150 Years Ago: Fighting at Mount Defiance

Today (June 19) in 1863 for the second time in three days the sounds of battle echoed across Loudoun Valley. In and around Middleburg, Virginia horse soldiers fought the third large scale cavalry battle of the Gettysburg campaign. When the day ended, the Federals had pressed Major-General J.E.B. Stuart’s troopers down the road a few miles, but the screen in front of the Army of Northern Virginia’s infantry remained.

I sat down yesterday evening with a mind to polish my note files on the Battle of Middleburg into a post complementing today’s “Marching through Loudoun” intallment. I needed supporting maps and a outline. But two 1000 word posts was a bit too ambitious. I could not, if I spent full day trying, improve upon the maps provided in the Civil War in Loudoun Valley study of 2004. If you have not read it, I recommend that study.

Considering Middleburg in relation to the “March through Loudoun”, the cavalry fight on June 19 kept Major-General Joe Hooker’s attention to the west. Exactly what was Stuart screening? Where were the Confederates heading?

In regards to the battlefield’s condition today, let me applaud the work of Civil War Trust, Mosby Heritage Area Association, Northern Virginia Regional Parks Authority, and others. At Mount Defiance, where heavy fighting occurred on June 19, five acres constitute a park in the making. Easements and other projects in the works promise to preserve significant portions of the battlefield.

Marching Through Loudoun: June 19, 1863

I like comparing situations across time to help with frame of reference. For instance at this time in 1863, the Army of the Potomac was oriented to the west. The last time the army had faced west to give battle was at Antietam. Days before that bloody battle, the Army of the Potomac marched out from Frederick towards gaps in the Catoctin Mountain. After several small, but sharp, cavalry actions (which my friend Laurence Freiheit has written about at length) the army reached passes in South Mountain.

Now nine months later, the army faced the Virginia side of the Catoctin, and Bull Run Mountains to the south. Large, and vicious, cavalry actions occurred between those rims and the Blue Ridge Mountains to the west. But, Major-General Joseph Hooker didn’t find any “lost orders” on which to guide his movements.

On June 19, 1863, Hooker continued to build the “Bull Run-Catoctin” line by moving the infantry corps forward. First Corps marched to Guilford Station, just one stop up on the Alexandria, Loudoun, & Hampshire Railroad (rail-less at this time in the war). Major-General George Meade’s Fifth Corps moved up to Aldie. Behind them, the Third Corps moved into the area of Gum Springs. Second Corps started movement for Thoroughfare Gap reaching Centreville.

Beyond Aldie, the Cavalry Corps opened a day long fight with their Confederate counterparts. Let me cover the Battle of Middleburg in a separate post. But while we are thinking about the horse soldiers, Colonel John B. McIntosh’s brigade from Second Division remained in the Thoroughfare Gap and Haymarket area, guarding that important pass. Further out, Colonel Othniel De Forest, sent out the previous day to reconnoiter to Warrenton, ran into resistance there. De Forest’s command was as part of Major-General Julius Stahel’s division. While not part of the Army of the Potomac at the time, within a ten days, the division would be – and under a new set of commanders.

But let me discus two events which put focus on Leesburg. With armies in motion and the possibility of battle practically every hour, the Twelfth Corps paused briefly to exercise martial responsibilities. Brigadier-General Alpheus Williams recorded this in his letters home:

Today we had the most unpleasant duty of shooting three deserters, about the first capital punishments which have taken place in the army for this offense. Two of them, of the 46th Pennsylvania Volunteers, deserted about two weeks ago when we were under orders to march towards the enemy. They bought citizens’ clothes, but were apprehended while trying to get off by Aquia Creek. The other (13th New Jersey Volunteers) deserted a year or more ago and was sent back from home. He neglected to avail himself of the pardon offered by the President in April last…. The whole corps was paraded in a large field and formed three sides of a square. By Gen. Hooker’s orders the execution was under my direction as commander of the division to which the men belonged. The carrying out of details I put, of course, on my provost marshal. Three graves were dug some two feet apart in a slight depression of the field, and on the gentle swell of the ground the troops were formed so every man could see the execution.

