150 years ago: Gillmore “willing to risk… reputation” outside Charleston

Credited with the reduction of Fort Puaski in April 1862, Brigadier-General Quincy Gillmore carried the reputation as both a master and pioneer of siege warfare, using techniques based on new technology.  During the operations at Fort Pulaski, Gillmore contracted malaria and took sick leave through the summer of 1862.  When Confederate advances threatened the Ohio Valley, Gillmore returned to field duty in Kentucky.  After putting his engineering skills to use improving fortifications, Gillmore took command of a division defending central Kentucky.  Gillmore did manage to defeat Confederate raiders in the Battle of Somerset, March 31, 1863.  Otherwise his command was a quiet backwater of the war.

But events would bring Gillmore back to the southern coasts.  Advance notice of the transfer reached Gillmore after mid-May.  To General George W. Cullum, the Army’s Chief of Staff in Washington, Gillmore wrote, rather bluntly, on May 23, 1863:

General: It has come to my knowledge that my name has been mentioned to the Secretary of War in connection with the reduction of the forts in Charleston Harbor, and it has been urgently suggested to place me in a position where I could direct and control the operations of the land forces against that place. Two or three communications from prominent men here have been sent to the Secretary.

It is not necessary to inform you, who are so well acquainted with me, that I am not in the habit of pushing myself forward or thrusting my professional opinion unasked upon the notice of those in authority. In my daily intercourse with gentlemen of my acquaintance I am, however, always free to answer questions and I have at sundry times and in sundry places expressed the opinion that the forts in Charleston Harbor could be reduced by the means (naval and military combined) now available in the Department of the South, increased by a suitable number of the best heavy rifled guns, provided these have not been sent there since I left that department one year ago.

I have also said that I am willing to risk my own reputation upon the attempt, as I did at Pulaski, provided I could be allowed the untrammeled execution of my own plans (as at Pulaski), except so far as they involved co-operation from the Navy.

You are at liberty to show this letter to the general-in-chief or any one else.
I expect to remain here until the evening of the 27th instant, and then go directly to Cincinnati.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Q. A. Gillmore, Brigadier-General.

There are two errors often cited with respect to Gillmore’s return to the Department of the South.  Some sources credit Gillmore as Major-General Ormsby Mitchel’s replacement to head the Tenth Corps.  With the Tenth Corps being the main field element of the Department of the South, the two commands were for the most part one and the same. However, Mitchel died of yellow fever in October 1862 after having just assumed command of the corps. Temporarily, Brigadier-General John M. Brannan commanded the corps and the department.  Under orders posted on January 20, 1863, Major-General David Hunter assumed command.  With the Tenth Corps and parts of the Eighteenth Corps assigned to the Department of the South, Hunter could have designated subordinate commands.  However disagreements with Major-General John Foster and operational needs must have precluded such organizational changes. Instead Hunter commanded, on paper, both the department and corps, with individual divisions and brigades reporting to headquarters at Hilton Head.  So…with that long explanation in place … Gillmore was not sent to replace Mitchel.

But that leads to the other error often made about Gillmore’s arrival.  It is often said that Hunter was relieved in reaction to the burning of Darien, Georgia. Under that line of reasoning, Gillmore went to the department as the “ringer” to deal with Fort Sumter, then found himself elevated to command the department after Hunter’s relief.  This is simply not true.  Special Orders No. 249 from Army Headquarters in Washington make this clear:

By direction of the President, Major-General Hunter is temporarily relieved from command of the Department of the South ,and will report to the Adjutant-General for special duty in Washington.  Brig. Gen. Q.A. Gillmore is assigned by the President to the temporary command of the Department of the South.

Date on the orders – June 3, 1863.

Date of the burning of Darien – June 11, 1863.

Date Gillmore officially arrived and assumed command – June 12, 1863.

Do the math.

The last week of May through the first half of June was an interesting period of activity along the South Carolina-Florida coast.  Federal raids along the coastline (not just Darien) soon dispelled the belief summer would bring inactivity.  Confederates would soon find themselves less one ironclad (and a good one at that).  And in addition to the replacement of Hunter, the Navy had already cut orders to bring Admiral Andrew H. Foote down to replace Admiral Samuel DuPont.  (But fate would have it that Foote would die before assuming command, which would bring another actor to the stage – John Dahlgren.)

Things were heating up along the southern coast… meteorologically and operationally.

(Gilmore’s letter is from OR, Series I, Volume 14, Serial 20, page 459.  Special Orders No. 249 is on page 464.)

