Mine Run

I can thump my chest today and report visiting portions of four major battlefields (and a couple more skirmish sites) in one day. Then again, living in Virginia, that’s like shooting fish in a barrel! I briefly visited the Upper Pontoon Bridge Site at Fredericksburg before heading to Chancellorsville to walk a section of trail I’d missed earlier. After some time spent on the Wilderness Battlefield, I closed out the day on the Mine Run battlefield to answer some questions left open from a visit last month.

I’ve heard Mine Run called the biggest battle that never was. Perhaps that is true. Following the bloodletting of the summer of 1863, Mine Run seems a small affair. In spite of over 130,000 total combatants, only about 1,300 casualties were recorded for both sides for the whole campaign (November 26 to December 2, 1863). As the closing actions in a long, hard year of campaigning, Mine Run was a fizzle rather than a bang.

Today the battlefield is difficult to understand just looking at the maps, and I would rate it among the most difficult to grasp even looking at the terrain in person. Several factors limit the modern visitor. Foremost, the battlefield is almost completely within private property. Most of the key areas cannot be seen up close without express permission, and even from a distance the ground is often screened by tree lines and modern buildings. Secondly, save a handful of state markers and two lonely National Parks Markers, no interpretive displays offer the great unwashed masses any indication there was a battle. In other words, you want to visit Mine Run, BYOB – Bring Your Own Books! This is strictly a tour for the intrepid Civil War enthusiast willing to stop and savor the field with topographical map in hand.

Everybody seems to love to “what if…” the Civil War. Personally I could live the rest of my days without another speculative account of what could have happened at Gettysburg. There’s just a finite number of events that could have occurred up there in Pennsylvania that really could have changed the course of events. On the other hand, Mine Run is fertile ground for such speculation:

• III Corps has that extra pontoon boat, and crosses on the morning of the 26th, placing a strong force on Lee’s flank. Odds are Lee doesn’t give battle and instead falls back to the North Anna. Now the “what if?” involves Grant starting the Overland Campaign there instead of on the Rappahannock.
• French is a bit more aggressive and pushes Prince instead of holding him back, thus breaking up Edward Johnson’s defense. With Confederate forces committed to blocking the AoP now, this would have precipitated a pitched battle, perhaps a “Wilderness” of sorts with widely separated columns. Even if a tactical stalemate, the repercussions of some 20,000 casualties would have been felt militarily and politically through the winter.
• Sykes arrives a little earlier with V Corps to reinforce the cavalry. Catches Heth’s division flat footed and drives drives them beyond Mine Run. Now Federals not only have turned the right, but are closer to Richmond than the ANV.
• Warren doesn’t come to the conclusion that the proposed attacks scheduled for the morning of the 29th were hopeless. Or perhaps Meade overrules him. He throws II Corps forward, and it is another Fredericksburg. Meade ended up on thin ice for backing down as it was, his position would be even more tenuous had he returned to the Rapidan with a command thus bloodied and nothing to show.
• Lee energizes his subordinates to attack the Federal right (which was weakened in preparation for Warren’s attack). With a little more intelligence on enemy dispositions, and that well known audacity, Mine Run could have been “Chancellorsville II” or perhaps worse. With the AoP trapped blow the Rapidan, a move on that flank might have pried lose the valuable hold on Germanna Ford.

I’ll stop before ending up further afield. But the point is Mine Run deserves more attention that receives. Perhaps some day portions of the battlefield will be preserved and used for something a bit more interesting than paint ball wars.

Civil War Engagements in Clarke County, Virginia

Clarke County, Virginia sits at the lower end of the Shenandoah Valley, tucked against the Blue Ridge, bordering West Virginia. During the Civil War, the county was traversed by both armies on several campaigns. It was also in the heart of Mosby’s Confederacy. The state Department of Historic Resources (and its predecessors) has placed six markers dedicated to Civil War activity (Battle of Berryville-J30, Berryville Wagon Train Raid-J1, Castleman’s Ferry Fight-T9, Crook and Early-T10, Lee’s Bivouac-J14, and Signal Station-B7). The Civil War Trails system offers a single interpretation, for the Battle of Cool Springs (July 18, 1864).

