simple setup, almost flimsy looking.  A surviving example in good condition appeared for sale on an antique vendor website recently:

04-01

I think any reader who has “experimented” with bottle rockets will understand the principle here.  Benton credited the 2-inch rocket with a range of 1,760 yards, and the 3-inch with 2,200 yards.

The primary advantage of the rockets lay in their light weight and ease of employment.  As Schimmelfennig noted, the “rocketeers” might setup very close to Confederate lines with little preparation.  Furthermore, the rockets were equally at home afloat.  Mounted in small boats, the rockets could be floated well forward into the creeks and marshes in front of James Island.  Other advantages often cited include the psychological impacts.  But such “shock and awe” effects were mostly nullified after the first employment.  The rockets offered ofter tactical advantages also, namely rapidity of fire and lack of recoil.

The main disadvantage of Hale’s War Rockets, as with most unguided rockets, was accuracy.  Too many variables affected the projectile’s path of flight.  Slight variations in the exhaust might send the rocket sailing off course.  Winds played against the rocket’s flight path, and required more adjustment than conventional artillery.  And of course in the days prior to smokeless powder, the exhaust trail of the rockets left a pointer to the battery’s location.

Schimmelfennig mentions forming a rocket battery (and boat rocket battery!) to operate these weapons.  That unit was Company G, 74th Pennsylvania Infantry.  A good writeup on the company’s use of the rockets is on Bret Coulson’s website (part 1 and part 2).  The company employed the rockets during their stay, then trained replacements when the regiment returned north to the defenses of Washington later in 1864.

Rockets, submarines, balloons, mines, and ironclads… the Charleston siege was a showcase of 1860′s military technology.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 35, Part II, Serial 66, pages 60-1.)