 

150 Years Ago: Engineer support for Morris Island “dilatory”

Sorry to hop around lot here, but I cannot resist sesquicentennial themed posts… and at the same time I want to keep in these threads about Charleston. That in mind, let me turn to a report filed by Brigadier-General Roswell Ripley, commander of the First Military District of South Carolina defending Charleston, on this day (May 24) in 1863. Ripley addressed Brigadier-General Thomas Jordon, General P.G.T. Beauregard’s Chief of Staff:

General: The continued occupation and activity of the enemy on Folly Island may reasonably lead us to expect an attack from that direction sooner or later, unless we are thoroughly prepared to receive it. What their force is we have no means of ascertaining, and from the great reduction in our numbers it is impossible to employ scouting parties in such strength as to furnish an approximation. Steamers are seen to communicate with them from time to time; but whether they bring or carry away troops, or whether they are merely supply vessels, are matters of doubt.

From personal observation, I have the honor to state that the preparations which are going on under the engineer department, for communication with, and the defense of, Morris Island, are dilatory, and will not be finished, according to present appearances, for a long period. The bridge over the first creek south of Fort Johnson is commenced; the ferry arrangements over Light-House Creek and the causeways over the Soft Marsh are only started. The progress on the battery at Vincent’s Creek, which was ordered some six weeks since, consisted a few days ago in the hulk being in position, and the collection of a few mounds of mud, sand, and shells, about one-fourth enough to fill the hulk, and which would hardly be efficient material for an epaulement.

Ripley’s concerns about attack from Folly Island were valid, as later events would show. In April, the southern half of Morris Island was mostly undefended. Ripley’s modest improvements at least allowed some defense of the island in the face of attack from the south.

To reinforce Battery Wagner against land assaults, Ripley ordered the reallocation of two carronades would for flank defense. The battery at Vincent’s Creek, then under construction, covered the rear of Battery Wagner and fire upon the flanks of any attack up Morris Island. The Confederates would never complete the work (although remains, along with the wreck of a steamboat and remains of similar Federal efforts to build a battery at that location, are in the marshes today.)

Ripley had seven guns on the south end of the island. Four of those guns covered Light-House Inlet. He asked for a 30-pdr Parrott to properly cover the inlet. Furthermore, he had plans to place a 10-inch mortar just below the lighthouse in order to harass any Federals working on Little Folly Islands.

However, as Ripley indicated, work was not progressing fast enough. Ripley held little faith that a series of paths and causeways intended to connect Morris Island with James Island would reach completion or be of much use. He complained, “The work on Fort Sumter, as usual, is going on slowly. No work is progressing at Battery Bee, nor on Morris Island, except a little being done by the troops.” In particular he leveled criticism at the engineers. His efforts to connect and improve the works on Morris Island were at a standstill, “…waiting for engineers to build and finish up magazines, the sickness of the artillery officer in command, and the inefficient supply of ordnance material, they are all badly prepared for service.”

Towards that later point, Ripley offered a suggestion to improve the ordnance on hand:

After several ineffectual efforts to have some arrangements made by which heavy guns can be rifled and banded at the [Charleston] arsenal (there being nobody at that establishment capable of the work), I have arranged with Mr. Cameron to put up a furnace himself, that the business can be proceeded with, and have ordered the iron from Atlanta.

I propose, if our heavy guns can be rifled and banded properly, and the south end of Morris Island be strengthened, so that it can be held against a strong attack, to place several at different points on the shore to command the whole anchorage from inside the bar to Fort Sumter, to prevent the possibility of assistance to disabled iron-clads by wooden vessels inside. This occurred after the action of the 7th of April for five days, and we were powerless to prevent it for want of a few guns of respectable caliber and range in such positions.

Up to this time, the Confederates at Charleston had rifled and banded weapons up to 42-pdr caliber. Prior to the ironclad attack of April 7, most felt the columbiads were useful enough as they were, without rifling. Now, as Ripley suggested, some were looking to band and rifle 8-inch and 10-inch columbiads. Particularly since no new heavy guns were due from Richmond in the near future.

8-inch Columbiad, Banded and Rifled

From the perspective of history, Ripley was correct in many regards. Morris Island was the next objective for Federal forces outside Charleston. But with the threadbare nature of the defense of Charleston, in order to improve Morris Island, something had to give elsewhere. A strong forward line would hollow the remainder of the Charleston defenses.