Predating both these marker and interpretive programs, in the 1890s, the J.E.B. Stuart Camp of Confederate Veterans marked ten locations in Clarke County considered worthy of mention. Simple granite markers were placed stating the name of the action, date, and participants. The marker stone for Cool Springs is typical:

The veterans clearly leaned toward sites of Southern victories. But in their defense, they only placed stones where the engagement site was properly documented. Either by design or accident, the ten markers covered events from the summer-fall of 1864, save one. The ten marked sites were (with links to HMDB entries):

Battle of Cool Springs, July 18, 1864, Early and Crook (battle also noted on the Castleman’s Ferry Fight state marker and the Civil War Trails marker).

Fight at Berry’s Ferry, July 19, 1864 Imboden and Crook.

Double Toll Gate Fight, August 11, 1864, Imboden and U.S. Cavalry.

Buck Marsh Fight, September 13, 1864 (actual date August 13), Mosby’s Attack on Sheridan’s Wagon Trains (action also noted on the Berryville Wagon Train Raid state marker).

Col. Morgan’s Lane, August 19, 1864, Mosby’s Attack on Custer’s House Burners, No Prisoners.

Battle of Berryville, September 3, 1864, Early and Sheridan (battle also noted on the Battle of Berryville State Marker).

Fight at Gold’s Farm, September 3, 1864, Mosby and 6th New York Cavalry.

Mt. Airy Fight, September 15, 1864, Mosby and U.S. Cavalry.

Vineyard Fight, December 16, 1864, Mosby and U.S. Cavalry.

Mt. Carmel Fight, February 19, 1865, Mosby and U.S. Cavalry.

Personally, I’ve located nine of the ten. I have visited the site of Berry’s Ferry on several occasions, with no luck finding the stone. The highway through that section (modern U.S. 50)  has shifted grade over time, and it may still stand off to the side somewhere. But pending a discovery or assistance from another visitor, I must list it as “missing” for now.

Of these, the Battle of Cool Springs was the bloodiest, with just over 800 casualties on both sides. The Battle of Berryville, preceding the Third Winchester, was the largest in terms of combatants involved. Most of the remainder involved Mosby’s Rangers and their operations. None of the sites are what I’d consider major battles, and finding mention of them in the history books is rare. Yet, I do have to feel gratitude towards those veterans who had the foresight to leave behind some physical indicator of these events. Otherwise, the knowledge of the locations, and possibly of the engagements themselves, may have been lost to history.

Ah, the Quarterly Antietam Trip!

One of the cycles I’ve fallen into after relocating to Northern Virginia involves trips to the big battlefields. It’s worked out that visits to Antietam, Gettysburg, Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania, and Manassas happen with some regularity. When I was based in the Trans-Mississippi or Department of Georgia, my visits to these large battlefields were almost breakneck pace. I might get a day at each site, so planning was critical. Often I’d rush through a stop without seeing all that honestly should be seen. Now that I am not under such time constraints, I can split out parts of the battlefields for detailed walks, taking what time is needed to really understand the ground, the people involved, and the battle.

This weekend was Antietam. At first, I feared the weather would limit the explorations. As we crested South Mountain on the Old National Road, there was a dusting of snow. Just enough to whiten the ground at the edges of the road, reminiscent of a cotton harvest season morning at points further south. Once down in the valley, the white stuff was absent and the morning just crisp enough to require gloves. This day my focus was on the morning phase of the battlefield, more the Federal advance than the Cornfield. This section of the field has always been a fuzzy area to my understanding of the battlefield. Everybody has read about the confused fighting around the North and East Woods and Cornfield. To me, when I read “confused fighting,” I take it one of several ways – the author doesn’t have space to account for the movements, the author hasn’t got a clue so he’s filling literary ellipses, or here’s an opportunity for an enterprising researcher to sort out the details!