One of these days I must trace down the location of this incident (and see if possible to have it marked, of course).

While this grim duty was completed, Major-General Henry Slocum carried on a significant correspondence with army headquarters. In a report at 10:40 a.m., Slocum urged the placement of a pontoon bridge at Edwards Ferry. In response, Army Chief of Staff Major-General Daniel Butterfield sent a barrage of questions:

What advantages are to be gained by putting a bridge at Edwards Ferry? Are there any reasons why we cannot cross at Noland’s and Hauling Fords? We think the enemy are in the Shenandoah Valley, Longstreet and A. P. Hill, one portion, perhaps, this side of the Blue Ridge. Ewell is reported in Maryland or Pennsylvania, but we cannot get any reliable or definite idea from there. The whole country, generals and all, seem struck with heavy stampede.

If General Warren is at the mouth of the Monocacy, request him to report here by safe route through your corps.

Do you hold Noland’s and Hauling Fords? They are held by our cavalry on the opposite side.

Slocum replied with the logic of a man seasoned in the problems encountered while campaigning in enemy territory:

I think the bridge should be built at Edwards Ferry to supply us. I have not force enough to keep the route to Vienna, or to hold many fords on the river in the country filled with guerrillas. Edwards Ferry is most accessible, and is covered by a strong redoubt on this side. Our supplies should be sent from Georgetown, by canal, to Edwards Ferry.

Supply. I’ve covered this in detail over many posts on Edwards Ferry. It is my opinion the placement of this first bridge was driven more by logistical requirements than any need to pass the army into Maryland. The redoubt mentioned by Slocum is Fort Evans. As seen on this map, that work dominates the approaches Edwards Ferry.

Built in 1861-2 during the Confederate stay in Leesburg, the fort remains today as one of the best preserved in Northern Virginia.

Convinced by Slocum’s reply, Butterfield cut orders for the engineers to begin building a pontoon bridge over the Potomac.

One last bit to consider. How was this conversation between Slocum and Butterfield transmitted? Leesburg and Fairfax Courthouse are some 27 highway miles apart. There was no direct telegraph line between. So those messages passed through a mixed network using wig-wags and telegraph, some of which is depicted on the map below:

Signal Stations: June 19-22.

Each message carried the tag “via Poolesville” indicating the message went from Leesburg to Poolesville by wig-wag, and then through Washington to Fairfax by telegraph. With First Corps moving up to Guilford Station, the telegraph lines extended out to that point down the railroad right of way, but not beyond.

Closing June 19, the army’s itinerary for the day read:

The First Corps marched from Herndon Station to Guilford Station; the Third Corps from Centerville to Gum Springs; and the Fifth Corps from Gum Springs to Aldie. Gregg’s cavalry division, except McIntosh’s (late Wyndham’s) brigade, advanced to Middleburg. McIntosh’s brigade moved from Aldie to Hay Market.

Now five infantry and one cavalry corps occupied Loudoun County.

(Citations from From the Cannon’s Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus S. Williams, edited by Milo Quaife, pages 216-7 and OR, Series I, Volume 27, Part I, Serial 43, page 142; Part III, Serial 45, pages 208-9.)

Marching Through Loudoun: June 18, 1863

Through the month of June 1863, the Army of the Potomac made two large operational pivots. The first pivot took place after the Battle of Brandy Station with the army moving off the Rappahannock River, where it faced generally south, into a position facing west. As my friend Clark Hall mentioned in the comments yesterday, the Bull Run Mountains and Catoctin Mountain formed a geographic shield. But that pivot was not complete on this day (June 18) in 1863. The army was still in motion.

