Maryland Heights, Part 7
As the dust settled from the Antietam Campaign, the defenses of Harpers Ferry, and specifically the fortification of Maryland Heights, received considerable attention. All involved pointed to the obvious conclusion that Maryland Heights deserved more attention than it received. In a survey submitted on October 17, 1862, Lieutenant C. B. Comstock suggested Maryland and Loudoun Heights “be occupied each by a line of stone block-houses or redoubts, a part of each of these lines to serve as one side of an entrenched camp for 3,000 men, the other sides of the camp to be strengthened by log block-houses, which would furnish in part quarters for the troops….” [OR, Series I, Volume XIX/2, page 441] Comstock added that the Maryland Heights heavy battery (presumably the Naval Battery) should be rebuilt into a redoubt. The survey also urged extensive fortification of Bolivar Heights with interlocking support from the high ground surrounding Harpers Ferry. Apparently Comstock’s recommendations, which echoed previous comments by other engineers, were acted upon for Maryland Heights, but Bolivar Heights continued to be ignored (and would be for the most part until mid-1864). Writing on March 16, 1863, Brigadier-General B. S. Roberts (garrison commander?) would imply in correspondence that the failure to fortify the Bolivar Heights left the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad unsecured. What I find interesting here is Roberts shifts the importance of Maryland Heights to that of deterring future Confederate invasions rather than defending the strategic point of Harpers Ferry or the railroad.
More lengthy was the review of the defenses of Harpers Ferry prepared for General John Barnard and forwarded on May 5, 1863. Attributed to Colonel W. F. Raynolds, the report provides the most detailed description of the fortifications up to that point. Raynolds identified the likely direction of attack from the North, as had occurred in the previous fall. As such the existing line of rifle pits was inadequate, without proper supporting artillery, obstructions to slow the enemy, or clear lines of site. The Stone Fort was drawn in detail with references to an existing gun platform and suggestions for better placements. A suggestion was made for “a half dozen disposable howitzers (mountain howitzers as good as anything probably),” for additional defense of the lines. The Colonel described the 30-pdr Battery as “well located, but it will be advantageous to have at least one gun at the higher point we examined.” (Thus we have the first reference to what would become the 100-pdr Battery.) The 24-pdr siege gun at the battery was mentioned as useless. Additionally he cited improper coverage of the magazines. The Naval Battery was dismissed as affording poor fields of fire other than over the town itself. Before leaving Maryland Heights, the Colonel mentioned the employment of additional 10- or 20-pdr Parrotts to supplement the existing weapons. The remainder of the report details Fort Duncan to the west of Maryland Heights. [OR, Series I, Volume XXV/2, pages 424-428.]
At the onset of the Gettysburg Campaign, a flurry of dispatches and telegrams attest to the confusion prior to and in the wake of the defeat at Second Winchester. The reaction by General Tyler was to withdraw from Harpers Ferry to the Heights. During that time Colonel Raynolds provided another description of the fortifications, and covered operations conducted during June 15-27 when he was assigned duty at Harpers Ferry. Little improvements are recorded with regard to Stone Fort and the rifle pits at the crest. Seven light field pieces were sited in the lines. He inventoried the 30-pdr Battery with six of the Parrott Rifles and two 24-pdr guns. One of these Parrotts was relocated to the Stone Fort. The armament tallied for the Naval Battery was two 100-pdrs Dahlgren guns , two 50-pdr Dahlgren guns and two 24-pdr guns. The timber from the crest of the Heights was cleared some 800 yards north of the Stone Fort back to the cliffs over the Potomac. Raynolds noted a 50-pdr Dahlgren removed from the Naval Battery placed about half way up the Heights on the west slope. Later he recorded one of the 100-pdr Dahlgrens was placed about 600 yards south of the Stone Fort (where the 100-pdr Battery was later located) and placed on a platform affording a 360 degree arc of fire. Raynolds seemed most pleased with the position of this gun noting,
“It can be used with effect against an enemy ascending either slope of the mountain in Pleasant Valley, on Loudoun or Bolivar Heights, or in Fort Duncan, and a single shot from it would render the stone fort untenable. It is the key to the position, and is rendered safe by the support it receives from the battery at the stone fort, the almost inaccessible slopes of Maryland Heights on the east and the guns distributed along the crest, and the rifle-pits which have been built to prevent an enemy ascending them.”
Other guns from the Naval Battery were relocated on another bluff west of the Sharpsburg Road. From the description, this seems to be the high ground above Lock 34, overlooking the Needles and Dam 3. To complete the overall works, timber within 1,500 yards of all the fortification lines was cut back. In closing, the Colonel adds,
The post was in a constant state of alarm, and daily under arms in line of battle, expecting an attack. Notwithstanding these hinderances, the works were sufficiently advanced to have made a good defense. As they progressed the spirits of the men revived, and, instead of gloom and despondency, hope and confidence prevailed, and I believe I am within the truth when I say that on June 27 the post would have resisted the attack of an army five times stronger than would have captured it on the 16th. [OR, Series I, Volume XXVII/2, pages 13-16, No. 379.--Report of Col. William F. Raynolds, Additional Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer Eighth Army Corps, of operations June 15-27]
In spite of what Raynolds felt, according the the summary of events, Maryland Heights were abandoned on June 30, to be reoccupied on July 7. There is no direct indication from official Confederate reports regarding their assessment of Harpers Ferry’s defenses. Clearly Lee made a deliberate decision not to assail the position and effectively neutralized the position by isolation.
The mention of 100-pdr and 50-pdr Dahlgren guns causes me to pause and revisit the question posed in part two of this serial. A IX-in Dahlgren (I prefer to use the Navy’s Roman numeral designation) fired a 90-lb solid shot. Often the Army would arbitrarily refer to the Navy weapons by the standard weight of shot designation, in this case probably rounding up to 100-pdr. On the other hand the 50-pdr is less easy to match. The weight of a standard 8-in Navy shell was around 50 pounds, and under the same logic the Army may be referring to a XIII-in Navy shell gun. A 50-pdr Rifled pattern attributed to Dahlgren existed, and just under 60 were cast starting in 1861. Tentatively, the identification should go to the rifled gun. In The Big Guns: Civil War Siege, Seacoast, and Naval Cannon, Edwin Olstead, Wayne E. Stark, and Spencer C. Tucker cite a report of registry number 16 as “Still on Maryland Heights, near Harpers Ferry, Sept. 25, 1862.” The caliber may not match with the reported 30-pdr Dahlgren in the Naval Battery plan, but a single number transcription error is plausible.
One side note, Colonel W. F. Raynolds seems to be William F. Raynolds who served before and after the war as a topographical engineer. His report of expeditions to the headwaters of the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers, while not directly Civil War related, is worth review.