Back in September last, I attended a NPS hike around the battlefield. Ranger Kieth Snyder guided us through the Cornfield. The focus was more on the Confederate unit movements, out of respect for time – after all we had a whole battlefield to cover and only had the day. (BTW, a podcast version of the tour is available at Civil War Traveler.) The tour experience had me thinking afterwards about how the Federal units were arrayed, the sequencing of their movements, and overall how the battle played out through those critical hours. While the Park Service has done wonders with projects to restore the battlefield, the East and North Woods still require some imagination on the part of the visitor. The rolling terrain in that sector seemed much more pronounced than in the center or southern portions of the battlefield. In my old Army days, we’d have called the ground here “washboard” and spoke of “defilade positions in the wadis” or such. Honestly, even without the woods, I found it hard to locate a key point offering good fields of fire for crew served weapons, i.e. artillery. Also looking at things with the old Scout platoon leader’s eyes, I thought it would be difficult to freely maneuver, again even without the historical tree lines and woods. Slowly it began to sink in. The fighting here wasn’t “confused” due to some authors omission or commission or lack of research. Heck the terrain alone is confusing enough, even before throwing in the battle effects! It’s hard enough with the full battery of modern aids and the benefit of 140 plus years of research to piece this together. I’d find it difficult writing an after action review to sort out the details, had I been a participant and lived through it all.

Other parts of the day were spent tracing the Federal advance back to Hitt Bridge and Pry Mill. Certainly worth the back-roads drive (or bike ride) for the extreme Civil War traveler. Before leaving, I made the obligatory pass through the Burnside Bridge and around the rest of the driving tour loop. As time permits, I’ve got two goals in mind. First, for the Historical Marker Database, documenting and entering the various War Department tablets, Park Service markers, and memorials. Second, to present an updated listing of the Artillery piece locations at the park. The one existing reference on line I know of, over at cwartillery.org, is useful but a bit dated.

Calling back to the Maryland Heights thread from weeks before, I snapped several photos from the battlefield looking generally in that direction. At the time I thought specifically of Kyd Douglas’ account of the 1864 invasion. He and several other officers took the time to view the old Antietam battlefield. Of course the whole time they were “under the glasses” of the Federal observers on Maryland Heights.

Maryland Heights, Part 8

After the detailed reports of 1863 the material in the Official Records tails off. While certainly other primary sources exist that detail the improvements on the Heights after July 1863, those are out of my reach at present. Suffice to say from the secondary sources, the two important improvements were the 100-pdr Parrott replacing the IX-in Dahlgren and the improvement of breastworks into the Interior and Exterior Forts.

What the Official Records to offer are hints at the impact or affect of fortifications upon the Heights on military operations. Throughout the fall of 1863 and into 1864, Federal dispatches indicate the contingency plan for operations should Harpers Ferry be threatened was to fall back on the Heights. Underscoring this strongly was General Halleck’s October 18, 1863 dispatch,

“Should the whole of Lee’s army attack Maryland Heights, the place must be held until Meade’s army comes to the rescue. It can be so held, and if the officers fail to do so they should be hung.” [O.R., Series I, Vol. XXIX/2, p. 352].

The following summer, the plan was indeed executed with the garrison holding the Heights during General Early’s raid on Washington. From the Federal perspective, it seems the value of the Heights declined as military operations moved further down the valley. In the fall of 1864, with Bolivar Heights well fortified and Confederate forces far afield, the main importance of the Heights was that of signal station.

From the Confederate perspective, the fortifications on the Heights factor in only the July 1864 operations. In his official report, Early simply stated

“After driving Sigel’s whole force of several thousand men to Maryland Heights and demonstrating against him, I moved on the 8th around his force through Boonsborough, Fox’s and Crampton’s Gaps, and entered Frederick City on the morning of the 9th, driving the enemy’s cavalry through the city.”[Report of Lieut. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, of operations July 8-14. including the battle of the Monocacy and operations against Washington, D.C., O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXVII/1, p. 347]

However, looking back through the recorded orders, Early seems to have some greater designs on Harpers Ferry, for on July 4 he called for General Breckinridge to cross at Boteler’s Ford and press the defenders on the Heights. However the efforts to reduce the garrison met with resistance from the heavy guns. From Captain Jed Hotchkiss’ appendix on the campaign, he notes the 100-pdr Parrott and guns from Fort Duncan hindering operations on Bolivar Heights. Later, in his report written on the 14th, Early cited the presence of the Maryland Heights’ garrison as one of several compelling his withdrawal from the Washington defenses.

