Maryland Heights, Part 8

After the detailed reports of 1863 the material in the Official Records tails off. While certainly other primary sources exist that detail the improvements on the Heights after July 1863, those are out of my reach at present. Suffice to say from the secondary sources, the two important improvements were the 100-pdr Parrott replacing the IX-in Dahlgren and the improvement of breastworks into the Interior and Exterior Forts.

What the Official Records to offer are hints at the impact or affect of fortifications upon the Heights on military operations. Throughout the fall of 1863 and into 1864, Federal dispatches indicate the contingency plan for operations should Harpers Ferry be threatened was to fall back on the Heights. Underscoring this strongly was General Halleck’s October 18, 1863 dispatch,

“Should the whole of Lee’s army attack Maryland Heights, the place must be held until Meade’s army comes to the rescue. It can be so held, and if the officers fail to do so they should be hung.” [O.R., Series I, Vol. XXIX/2, p. 352].

The following summer, the plan was indeed executed with the garrison holding the Heights during General Early’s raid on Washington. From the Federal perspective, it seems the value of the Heights declined as military operations moved further down the valley. In the fall of 1864, with Bolivar Heights well fortified and Confederate forces far afield, the main importance of the Heights was that of signal station.

From the Confederate perspective, the fortifications on the Heights factor in only the July 1864 operations. In his official report, Early simply stated

“After driving Sigel’s whole force of several thousand men to Maryland Heights and demonstrating against him, I moved on the 8th around his force through Boonsborough, Fox’s and Crampton’s Gaps, and entered Frederick City on the morning of the 9th, driving the enemy’s cavalry through the city.”[Report of Lieut. Gen. Jubal A. Early, C. S. Army, of operations July 8-14. including the battle of the Monocacy and operations against Washington, D.C., O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXVII/1, p. 347]

However, looking back through the recorded orders, Early seems to have some greater designs on Harpers Ferry, for on July 4 he called for General Breckinridge to cross at Boteler’s Ford and press the defenders on the Heights. However the efforts to reduce the garrison met with resistance from the heavy guns. From Captain Jed Hotchkiss’ appendix on the campaign, he notes the 100-pdr Parrott and guns from Fort Duncan hindering operations on Bolivar Heights. Later, in his report written on the 14th, Early cited the presence of the Maryland Heights’ garrison as one of several compelling his withdrawal from the Washington defenses.

General Robert E. Lee, responding to one of Early’s field reports on July 11 would write,

“Your letter of the 7th was received this morning. Your movements and arrangements appear to me to have been judicious, and I am glad you did not delay to storm the works at Maryland Heights. It was better to turn them and endeavor to draw the enemy from them.” [O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXVII/2, p. 595]

Taken in perspective, with a time consuming reduction of the town in September 1862 and Lee’s bypass of Harpers Ferry in June 1863, Lee seemed pleased his subordinate opted for the later course of action. Personally I wonder which Lee felt more concern about – the loss of time spent reducing the garrison or the loss of manpower in the process. Regardless, the presence of the 100-pdr Parrott, as noted by Hotchkiss, at least limited the Confederate activities at Harpers Ferry. I would further argue the presence of that gun and other heavy ordinance on Maryland Heights, prevented Early from using a more direct route to Washington.

Thus I’ll end the serial at this time with the question – if Early was a day late at Fort Stevens, was it because he spent a day taking the round about way through Washington County, Maryland in respect for the guns on Maryland Heights?