A friend on Facebook passed along this article from the New York Times Disunion Blog:
The Union’s “Newfangled Gimcracks”
In late December 1861 Abraham Lincoln issued a directive that, had it been vigorously pursued, might have brought the Civil War to a rapid end: An order, via Gen. James Ripley, the Army’s ordnance chief, for 10,000 Spencer repeating rifles. Because Ripley resisted the order for months and did nothing to help put the rifles into volume production, initial deliveries didn’t start until about a year and a half after Lincoln first tested the rifle. Consequently, Union soldiers had to fight with less efficient weapons, handicapping them and greatly lengthening the bloody conflict. …. Read more.
I figure most readers have heard this line a few times before. Certainly one of the “what if’s” that are pushed around in light conversation. As the article points out, several inventors had advanced small arms ready for use at the start of the war, with Spencer, Henry, Sharps, and Burnside mentioned. But none were in wide scale use or ready for mass production. But simply vilifying General Ripley (or conversely General Gorgas on the other side) for pushing back on the Spencers is overlooking the broader picture.
A similar situation arose with artillery at the start of the war. I’ve chronicled the Rodman story, but recall from the latest post that production of the type started slowly and only kicked in halfway through the war. While everyone knew rifled cannon were the “next big thing” only a handful were around in April 1861. And none were in regular production. Then there were the five, the somewhat conservative from a weapons standpoint, Napoleon light 12-pdr then in service. Of the “big three” field artillery weapons – the Ordnance Rifle, the Parrott, the Napoleon – wide-scale production didn’t start until the second half of 1861. And I’d argue none of those “big three” offered a transformative improvement over the decades old 6-pdr. After all they still loaded the same way through the muzzle!
Like the small arms, several inventors offered breechloading cannons. Several domestic sources breechloaders reached trials during the war, but by far the most famous of the type were English Whitworths. That weapon offered a transformative improvement with its long range and accuracy.
2.75 inch Whitworth at Gettysburg
Yet Charles Knap would relate in testimony to Congress, “It is a perfect thing to show the state of the art, but for actual service, in my opinion, it is not worth carrying into the field.” The knocks against the Whitworth included troublesome breech mechanism with poor sealing, unique ammunition, heavy carriage, and light projectile payload. But the most damning problem lay with the “people” side – drill and acceptance. That fine English breechloader required special drill for the crew. Training times were easily triple that of the muzzle loaders, in part due to the weapon’s rarity but also because of complexity of the weapon. Furthermore, to some seasoned, veteran artilleryman of 1861 that breechloading mechanism was just… wrong.
Be it a repeater or breechloading cannon, the ordnance officers cited concerns about serviceability and reliability. The new weapons featured moving parts… many moving parts… compared to the simple muzzle loaders. Beyond the crew drills mentioned above, these new weapons required some changes to doctrine in order to take advantage of the capabilities. And doctrine changes are not simply seasonal rotations!
Military history is full of examples where a technologically advanced weapon cannot be introduced due to practical considerations. Indeed often “yesterday’s” weapon sees service well beyond its obsolescence. Consider the production and service longevity of weapons like the Curtiss P-40 or the M4 Sherman. In both cases, better weapons existed while production continued full scale. Authorities feared a break in deliveries incurred if new designs entered production. Better to have large stocks of a weapon the troops know how to use than tying fortunes to slowly increasing quantities of untried and unfamiliar weapons, even if technically more advanced.
On the other side of the scale, there are many examples of weapons introduced to combat too early. While today considered a battleworthy weapon, the early variants of the AR-15/M-16 fared poorly (tragically) in Vietnam. Many of the light machine guns introduced in World War I failed in the trenches.
But while we chide the Ordnance Department for being slow to adopt those “newfangled gimracks,” keep in mind the weapons and improvement those officers did advance – such as the minie ball and Boreman fuse. While neither changed the basic weapon system, arguably both transformed the battlefield. So let’s not be so hasty to complain about Ripley or Gorgas!