General Robert E. Lee, responding to one of Early’s field reports on July 11 would write,

“Your letter of the 7th was received this morning. Your movements and arrangements appear to me to have been judicious, and I am glad you did not delay to storm the works at Maryland Heights. It was better to turn them and endeavor to draw the enemy from them.” [O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXVII/2, p. 595]

Taken in perspective, with a time consuming reduction of the town in September 1862 and Lee’s bypass of Harpers Ferry in June 1863, Lee seemed pleased his subordinate opted for the later course of action. Personally I wonder which Lee felt more concern about – the loss of time spent reducing the garrison or the loss of manpower in the process. Regardless, the presence of the 100-pdr Parrott, as noted by Hotchkiss, at least limited the Confederate activities at Harpers Ferry. I would further argue the presence of that gun and other heavy ordinance on Maryland Heights, prevented Early from using a more direct route to Washington.

Thus I’ll end the serial at this time with the question – if Early was a day late at Fort Stevens, was it because he spent a day taking the round about way through Washington County, Maryland in respect for the guns on Maryland Heights?

Maryland Heights, Part 7

As the dust settled from the Antietam Campaign, the defenses of Harpers Ferry, and specifically the fortification of Maryland Heights, received considerable attention. All involved pointed to the obvious conclusion that Maryland Heights deserved more attention than it received. In a survey submitted on October 17, 1862, Lieutenant C. B. Comstock suggested Maryland and Loudoun Heights “be occupied each by a line of stone block-houses or redoubts, a part of each of these lines to serve as one side of an entrenched camp for 3,000 men, the other sides of the camp to be strengthened by log block-houses, which would furnish in part quarters for the troops….” [OR, Series I, Volume XIX/2, page 441] Comstock added that the Maryland Heights heavy battery (presumably the Naval Battery) should be rebuilt into a redoubt. The survey also urged extensive fortification of Bolivar Heights with interlocking support from the high ground surrounding Harpers Ferry. Apparently Comstock’s recommendations, which echoed previous comments by other engineers, were acted upon for Maryland Heights, but Bolivar Heights continued to be ignored (and would be for the most part until mid-1864). Writing on March 16, 1863, Brigadier-General B. S. Roberts (garrison commander?) would imply in correspondence that the failure to fortify the Bolivar Heights left the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad unsecured. What I find interesting here is Roberts shifts the importance of Maryland Heights to that of deterring future Confederate invasions rather than defending the strategic point of Harpers Ferry or the railroad.

More lengthy was the review of the defenses of Harpers Ferry prepared for General John Barnard and forwarded on May 5, 1863. Attributed to Colonel W. F. Raynolds, the report provides the most detailed description of the fortifications up to that point. Raynolds identified the likely direction of attack from the North, as had occurred in the previous fall. As such the existing line of rifle pits was inadequate, without proper supporting artillery, obstructions to slow the enemy, or clear lines of site. The Stone Fort was drawn in detail with references to an existing gun platform and suggestions for better placements. A suggestion was made for “a half dozen disposable howitzers (mountain howitzers as good as anything probably),” for additional defense of the lines. The Colonel described the 30-pdr Battery as “well located, but it will be advantageous to have at least one gun at the higher point we examined.” (Thus we have the first reference to what would become the 100-pdr Battery.) The 24-pdr siege gun at the battery was mentioned as useless. Additionally he cited improper coverage of the magazines. The Naval Battery was dismissed as affording poor fields of fire other than over the town itself. Before leaving Maryland Heights, the Colonel mentioned the employment of additional 10- or 20-pdr Parrotts to supplement the existing weapons. The remainder of the report details Fort Duncan to the west of Maryland Heights. [OR, Series I, Volume XXV/2, pages 424-428.]