What worried Major-General Joseph Hooker at this time 150 years ago were reports of Confederate activity at Point of Rocks, about half way between Leesburg and Harpers Ferry. With fears the Rebels might launch a cavalry raid into Maryland (and not realizing a portion of their infantry was already in Maryland), Hooker ordered forward his own infantry. To Major-General Henry Slocum’s Twelfth Corps at midnight on June 17:

The major-general commanding directs that, on receipt of this order, if after 3.30 a.m. or at that hour, you move your corps to Leesburg. Hold it, and open communication with the fords on the Potomac in that vicinity, and hold them. Captain McKee, with a detachment of cavalry of this army, ought to be at the mouth of the Monocacy to-night; bridge trains and two regiments of infantry to-morrow noon. General Pleasonton encountered Fitz. Lee’s brigade of cavalry at Aldie at 4 o’clock this afternoon. Stuart was reported at Middleburg. The inclosed dispatch would lead to a presumption that they are there to cover White’s crossing the river, or else to join him. This must be prevented. General Pleasonton may be sending in a force toward Leesburg, as he has been directed to do so. Guard against collision with him. Inform his officers there, should you meet them, of all you can learn regarding enemy’s movements.

Hooker ordered the Eleventh Corps to stand ready move in support should the Twelfth encountered resistance. The Fifth Corps would remain in place at Gum Springs. Captain Samuel McKee, mentioned in the orders to Slocum, moved to secure river crossing points from the Maryland side. If all these movements were completed with vigor, any attempt by Confederate cavalry to break into Maryland would end before getting started. Only one problem… the Stuart’s cavalry wasn’t planning to splash across the Potomac that day. As Captain McKee reported mid-afternoon, “Nothing has been seen or heard of the enemy here today.”

Hooker anticipated Twelfth Corps in Leesburg might reach Leesburg by mid-day. As Major-General John Reynolds observed, Slocum had trouble crossing Goose Creek due to bad, rocky fords. There were no bridges over the lower portion of Goose Creek. Afternoon rainstorms further delayed the Twelfth Corps. Slocum did not close on Leesburg until 5 p.m.

From Aldie, Brigadier-General Alfred Pleasonton sent out patrols towards Middleburg. He also posted a brigade at Thoroughfare Gap. A “Bull Run-Catoctin line” was taking shape.

As the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry was stretched thin, Hooker requested two regiments of Major-General Julius Stahel’s division to reconnoiter to Warrenton and Sulpher Springs to the south. Stahel would send Colonel Othniel De Forest with two regiments to fill this request.

Meanwhile, the engineers of the army were also busy. For the last week, the brigade worked to pull in the bridges placed at Fredericksburg earlier in the month, then transport the lot to Washington. Summarizing the state of readiness, Brigadier-General Henry Benham reported:

I am now about to bring the bridges from Alexandria to this depot for rearrangement and repairs. We have nearly 200 pontoons to examine and refit into bridges, and about 1,200 animals of the trains to care for, while the total effective force of my brigade, excepting the company and fractional company at work in this depot, and that company at Harper’s Ferry, is only about 1,000 to 1,100 men, and of these 600 are now up the Potomac, under Major Spaulding and Captain Turnbull; and the balance of the command, … should, as I would respectfully recommend, all be concentrated at this depot, where the services of all will be required for the care and guarding of this large number of animals and the speedy restoration of the bridges to a serviceable condition, which will be immediately reported to headquarters.

This early in the campaign, the engineers were already hard pressed.

As June 18 came to a close, Hooker’s headquarters sent out a circular with instructions to “exclude all excess of personal baggage” and generally clean up the wagon trains. The army needed to move faster, with fewer encumbrances. At the close of the circular, a summary of the army’s dispositions read:

The general headquarters will be at Fairfax Court-House to-night. Telegraphic communication will be established to General Reynolds’ camp, near Guilford Station. [were First Corps would move on the 19th]

The Twelfth Corps is at Leesburg; the Eleventh on Goose Creek, near Trappe Rock, 4 miles from Leesburg; the Fifth Corps, General Meade, at Gum Springs; cavalry in the vicinity of Aldie; the Sixth Corps at Germantown; Second Corps at Sangster’s Station. General Pleasonton engaged Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, of Stuart’s cavalry, at Aldie yesterday, capturing 9 officers and 74 men.

The Army of the Potomac was not finished with this first pivot, but the line was forming across Loudoun. The 19th would bring both marching and fighting.

(Citations from OR, Series I, Volume 27, Part III, Serial 45, pages 178, 193, 194, 197, and 198.)