Needless to say, Ripley’s comments did not go over well with the engineers.

(Ripley’s report is part of the Appendix of OR, Series I, Volume 14, Serial 20, pages 1021-3.)

Water batteries against gunboats: Defenses of Vicksburg, part 2

Continuing from yesterday’s post on the Confederate defenses of Vicksburg, now let me turn to the big guns… and those with some real “names.” During the siege of Vicksburg not all the pressure the defenders came from the land approaches.  With Federal gunboats still working along the Mississippi, the Confederates had every reason to retain the batteries at the city’s riverfront.  Those heavy guns would parry any attempt by the Federals to take the city by riverine assault.

Colonel Edward Higgins commanded the river batteries.  In his consolidated report of the siege, filed on July 25, 1863, he offered a list of cannons under his command and their dispositions:

The line of batteries extended along the river front, commencing at a point above Fort Hill, on the right of my line, to a redoubt which terminated the extreme right of the rear lines and met my left, a distance of 3 miles, and consisted of 8 10-inch columbiads, 1 9-inch Dahlgren, 1 8-inch columbiad, 1 7.44-inch Blakely gun, 1 7-inch Brooks, 1 6.4-inch Brooks, 3 smooth-bore 42-pounders, 2 smooth-bore 32-pounders, 8 banded and unbanded 32-pounder rifles, 1 18-pounder rifle, 1 20-pounder Parrott, 1 Whitworth, 1 10-inch mortar, 1 8-inch siege howitzer, making in all 31 pieces of heavy artillery, besides 13 pieces of light artillery, which were placed in position to prevent a landing of the enemy on the city front. These batteries were divided into three commands, as follows: The upper batteries, from Fort Hill to the upper bayou, were worked by the First Tennessee Artillery, under Col. Andrew Jackson, jr. The center batteries, or those immediately on the city front, were under charge of Maj. F. N. Ogden, Eighth Louisiana Artillery Battalion, to whose command was attached Capt. S.C. Bains’ company, of Vaiden Light Artillery. The lower batteries were in charge of the First Louisiana Artillery, under Lieut. Col. D. Beltzhoover. A portion of the Twenty-third [Twenty-second] Louisiana Volunteers was joined to Lieutenant-Colonel Beltzhoover’s command.

The batteries offered an impressive weight of fire, on paper at least. Keep in mind that some of these guns arrived at at time that other sectors, namely Charleston, were also requesting heavy guns.

On May 18, 1863, Federal gunboats appeared both up and downstream of Vicksburg, seemingly prepared to rush up with the anticipated infantry assault.  The following day, positions on the north end of the river batteries came under fire of Federal sharpshooters.  Responding to that threat, traverses went up overnight to the side and rear of the four gun water battery.  Throughout May 20 and 21, Federal gunboats and mortar boats maintained fire on the batteries but with little effect.

Timed with army assaults on the lines, again the navy moved up to bombard the river batteries.  Higgins reported:

On the 22d, at 9 a.m., four iron-clads and one wooden gunboat engaged the lower batteries, and after an engagement of one hour and a half were repulsed. Two of the iron-clads were seriously damaged. This engagement was creditable To the First Louisiana Artillery, who, with ten guns, mostly of small caliber, contested successfully against thirty-two heavy guns of the enemy. Our casualties were only 2 wounded during the fight; one 10-inch columbiad and the 18-pounder rifled gun were temporarily disabled. The Blakely gun burst at the muzzle.

The siege had just began and three of Higgins’ best guns were on the disabled list.  All three were eventually returned to service.  The Blakely, soon obtaining the nickname “Widow Blakely” as it was the only weapon of that type in the lines, was repaired by cutting down the cracked muzzle.  The 18-pdr rifle was likely the famous “Whistling Dick,” and likewise returned to service.

On May 23 Higgins released eleven of his light field pieces to reinforce the landward defenses (and thus those guns appear on the table shown yesterday).  With pressing needs in the siege lines, later more of the guns and crews shifted to the landward side.  The two Brooke rifles burst during the siege.  For the rest of the siege, the remaining heavy guns worked against the gunboat threat and also fired counter-battery against Federal weapons on the Louisiana shore. (And I plan to examine some of the more interesting of those exchanges in line with 150th anniversaries, with this being a “setup” post in that regard.)

According to Higgins’ report, the last shots from the river batteries came at 5 p.m. on July 3.

(Higgins’ report comes from OR, Series I, Volume 24, Part II, Serial 37, pages 336-340.)