At the onset of the Gettysburg Campaign, a flurry of dispatches and telegrams attest to the confusion prior to and in the wake of the defeat at Second Winchester. The reaction by General Tyler was to withdraw from Harpers Ferry to the Heights. During that time Colonel Raynolds provided another description of the fortifications, and covered operations conducted during June 15-27 when he was assigned duty at Harpers Ferry. Little improvements are recorded with regard to Stone Fort and the rifle pits at the crest. Seven light field pieces were sited in the lines. He inventoried the 30-pdr Battery with six of the Parrott Rifles and two 24-pdr guns. One of these Parrotts was relocated to the Stone Fort. The armament tallied for the Naval Battery was two 100-pdrs Dahlgren guns , two 50-pdr Dahlgren guns and two 24-pdr guns. The timber from the crest of the Heights was cleared some 800 yards north of the Stone Fort back to the cliffs over the Potomac. Raynolds noted a 50-pdr Dahlgren removed from the Naval Battery placed about half way up the Heights on the west slope. Later he recorded one of the 100-pdr Dahlgrens was placed about 600 yards south of the Stone Fort (where the 100-pdr Battery was later located) and placed on a platform affording a 360 degree arc of fire. Raynolds seemed most pleased with the position of this gun noting,

“It can be used with effect against an enemy ascending either slope of the mountain in Pleasant Valley, on Loudoun or Bolivar Heights, or in Fort Duncan, and a single shot from it would render the stone fort untenable. It is the key to the position, and is rendered safe by the support it receives from the battery at the stone fort, the almost inaccessible slopes of Maryland Heights on the east and the guns distributed along the crest, and the rifle-pits which have been built to prevent an enemy ascending them.”

Other guns from the Naval Battery were relocated on another bluff west of the Sharpsburg Road. From the description, this seems to be the high ground above Lock 34, overlooking the Needles and Dam 3. To complete the overall works, timber within 1,500 yards of all the fortification lines was cut back. In closing, the Colonel adds,

The post was in a constant state of alarm, and daily under arms in line of battle, expecting an attack. Notwithstanding these hinderances, the works were sufficiently advanced to have made a good defense. As they progressed the spirits of the men revived, and, instead of gloom and despondency, hope and confidence prevailed, and I believe I am within the truth when I say that on June 27 the post would have resisted the attack of an army five times stronger than would have captured it on the 16th. [OR, Series I, Volume XXVII/2, pages 13-16, No. 379.--Report of Col. William F. Raynolds, Additional Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer Eighth Army Corps, of operations June 15-27]

In spite of what Raynolds felt, according the the summary of events, Maryland Heights were abandoned on June 30, to be reoccupied on July 7. There is no direct indication from official Confederate reports regarding their assessment of Harpers Ferry’s defenses. Clearly Lee made a deliberate decision not to assail the position and effectively neutralized the position by isolation.

The mention of 100-pdr and 50-pdr Dahlgren guns causes me to pause and revisit the question posed in part two of this serial. A IX-in Dahlgren (I prefer to use the Navy’s Roman numeral designation) fired a 90-lb solid shot. Often the Army would arbitrarily refer to the Navy weapons by the standard weight of shot designation, in this case probably rounding up to 100-pdr. On the other hand the 50-pdr is less easy to match. The weight of a standard 8-in Navy shell was around 50 pounds, and under the same logic the Army may be referring to a XIII-in Navy shell gun. A 50-pdr Rifled pattern attributed to Dahlgren existed, and just under 60 were cast starting in 1861. Tentatively, the identification should go to the rifled gun. In The Big Guns: Civil War Siege, Seacoast, and Naval Cannon, Edwin Olstead, Wayne E. Stark, and Spencer C. Tucker cite a report of registry number 16 as “Still on Maryland Heights, near Harpers Ferry, Sept. 25, 1862.” The caliber may not match with the reported 30-pdr Dahlgren in the Naval Battery plan, but a single number transcription error is plausible.

One side note, Colonel W. F. Raynolds seems to be William F. Raynolds who served before and after the war as a topographical engineer. His report of expeditions to the headwaters of the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers, while not directly Civil War related, is worth review.